

this company's relationship with I. G. Farben over a 13-year period had stifled synthetic rubber production in America and had put control over that vital defense product in the hands of the German Government. In addition, Thurman Arnold, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, testified that as late as February and March 1941, Jersey Standard had sold gasoline and enabled Axis airlines operating out of South America to defeat the British blockade. Indignation over these disclosures caused the then Senator Harry S. Truman to remark "I think this approaches treason."¹

An aroused public after these hearings required Jersey Standard to relieve the principal officer involved from his duties in the company.

Another example of oil industry officials' failure to act responsibly is found in the remarks of Mr. P. C. Spencer, president of the Sinclair Oil Corp., at a meeting of the National Petroleum Council on September 29, 1953. On that occasion Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, had requested the Secretary of Interior, Douglas McKay, to explore with the oil industry construction of standby pipeline facilities that would be required in the event of an emergency. In his request, Mr. Flemming noted " * * * it is apparent that timely provisions of this additional capacity could not be achieved, if construction were to be deferred until after the emergency arose."²

Mr. Flemming's request was presented to the National Petroleum Council, whereupon Mr. Spencer opposed the construction of standby pipeline facilities. He stated:

"Surpluses not properly handled or controlled are an anathema, because they have a way of destroying price structures, they have a way of breaking down progress, and they can destroy an industry. It certainly

would be a tragedy, gentlemen, to attempt to protect our national security by building up standby facilities which in the end make the industry so feeble it could not do the job in any event.

"I am talking particularly here about standby pipeline facilities. It applies with equal force to standby tanker facilities, standby refining facilities, standby storage, and, if you please, standby production. It applies all through the line."³

As to his solution for the maintenance of a proper mobilization base, Mr. Spencer said:

"I am a rank amateur as a strategist in war or logistics, but it seems to me, perhaps somebody told me, that the greatest cushion in the world for petroleum reserves is in the elasticity of and the flexibility of civilian demand. Take it away from them, if we are going to have a war. * * * We have tried to make war too comfortable and too convenient for civilians. * * * War should be tough. We should cut back the civilian demand. I think that is the greatest reserve cushion we have."⁴

It is submitted that these statements hardly reflect the requisite degree of corporate responsibility for the problems of the American public.

Currently, the Senate is again investigating the petroleum industry in connection with the actions the industry has taken to resolve the crisis presented by closure of the Suez Canal. In this instance, it appears that the oil industry has again acted with a view toward corporate profits rather than the welfare of the American public. At a time when stocks of gasoline were at alltime highs, the industry used the Suez crisis as an excuse to impose additional price increases. As of February 8, 1957, the industry had nearly 200 million barrels of gasoline in stocks. This was an increase of nearly 4 million barrels over the preceding week and 12 million barrels over the stocks in storage a year ago. It now develops that the crisis presented by the Suez shutdown was not as extensive as originally feared. In fact, there is a widespread belief that the public relations cam-

paign surrounding the seriousness of the crisis were based in large part upon recommendations made by the major oil companies in order to justify an increase in crude petroleum prices.

In conclusion, I think you will all agree that the problems presented by the existing concentration in American industry are most intricate.

Let no one doubt that benefits from our existing corporate structure are substantial. I believe it is fair to say that the United States as a community has profited mightily in the development of our current corporate economic structure. The system of large scale distribution and mass production made possible by these large institutions can fairly claim the credit for changing the face of our country for the better. As a result, poverty, in the sense it is understood elsewhere in the world, in America has been reduced to minimal proportions.

The most dramatic social revolution in history has occurred through natural growth and without the bitter divisions that have darkened the political life of other nations. It gave the lie to Karl Marx.

All to the good, but the good must not be diminished. Unless the powers that have been concentrated in corporate management are exercised prudently and with vision, it is apparent that this concentration will force the Government to take action and direct the complex itself, and freedom will be the price we pay.

I am convinced that it is essential to maintain in full vigor enforcement of the anti-trust laws to cope with these problems even though in some respects results have not been satisfactory. Change must be made slowly. The problem presented by existing concentrates are of such gravity that precipitous action by the Government on any particular phase would be unwise. Tinkering with the economic process without full comprehension of the results likely to ensue, could create more problems than are solved.

We must hope the determination of the type of economic life of and the nature of political institutions which are to be enjoyed by the American people in the future, rests in the hands of those who understand freedom best.

SENATE

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1957

Rev. R. L. Clem, rector of St. John's Military School, Salina, Kans., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, our Heavenly Father, Thou who hast so richly blessed this Nation, we thank Thee for the heritage that is ours. Grant that Thy people everywhere may have the grace to understand what is Thy will, and the strength and determination to fulfill Thy purpose for us. Lift us, we beseech Thee, above all selfishness. Keep our hearts in confident trust. Make us reverent in the use of our freedom, and deepen within us our faith and righteousness.

We invoke Thy blessing upon this body here assembled, that they may rise to high levels of devotion and service to the benefit of all people and to Thy honor and glory. This we pray in Christ's name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, and by unanimous consent, the Journal

of the proceedings of Monday, February 25, 1957, was approved, and its reading was dispensed with.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States submitting a nomination was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

As in executive session, The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting the nomination of Olin Hatfield Chilson, of Colorado, to be Under Secretary of the Interior, which was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Gore	Morton
Allott	Green	Mundt
Anderson	Hayden	Murray
Barrett	Hennings	Neely
Beall	Hickenlooper	Neuberger
Bennett	Hill	O'Mahoney
Bible	Holland	Pastore
Blakley	Hruska	Payne
Bricker	Humphrey	Potter
Bush	Ives	Purtell
Butler	Jackson	Revercomb
Byrd	Javits	Robertson
Capehart	Jenner	Russell
Carlson	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Carroll	Johnston, S. C.	Schoeppel
Case, N. J.	Kefauver	Scott
Case, S. Dak.	Kennedy	Smathers
Chavez	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Church	Knowland	Smith, N. J.
Clark	Kuchel	Sparkman
Cooper	Lausche	Stennis
Cotton	Long	Symington
Dirksen	Magnuson	Talmadge
Douglas	Malone	Thurmond
Dworshak	Mansfield	Thye
Eastland	Martin, Iowa	Watkins
Ellender	McCarthy	Wiley
Ervin	McClellan	Williams
Flanders	McNamara	Young
Frear	Monroney	
Goldwater	Morse	

Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] is absent on official business.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER] are absent because of illness.

The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MARTIN] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. A quorum is present.

PROPOSED UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT TO
LIMIT DEBATE

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I have asked for a quorum call in order that all Senators might be on notice with respect to the proposed unanimous-consent agreement which I suggested yesterday, and which appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on page 2495.

I ask that the clerk read the agreement, and I now propose it, on behalf of the distinguished minority leader [Mr. KNOWLAND] and myself.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the clerk will read.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Ordered, That, effective on Thursday, February 28, 1957, at the conclusion of routine morning business, during the further consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence, debate on any amendment, motion, or appeal, except a motion to lay on the table, shall be limited to 60 minutes, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of any such amendment or motion and the majority leader: *Provided*, That in the event the majority leader is in favor of any such amendment or motion, the time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by the minority leader or some Senator designated by him: *Provided further*, That no amendment that is not germane to the provisions of the said joint resolution shall be received.

Ordered further, That if and when the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, whether or not amended, is agreed to, the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services jointly shall be deemed to be discharged from the further consideration of House Joint Resolution 117, the companion House measure; that said joint resolution shall be deemed to be amended by striking out all after the resolving clause and in lieu thereof inserting the text of Senate Joint Resolution 19 as amended; and that the amendment to the said House joint resolution shall be deemed to have been engrossed and the joint resolution shall then be read the third time.

Ordered further, That on the question of the final passage of the said joint resolution debate shall be limited to 8 hours, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the majority and minority leaders: *Provided*, That the said leaders or either of them, may, from the time under their control on the passage of the joint resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any amendment, motion, or appeal.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Texas?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, there are three things which I should like to point out for the information of the Senate.

First, if this agreement should be entered into, it would not become effective until Thursday.

Second, 1 hour is provided for each amendment, 30 minutes to a side.

Third, a total of 8 hours is provided on the joint resolution. Any of that time can be yielded on amendments if Senators so desire.

I hope every Member of the Senate will give this proposal serious consideration. I am not claiming it is perfect. It is open to adjustments if Senators feel that it is necessary to increase the time or reduce the time. I hope we may be able to remain in session a little later, work a little longer, and conduct our business a little more efficiently, so that perhaps we may reach a vote this week.

If we do not get a unanimous consent agreement, and if we are unable to reach a vote through the normal processes, it may be necessary to have a Saturday session. I do not like to ask Senators to attend a session of the Senate on Saturday, when they have so much work in their offices and so many other duties to attend to; but this is an important matter. It has been before the Senate for a substantial length of time. Senators have been accorded great opportunity to express themselves.

The Senate will remain in session as late as Senators may desire this evening, tomorrow evening, and the remainder of the week.

I appeal to my colleagues seriously to consider the suggestions which the leaders have made. If they feel that they cannot go along with us at this time, I hope they will make some constructive alternative suggestions.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Texas?

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. MALONE. I have listened very carefully to the debate during the past week. It seems to me that the debate has been very spirited. Many Senators are beginning to come out from behind the brush.

I was very much interested in listening to the speech yesterday by the able junior Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE].

I believe that further debate is necessary. I myself have awaited my turn. As I recall, I told the majority leader that I would like to speak on Thursday. It is not important when. However, I think it is unwise to limit debate at this time, when it seems to me we are just beginning to get some of the answers. I object.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. The Senator from Texas is always eager to accommodate his friend from Nevada. I wonder whether he would be willing to withhold his objection for the time being so that perhaps we may reach some modifications in the proposed unanimous-consent agreement which would suit his convenience and in that way permit us to obtain an agreement; or does the Senator feel that we should not enter into any agreement at this time?

Mr. MALONE. I think it is a very laudable ambition of the distinguished

majority leader, who has always shown himself cooperative with all Members of the Senate, on both sides of the aisle on every subject; however, at this time I would have to object.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE
BUSINESS

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, under the rule, there will be the usual morning hour for the transaction of the usual routine business. I ask unanimous consent that statements in connection therewith be limited to 3 minutes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, may I have the question stated?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield, Mr. President, and I ask unanimous consent that the time I yield to the Senator from Oregon not be charged to my 3 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROPOSED UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I assume the Senator from Oregon wishes to speak on the proposed unanimous-consent agreement.

Mr. MORSE. I will accommodate myself to even less than 3 minutes. However, I believe, in view of the fact that the majority leader, on behalf of himself and the minority leader, has raised a procedural matter in connection with the unanimous-consent agreement, it may be well that I speak on that subject now. I may say that other Senators also hold the point of view expressed by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE].

I think it might be well to get it out of our system at this time, and therefore, I should like to make some observations on the procedural point raised by the majority leader, if I may be permitted to do so.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I have no desire to foreclose any discussion of the subject. I have some statements I should like to make under the 3-minute rule. I ask unanimous consent, therefore, that I may yield to the Senator for not to exceed 3 minutes.

Mr. MORSE. I will not take 3 minutes.

I am glad the Senator from Nevada objected, because I would have been one of the other Senators who would have objected if he had not done so. The Senator from Nevada and I are not alone in taking this position. There are a considerable number of us who feel that debate on this subject should not be limited. However, I wish to address myself to the whole matter of unanimous-consent agreements to limit debate in the Senate.

I have been making a study of the subject. I wish to say most respectfully that I believe we are moving too far away from the regular order of business in the Senate. I believe we have gone too

far already, as a matter of general practice, in not transacting business in the Senate without unanimous-consent agreements limiting debate and fixing time for voting. I believe it is a very bad procedural practice, and it ought to be brought to an end, not only with respect to the pending joint resolution, but with respect to all other items of business; and I intend to do that in this session of Congress. That should be the procedure followed, except when it is absolutely necessary to limit debate.

I believe that the place for Senators to be is in the Senate Chamber listening to debate. Each one of us knows what happens when we accept a unanimous-consent agreement to limit debate and to vote at a fixed time. Senators go about their business, instead of attending to the business on the floor of the Senate. I do not think that is in keeping with the functions of this body. The whole practice of transacting business, by and large, primarily by way of unanimous-consent agreements is bad practice, and I am not going to support it in this session of Congress. I am particularly not going to support it with respect to the pending joint resolution. I think much debate still needs to be had on it. All one need do is to watch one's mail to find out what is happening to American public opinion as more and more people comprehend what is involved in this very dangerous resolution proposed by the Eisenhower administration, so far as the Middle East foreign policy is concerned.

I happen to believe that no resolution on the Middle East policy ought to be adopted until some of the pending disputes in the Middle East, which threaten peace in the Middle East, are resolved.

Furthermore, as the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE] pointed out yesterday, we ought to know what the economic program of this administration is with respect to specific projects that are going to be supported by the money for which the President is asking. We should have full debate on the whole question.

The regular rules of the Senate take care of the situation. If no Senator is prepared to discuss the pending question, or wants to discuss it, the discussion is stopped, and the Senate votes. What is wrong with that?

So far as the majority leader's suggestion is concerned that we sit longer hours, I can only say that in this delightful brotherhood we enjoy each other's company. I do not mind spending evenings with my colleagues, and I assume that is the fraternal spirit that moves my colleagues. Therefore I have no objection to spending evenings and even Saturdays in the Senate. That suggestion does not disturb me.

What disturbs me, Mr. President, is that we are creating a pattern by which the business of the Senate is coming to be transacted almost entirely or certainly in many instances by unanimous-consent agreements limiting debate. I do not believe that is in keeping with the true parliamentary functions of the Senate. Therefore, as a matter of policy, Mr. President, I am against it; and in this

session of the Senate I will not give unanimous consent to limit the debate, except on very rare occasions.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I believe my colleagues are on notice that it is impossible to obtain a unanimous-consent agreement at this stage of the game, and perhaps even later, so far as the pending resolution is concerned.

I should like to point out to all my colleagues, however, that when debate ceases, the joint resolution will be open to amendment; the Chair will put the question, and, unless Senators are here to express themselves, as they were not here last week, a vote may be taken on this very important measure.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Morning business is now in order.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT ENTITLED "RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT ACTION REPORT"

A letter from the Director, Legislative Liaison, Department of the Air Force, Washington, D. C., transmitting, pursuant to law, a confidential report of that Department entitled "Research and Development Procurement Action Report," covering the period from July 1, 1956, to December 31, 1956 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

PROPOSED CONSTITUTION OF ALASKA

A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior transmitting an original copy of the proposed Constitution of Alaska (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

AMENDMENT OF FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938

A letter from the Secretary of the Navy, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, to restrict its application in certain overseas areas, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDENT pro tempore:

Two resolutions of the Senate of the State of Pennsylvania; to the Committee on Finance:

"The Social Security Act has been extended so as to provide benefits for totally disabled persons who are over the age of 50 years.

"The law as written is difficult to interpret and administer and the few persons who come within its general scope are unsuccessful in obtaining benefits.

"The humanitarianism of the law cannot be questioned and if practicable and possible, should be clarified and made less stringent so that worthy totally disabled persons over 50 years of age can obtain benefits it affords: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the Senate of Pennsylvania memorialize Congress to clarify the existing provisions and further, to relax the strict requirements of the Federal social security law that relates to eligibility for benefits for totally disabled persons over the age of 50 years; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and to each Senator and Member of the House of Representatives from Pennsylvania in the Congress of the United States.

"I certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of a resolution introduced by Senators W. J. Lane, James S. Berger, and John H. Dent and adopted by the Senate of Pennsylvania the 12th day of February, 1957.

"A. H. LETZLER,

"Secretary, Senate of Pennsylvania."

"The impending cessation of operations of the Vesta Coal Mine, a subsidiary of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., in the borough of California, in Washington County, Pa., will rapidly increase unemployment in surrounding communities located in Washington, Greene, and Fayette Counties.

"Unemployment and consequent hardship in these three counties is of vital concern to the people of this entire Commonwealth. The economic dislocation of any large area within this Commonwealth has its repercussions throughout the entire State, and affects the economic well-being of the entire State as well as arousing the humanitarian instincts and sympathetic concern for fellow Pennsylvanians in their hour of need and duress. Economic need and want vitally effects not only adults, but many helpless children who will feel the want of proper food, clothing, housing, and medical facilities, and should the economic dislocation continue for a long period of time, the want of proper educational facilities through lack of teachers and buildings.

"Government should be concerned with helping areas with serious economic difficulties through aiding business and any type of productive economic enterprise to locate in the suffering areas.

"Washington, Greene, and Fayette Counties have a large, skillful, and willing labor force which has proven its desire in the past to produce the essential products of our modern economy. The tax structures in these three counties are favorable to business, and many industrial sites are available to manufacturing enterprises and other business activities which care to locate in communities where the public and its leadership will lend the utmost cooperation in establishing an atmosphere favorable to the establishment and growth of business: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the Senate of Pennsylvania memorialize the Congress of the United States to make a thorough study of the possibility of locating Government subsidized industries in Washington, Greene, and Fayette Counties, and to take into consideration the huge labor pools available, as well as the large number of available industrial sites and favorable tax structures existing in these three counties; and be it further

"Resolved That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the presiding officers of each House of the Congress of the United States and to each Senator and Representative from Pennsylvania in the Congress of the United States.

"I certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of a resolution introduced by Senators W. J. Lane, Thomas J. Kalman, Rowland B. Mahany, Frank Kopriver, Jr., Joseph M. Barr, and John H. Dent, and adopted by the Senate of Pennsylvania the 18th day of February 1957.

"A. H. LETZLER,

"Secretary, Senate of Pennsylvania."

A letter in the nature of a petition from the junior class of the Morganza, La., High School, relating to portions of Washington's Farewell Address; ordered to lie on the table.

RESOLUTION OF TEXAS STATE SENATE

Mr. BLAKLEY. Mr. President, on behalf of my distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from Texas and majority leader [Mr. JOHNSON], and myself, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD and appropriately referred, a resolution adopted by the Senate of the State of Texas.

This resolution urges the President of the United States to take immediate steps to limit the importation of foreign oil to the 1954 percentage of the domestic market, as recommended by the President's own advisory committee.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Finance, and, under the rule, ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Senate Resolution 126

Whereas the President of the United States has called upon oil producers and proration boards to consider where our long-term interests are with reference to current oil production, thereby implying some failure on the part of such producers or State regulatory boards to consider the public interest in their actions; and

Whereas the Railroad Commission of Texas is required by the laws of this State to promote sound conservation practices and prevent waste of irreplaceable natural resources; and

Whereas the inability of Texas to produce and transport more oil without waste has resulted from the continued and constantly increasing excessive importing of foreign oil into this country; and

Whereas the oil lift to Europe can succeed if members of the Middle East Emergency Committee, made up of international companies given Federal antitrust immunity, were required to (1) divert their excessive imports to Europe, (2) reduce refinery runs to free crude oil for export, or (3) change their refinery yields to produce needed fuel oils; and

Whereas the National Congress has authorized the President and the executive department by the Trade Agreements Act of 1955 to limit foreign oil to its 1954 percentage of the domestic market; and

Whereas the executive department has failed to take any positive action to secure such limitation, allowing such imports to rise from 16.6 percent in 1954 to over 20 percent at the present time, thus curtailing the ability of Texas producers to produce and market, finance new discoveries, or transport new domestic supplies of oil from the interior to the seaboard; and

Whereas over 1 million barrels per day of potential Texas production cannot be transported to the gulf coast due to lack of transportation resulting from excessive importing, not only limiting the amount of oil available for Europe but endangering the future national security: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the State of Texas, That the President of the United States be urged to take immediate steps to limit imports of foreign oil to their 1954 percentage of the domestic market as authorized by the Congress and required for the security of the United States; and be it further

Resolved, That the secretary of the senate is directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President of the United States and to each Member of Congress from Texas.

BEN RAMSEY,
President of the Senate.

I hereby certify that the above resolution was adopted by the senate on February 13, 1957.

CHARLES SCHNABEL,
Secretary of the Senate.

INCREASE IN OIL PRICES— RESOLUTION

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I present a resolution from the Shevlin Copley Farmers Union Local, of Bagley, Minn., opposing recent increases in oil prices.

I ask unanimous consent that the resolution may be printed in the RECORD, and appropriately referred.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEBRUARY 20, 1957.

Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
Washington, D. C.:

Whereas there is an investigation being conducted in regard to the raise in the price of gas and fuel oil to consumers in the United States; and

Whereas we can see no reason for a raise in price just because oil is being exported in huge quantities, and as we farmers are taking less and less for what we have to market; and

Whereas the big oil companies apparently influence to a great extent the doings of the Congress of the United States: Therefore be it

Resolved, That we, the members of the Shevlin Copley Farmers Union Local No. 341, go on record as opposed to the recent raise in price and any further raise under present conditions in the price of gasoline and fuel oil or like commodities.

MRS. OSCAR KVAND, Secretary.

BROADER COVERAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION—PETITION

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I have just received a letter from Local 337 of the United Garment Workers of America, of New Ulm, Minn., embodying a petition concerning broader coverage of unemployment compensation.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter may be printed in the RECORD, and appropriately referred.

There being no objection, the letter was referred to the Committee on Finance, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED GARMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA,
LOCAL NO. 337,
New Ulm, Minn., February 18, 1957.

Senator HUBERT HUMPHREY,
State Capitol Building,
St. Paul, Minn.

DEAR SENATOR: We, of Local 337, Garment Workers of America, are for increased benefits in unemployment compensation. We believe there should be broadened coverage. We favor the elimination of unfair disqualifications.

Gratefully yours,

LEONA AUSTAD,
Recording Secretary.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

As in executive session,
The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

C. Douglas Dillon, of New Jersey, to be a Deputy Under Secretary of State, vice Herbert V. Prochnow;

G. Frederick Reinhardt, of California, to be Counselor of the Department of State, vice Douglas MacArthur 2d; and

Walter K. Schwinn, of Connecticut, and sundry other persons, for appointment and promotion in the Foreign Service.

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

Hyde Gillette, of Illinois; to be an Assistant Postmaster General, vice Albert J. Robertson;

John M. McKibbin, of Pennsylvania, to be an Assistant Postmaster General, vice Norman R. Abrams; and

Sixty-two postmasters.

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. KNOWLAND:

S. 1370. A bill for the relief of Wanda Wawrzyczek; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PURTELL:

S. 1371. A bill for the relief of Carmelo Vinci; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 1372. A bill to waive any claims of the United States for the repayment of loans made by the Department of State to Harry H. Thomas and Jeanne A. Thomas; and

S. 1373. A bill for the relief of Noel Kaiser; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DOUGLAS:

S. 1374. A bill for the relief of Marie Frittmann; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SCHOEPEL (by request):

S. 1375. A bill for the relief of Sheldon J. Coffman; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BEALL:

S. 1376. A bill for the relief of Chong You How (also known as Edward Charles Yee), his wife, Eng Lai Fong, and his child, Chong Yim Keung; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. COOPER (for himself and Mr. MORTON):

S. 1377. A bill to remove inequities created by, and to avoid discrimination resulting from, administrative practices and enforcement of the Civil Service Retirement Act of 1930, as amended; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. LONG (for himself and Mr. ELLENDER):

S. 1378. A bill to provide for modification of the existing project for Chefuncte River and Bogue Falia, La.; and

S. 1379. A bill to modify and extend the project for Lake Pontchartrain, La.; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. MAGNUSON (by request):

S. 1380. A bill to authorize the imposition of civil penalties for violation of the security provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and for other purposes;

S. 1381. A bill to amend section 402 (c) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, to provide more definite standards for determining who is entitled to exemption from part IV of that act as an association of shippers or a shippers' agent;

S. 1382. A bill to amend section 409 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended;

S. 1383. A bill to amend section 410 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, to require freight forwarders to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity;

S. 1384. A bill to revise the definition of contract carrier by motor vehicle as set forth in section 203 (a) (15) of the Interstate Commerce Act, and for other purposes;

S. 1385. A bill to amend section 11 of the Clayton Antitrust Act to extend the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission thereunder to contract carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act; and

S. 1386. A bill to authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe rules, standards, and instructions for the installation, inspection, maintenance, and repair of

power or train brakes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

(See the remarks of Mr. MAGNUSON when he introduced the above bills, which appear under separate headings.)

By Mr. CASE of South Dakota:

S. 1387. A bill for the relief of Rebecca Jean Lundy (Helen Choy); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MAGNUSON:

S. 1388. A bill to allow credit or refund of gift tax erroneously paid by reason of treating nontaxable divisions of community property as gifts; and

S. 1389. A bill relating to the income-tax basis, in the hands of a surviving spouse, of certain property previously held as community property; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 1390. A bill for the relief of Roberto Mario Bettinzoli; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MAGNUSON (for himself and Mr. JACKSON):

S. 1391. A bill to repeal the act of February 18, 1896, as amended; to the Committee on Armed Services.

S. 1392. A bill to provide for increasing the storage capacity of the Bumping Lake Reservoir, Yakima River Basin, Wash.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mrs. SMITH of Maine (for herself, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. AIKEN, Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. BARRETT, Mr. BRIDGES, Mr. BUSH, Mr. CHAVEZ, Mr. DWORSHAK, Mr. IVES, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. MORSE, Mr. NEUBERGER, and Mr. YOUNG):

S. 1393. A bill to authorize the National Potato Grade Labeling Act, which provides quality requirements for, and the inspection, certification, and labeling of Irish potatoes; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

(See the remarks of Mrs. SMITH of Maine when she introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. CARLSON (for himself and Mr. BENNETT):

S. 1394. A bill to provide for the discontinuance of the Postal Savings System established by the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 814), as amended, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

(See the remarks of Mr. CARLSON when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina:

S. 1395. A bill to amend section 9 (a) of the Civil Service Retirement Act, relating to computation of annuities; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. BARRETT (for himself and Mr. O'MAHONEY):

S. 1396. A bill to amend section 6 of the act approved July 10, 1890 (26 Stat. 222), relating to the admission into the Union of the State of Wyoming by providing for the use of public lands granted to said State for the purpose of construction, reconstruction, repair, renovation, furnishing, equipment, or other permanent improvement of public buildings at the capital of said State; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. PURTELL:

S. 1397. A bill for the relief of Angeline Mastro Mone (Angelina Mastrolanni); and S. 1398. A bill for the relief of Anna M. Spinelli; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ALLOTT:

S. 1399. A bill for the relief of Allart Dirk Haverkamp; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HUMPHREY:

S. 1400. A bill authorizing the construction of local flood-protection works on the Mississippi River at St. Paul and South St. Paul, Minn.; to the Committee on Public Works.

(See the remarks of Mr. HUMPHREY when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

PRINTING AS A SENATE DOCUMENT STUDY ENTITLED "THE RIGHT TO BUY AND ITS DENIAL TO SMALL BUSINESS"

Mr. SPARKMAN submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 105), which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

Resolved, That there be printed as a Senate document a study on "The Right To Buy and Its Denial to Small Business," prepared for the Senate Select Committee on Small Business by Dr. Vernon E. Mund; and that 4,000 additional copies be printed for the use of the committee.

PRINTING OF ADDITIONAL COPIES OF COMMITTEE PRINT ENTITLED "TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSI- NESS"

Mr. SPARKMAN submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 106), which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

Resolved, That there be printed for the use of the Select Committee on Small Business of the Senate 6,000 additional copies of the Committee Print entitled "Tax Guide for Small Business" prepared during the 84th Congress, 2d session.

CIVIL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF SECURITY PROVISIONS OF CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, by request, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to authorize the imposition of civil penalties for violation of the security provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and for other purposes. I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Acting Secretary of Commerce, transmitting this proposed legislation, may be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 1380) to authorize the imposition of civil penalties for violation of the security provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. MAGNUSON, by request, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

The letter presented by Mr. MAGNUSON is as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
Washington, D. C., February 18, 1957.
Hon. RICHARD M. NIXON,
President of the Senate,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is requested that the enclosed draft of a bill be introduced in the Senate at your convenience. The purpose of the proposal is: "To authorize the imposition of civil penalties for violation of the security provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and for other purposes."

Following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, legislation was enacted authorizing the Secretary of Commerce, upon the direction of the President, to exercise control of the flight of aircraft over certain areas for

national security purposes. (64 Stat. 825; title XII, Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended; 49 U. S. C. 701-705.) Thereafter, an Executive order was issued by the President (Ex. Ord. No. 10197, December 21, 1950), directing the Secretary to put the program into effect. At present the only sanctions which may be applied for violations of the security regulations which have been issued by the Secretary under that authority are either (1) suspension or revocation of the pilot's certificate in cases where the pilot is personally chargeable with the violation or against the air carrier's operating certificate where the air carrier is chargeable with the violation, or (2) in the case of willful offenses, criminal penalties. In most cases, neither of these sanctions is appropriate.

To a pilot holding an airline transport pilot or commercial rating, suspension or revocation means loss of earnings and, to the air-transport industries, loss of essential man-hours of skilled services. Suspension of the operating certificates of an air carrier means loss of essential transportation service to the Nation. These results are both inappropriate to the times and too severe for the usual offense.

Criminal penalties are even more drastic and thus even less appropriate in most of the cases presented. In any event, criminal intent is usually lacking in these cases, which generally involve some unauthorized entry into an air defense identification zone through oversight or neglect.

The civil penalty which is the normal sanction applied for minor violations of other safety provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 would provide a moderate and expeditious remedy more appropriate to these technical violations. An amendment to the law is necessary to authorize the imposition of that sanction in such cases. The attached bill would provide that authority; it would amend section 901 (a) of the act so as to include within those infractions for which a civil penalty may be imposed any violation of a rule, regulation, or order issued under title XII of the act.

The Bureau of the Budget has advised that it has no objection to the transmission of this letter and proposed legislation to the Congress.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER WILLIAMS,
Acting Secretary of Commerce.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF INTER- STATE COMMERCE ACT

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, at the request of the Interstate Commerce Commission I introduce, for appropriate reference, three bills to amend the Interstate Commerce Act. I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, requesting this proposed legislation, may be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bills will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bills introduced by Mr. MAGNUSON (by request) were received, read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, as follows:

S. 1381. A bill to amend section 402 (c) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, to provide more definite standards for determining who is entitled to exemption from part IV of that act as an association of shippers or a shippers' agent;

S. 1382. A bill to amend section 409 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended; and

S. 1383. A bill to amend section 410 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, to

require freight forwarders to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity.

The letter accompanying the above bills is as follows:

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., February 1, 1957.
The Honorable WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
Chairman, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, United
States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MAGNUSON: I am submitting herewith for your consideration 20 copies each of draft bills to amend sections 402 (c), 409, and 410 of the Interstate Commerce Act, respectively, together with statements of justification therefor. The draft bills would give effect to legislative recommendations Nos. 17, 18, and 19 appearing on pages 169, 170, and 171 of the Commission's 70th annual report to Congress, as follows:

"17. We recommend that section 402 (c) be amended to make the exemption of shippers' associations and shippers' agents applicable only where the operation is that of a bona fide association or agent as defined in that section.

"18. We recommend that section 409 be amended so as to (1) place the burden of proof on the parties to contracts between freight forwarders and common carriers by motor vehicle subject to part II of the act for the transportation of freight when such contracts are called into question, (2) prohibit such contracts at compensation lower than the motor carrier's tariff rates in all cases where the line-haul transportation is for a total distance of 450 miles or more, and (3) provide penalties for the offer, grant, giving, solicitation, acceptance, or receipt of any rebate, concession, or discrimination resulting from the transportation of property at compensation less than that specified in such contract.

"19. We recommend that section 410 be amended so as to require the obtaining of a certificate of public convenience and necessity as a prerequisite to engaging in service as a freight forwarder."

We would appreciate your assistance in introducing these bills and scheduling early hearings thereon.

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

OWEN CLARKE,
Chairman.

JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOMMENDATION 17

The attached draft bill is designed to provide statutory standards by which the Interstate Commerce Commission may determine who is entitled to exemption, as a shippers' association or a shippers' agent, from the application of part IV of the Interstate Commerce Act.

When part IV was added to the act there were few shipper associations claiming exemption under the provisions of section 402 (c) thereof. Since then, however, especially following the court's decision in *United States v. Pacific Wholesalers Assn.* (338 U. S. 689), the number of groups and individuals purporting to do business within the purview of the exemption has greatly increased.

At present there are almost as many shippers' associations and shippers' agents engaged in consolidating and distributing freight as there are authorized freight forwarders. Many of these associations have large memberships, and their activities are nationwide and involve the movement of general commodities in substantial quantities. The regulated freight forwarders which compete with the shipper associations have, in several instances, reduced or attempted to reduce their rates to meet such competition.

Complaints are received regularly respecting the operations of self-styled shippers' associations. A number of such associations

have been investigated by the Commission's staff, and, in general, there is little distinction between the service received by a shipper from such an association and that provided by a regulated freight forwarder. In some instances former principals in forwarder businesses have been found to be prominently identified with newly established shippers' associations.

While probably a number of such individuals and groups are bona fide associations and agents, the exemption in section 402 (c) has become a loophole through which enterprising promoters are engaging essentially in a freight forwarder business under the guise of a shippers' association and are thereby evading regulation to the detriment of forwarders subject to the act.

The Commission is unable to cope with this situation effectively in the absence of statutory standards for determining who is entitled to exemption under section 402 (c). Studies made by the Commission's staff have indicated that the operations of certain self-styled shippers' associations are open to question with respect to certain features. The draft bill would provide that these features, among others, shall be considered by the Commission in determining whether a particular operation is to be exempt, or subjected to regulation. More specifically, it would amend section 402 (c) by adding thereto a new paragraph which would authorize the Commission to make the exemption of shippers' associations and shippers' agents inapplicable if it finds that their activities are not being conducted solely for the purposes, and within the limitations, specified in the provision permitting the exemption, or that such action is necessary to carry out the purposes of part IV and the provisions of the national transportation policy.

JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOMMENDATION 18

Under the provisions of section 409 (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, contracts for the transportation of freight between freight forwarders subject to part IV of the act and common carriers by motor vehicle subject to part II thereof must be filed with the Commission, and the Commission has the power, after hearing, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, to prescribe the terms, conditions, and compensation of such contracts if it finds that such terms, conditions, or compensation are inconsistent with the provisions and standards set forth in paragraph (a) of section 409.

Thousands of such contracts are filed with the Commission. However, the Commission's attempts to subject certain of these contracts to formal investigation have disclosed several major defects in the law, the most important of which is the failure to place the burden of proof on the makers of such contracts when called into question.

The attached draft of bill would correct what the Commission considers this most important defect by adding a new paragraph "(c)" to section 409 providing that at any hearing involving an investigation into the terms, conditions, and compensation of any such contract the burden of proof shall be upon the parties thereto to show that such terms, conditions, and compensation are not inconsistent with the provisions and standards set forth in section 409 (a). Similar provisions respecting burden of proof may be found in sections 15 (7), 216 (g), 218 (c), 307 (g), 307 (i), and 406 (e) of the act relating to investigation and suspension of ordinary commercial rates, charges, etc.

The proposed bill would also amend paragraph (b) of section 409 by adding at the end thereof provisions which would strengthen and spell out more clearly the prescription powers of the Commission and provide it with authority to prescribe the minimum compensation which may be charged under such contracts. This amendment would al-

low the parties to change the amount of compensation to be paid so long as such amount does not go below the minimum prescribed, without petitioning the Commission for modification of its order as would be necessary if the precise amount of compensation were prescribed.

In addition, section 409 (a) would be amended by the proposed bill so as to prohibit such contracts at a compensation which is lower than the motor carrier's tariff rate in all cases where the line-haul transportation is for a total distance of 450 highway-miles or more. Under the present provisions of the statute, such prohibition applies to "line-haul transportation between concentration points and breakbulk points in truckload lots where such line-haul transportation is for 450 highway-miles or more." This amendment is proposed because (1) it is considered uneconomical for freight forwarders to utilize motor carriers to assemble and distribute forwarder traffic for distances of 450 miles or more from the forwarder's assembly and distribution stations, (2) it would prevent the circumvention of such prohibition (through the use of contract rates which are not subject to any specified minimum weights) by eliminating the term "truckload lots" and making the prohibition applicable to all cases where such line-haul distance is 450 miles or more, and (3) it would eliminate the necessity for the Commission to determine what is meant by "truckload lots" as used in the statute, a term considered almost impossible to define with exactness sufficient to stand up in court in a criminal proceeding.

New paragraphs "(d)" and "(e)" would also be added to section 409 by the proposed bill to insure better observance of the terms, conditions, and compensation of such contracts, and to provide penalties for any rebate, concession, or discrimination resulting from the transportation of property at compensation less than that specified therein. Without such provisions, freight forwarders and motor carriers could possibly violate their contracts with impunity, since there appears to be some question as to whether or not the enforcement provisions of parts II and IV of the act are applicable to this situation.

JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOMMENDATION 19

The attached draft bill would amend section 410 of the Interstate Commerce Act to require future applicants for freight forwarder authority to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity instead of a permit as a prerequisite to engaging in freight forwarding service.

At the time part IV of the Interstate Commerce Act was enacted, Congress was of the view that freight forwarder operating rights should be granted with greater liberality than the operating rights of common carriers. Accordingly, the law governing the issuance of forwarder rights was patterned after the provisions of part II of the act governing the issuance of permits to contract carriers by motor vehicle instead of those governing the issuance of certificates to common carriers. And, in order to encourage persons to enter the freight-forwarding field, section 410 (d), which has no counterpart in part II of the act, was included. Under this provision the Interstate Commerce Commission is prohibited from denying authority to engage in proposed forwarder service solely on the ground that the existing forwarder service is adequate. This provision is discussed at length in *Lipschultz Fast Freight Extension—West and Midwest* (265 I. C. C. 431).

There exist, at present, almost 100 authorized freight forwarders. Of these, five are authorized to serve virtually all points in the United States. Six others are authorized to serve all points in the United States from specified origin points, and 12 of the remaining have rights to serve all points in

more than 30 States. Others have broad authorities which generally follow existing traffic-flow patterns in the United States. A large number of freight forwarders are, therefore, now competing with each other and other carriers for the available traffic.

The ease with which permits may be obtained under the present provisions of section 410 (d) could very well result in an overcrowding of the freight forwarding field, with general impairment of forwarder service and harm to the general public. Moreover, since freight forwarders were classified as common carriers by the act of December 20, 1950 (Public Law 881, 81st Cong.), it seems appropriate that applicants for forwarder rights should be required to make a showing similar to that of other persons seeking common carrier rights.

The draft bill would, therefore, revise section 410 to require an applicant to show that the proposed service is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity and would eliminate the present provisions of section 410 (d). The rights of the present holders of permits would be protected by the provision for automatic conversion of permits to certificates.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, at the request of the Interstate Commerce Commission, I introduce, for appropriate reference, three other bills to amend the Interstate Commerce Act. I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, requesting this proposed legislation, may be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bills will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bills introduced by Mr. MAGNUSON (by request) were received, read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, as follows:

S. 1384. A bill to revise the definition of contract carrier by motor vehicle as set forth in section 203 (a) (15) of the Interstate Commerce Act, and for other purposes.

S. 1385. A bill to amend section 11 of the Clayton Antitrust Act to extend the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission thereunder to contract carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act; and

S. 1386. A bill to authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe rules, standards, and instructions for the installation, inspection, maintenance, and repair of power or train brakes.

The letter presented by Mr. MAGNUSON is as follows:

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
Washington, February 8, 1957.
The Honorable WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
Chairman, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, United
States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MAGNUSON: I am submitting herewith for your consideration 20 copies each of draft bills, together with statements of justification therefor, designed to give effect to Legislative Recommendations Nos. 6, 20, and 24, appearing on pages 162, 171, and 174, respectively, of the Commission's 70th annual report to Congress as follows:

"6 (a) We recommend (1) that the definition of contract carrier by motor vehicle as set forth in section 203 (a) (15) be amended so as to state clearly the nature of the services which may be performed by such carriers and to provide that such services may be performed under continuing contracts for only one person or a limited number of persons, and (2), if so amended, that section

212 be amended by adding a new paragraph (c) authorizing the Commission to revoke the permit of such a carrier and to issue in lieu thereof a certificate of public convenience and necessity if it finds, after a hearing, that the operations of the permit holder are not those of a contract carrier under the revised definition, are those of a common carrier, and are otherwise lawful.

"(b) We also recommend that section 209 (b) be amended so as (1) to empower the Commission to limit the person or persons and the number or class of persons for which a contract carrier by motor vehicle may lawfully perform transportation services without additional authority and (2) to provide that additional permits may be issued only upon a showing that existing common carriers are unwilling or unable to provide the type of service for which a need has been shown.

"20. We recommend that section 11 of the Clayton Antitrust Act (15 U. S. C., sec. 21) be amended so as to provide that the Commission's jurisdiction thereunder shall include contract carriers as well as common carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.

"24. We recommend that the Safety Appliance Acts (45 U. S. C., secs. 1-16) be amended so as to give the Commission authority to prescribe rules, standards, and instructions for the installation, inspection, maintenance, and repair of power or train brakes."

Your assistance in having these bills introduced would be very much appreciated.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

OWEN CLARKE, Chairman.

JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOMMENDATION 6

The attached draft bill would revise the definition of contract carrier by motor vehicle as set forth in section 203 (a) (15) of the Interstate Commerce Act and provide a "grandfather" clause authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to issue a certificate in lieu of a permit without requiring proof of public convenience and necessity if it finds that the operations of existing permit holders do not conform to the revised definition and are those of a common carrier. The proposed measure would also amend section 209 (b) of the act so as to grant the Commission authority to limit the number of contracts under which a motor contract carrier may perform transportation services without additional authority, and would further provide that additional permits may be issued only upon a showing that existing common carriers are unwilling or unable to render the required type of service.

One of the most difficult problems with which the Commission has been faced in recent years in connection with the regulation of motor carriers is the question of determining the line of demarcation to be drawn between contract carriers and common carriers. Under the present definition of contract carrier by motor vehicle in section 203 (a) (15) of the act and the proviso in section 209 (b), which specifically prohibits the Commission from restricting such carriers from substituting or adding contracts within the scope of their permits, some contract carriers have been able to effect so many contracts that they are actually performing what is tantamount to a common carrier service. The resulting diversion of traffic from the common carriers could, if continued, seriously impair their ability to render adequate service to the general public, particularly to the smaller shippers who depend almost entirely upon public transportation facilities.

The underlying purpose of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, is to promote and protect adequate and efficient common-carrier service by motor vehicle in the public interest, and the regulation of contract carriers was de-

signed with that end in view. The purpose of the amendments proposed in the draft bill is to enable the Commission more effectively to administer the act so as to achieve the principal purpose thereof.

A contract carrier is one who has permission to engage in the transportation business on the public highways, but without the obligation to serve all persons alike. They enjoy a decided advantage in the competitive struggle for certain types of traffic. Common carriers are required to serve the general public, at their published tariff rates, without unlawful discrimination. Contract carriers, on the other hand, may pick and choose the shippers they may wish to serve and may discriminate in their charges which are required to meet a standard of only minimum reasonableness. Their costs, moreover, are substantially reduced if they have no terminals to maintain and are able to refuse to transport other than full loads, or only when return loads are available.

The position of the contract carrier in the overall transportation picture is justifiable only from the advantages which it can offer in the way of personal and specialized service for one or a limited number of shippers. It seems clear, therefore, that unless a contract carrier renders a particular shipper or a limited number of shippers a type of service different from that which existing common carriers are able or willing to provide, it should not be permitted to encroach upon the operations of the common carriers and skim off the cream of the traffic upon which the common carriers depend to support their overall service to the public.

In its administration of the act, the Commission has generally required, in granting contract carrier authority, a showing of a need for individual and specialized service, or at least dedication of equipment and facilities, under continuing bilateral contracts. The Commission has also described in permits "the business of the contract carrier and the scope thereof" in the terms of territory, commodities, and occasionally the type of equipment to be utilized. In some instances it has specified the class of shippers to be served. This is most desirable in certain cases when specifying, with particularity, the type of service for which the grant of authority was intended. Experience has indicated, however, that the Commission is in need of broader discretionary powers to enable it to specify in the permit the type and nature of the service to be performed with such particularity as to confine future service thereunder to that for which a need was shown at the time the permit was granted.

Under existing law, even though the initial grant of authority may have been based on a showing of a need for individual specialized service, there is no assurance, once a permit has been granted, against a contract carrier actively competing with and supplanting common carriers by subsequently adding a large number of contracts with other shippers. In this connection, the Supreme Court recently stated in *U. S. v. Contract Steel Carriers* (350 U. S. 409), decided March 2, 1956, that a contract carrier is free to aggressively search for new business within the limits of its license. This decision has also cast considerable doubt on the correctness of the Commission's interpretation of the act as to specialization. Freedom to solicit customers without restriction as to specialized service will tend to obliterate the distinction between common and contract carriers which Congress intended.

The amendments proposed in the draft bill would enable the Commission to give greater effect to this congressional purpose by amending the definition of contract carrier by motor vehicle to state clearly that the transportation services furnished by such carriers are to be of a special and individual nature for one or a limited number of per-

sons and which are not provided by common carriers; by specifically providing in section 209 (b) that the Commission, in granting contract carrier authority, may include terms, conditions, and limitations respecting the person or persons or the number or class thereof for which a contract carrier may perform transportation services as may be necessary to assure that the business conducted by the permit holder is that of a contract carrier and within the scope of its permit; and by removing from the proviso in section 209 (b) the prohibition against the Commission limiting the number of effective contracts which a contract carrier may have under its permit. The proposed further amendment to section 209 (b) which would permit the issuance of contract carrier operating authorities only upon a showing that existing common carriers are unwilling or unable to furnish the required type of service would serve to provide a further measure of control over unlimited expansion of contracts for nonspecialized service.

The recommended amendment to section 212 is in the nature of a "grandfather" clause authorizing the Commission to issue a certificate in lieu of a permit without proof of convenience and necessity where it finds the operations of existing permit holders do not conform to the revised definition, are those of a common carrier, and are otherwise lawful.

The proposed new subsection (c) to section 203, prohibiting the performance of for-hire motor carrier transportation in interstate or foreign commerce without a certificate or permit from the Commission, is necessary because under the proposed revision of the motor contract carrier definition certain types of operations formerly included in the definition would be excluded therefrom, not all of which would come within the definition of effective contracts which a contract carrier may have under its permit. The proposed further amendment to section 209 (b) which would permit the issuance of contract carrier operating authorities only upon a showing that existing common carriers are unwilling or unable to furnish the required type of service would serve to provide a further measure of control over unlimited expansion of contracts for nonspecialized service.

The recommended amendment to section 212 is in the nature of a grandfather clause authorizing the Commission to issue a certificate in lieu of a permit without proof of convenience and necessity where it finds the operations of existing permit holders do not conform to the revised definition, are those of a common carrier, and are otherwise lawful.

The proposed new subsection (c) to section 203, prohibiting the performance of for-hire motor carrier transportation in interstate or foreign commerce without a certificate or permit from the Commission, is necessary because under the proposed revision of the motor contract carrier definition certain types of operations formerly included in the definition would be excluded therefrom, not all of which would come within the definition of common carrier by motor vehicle as set forth in section 203 (a) (14) of the act. In the absence of such a provision, anyone engaging in motor transportation for compensation, either with or without a permit, which is not that of a common carrier because not held out to the general public, or for other reasons, and which is not within the amended and restricted definition of a contract carrier would not be subject to regulation by the Commission as either a common or a contract carrier. Presumably such person would also be able to engage in such operations without being subject to any regulation whatever, not even to the safety and hours of service regulations which are applicable to private carriers. Without

this proposed provision the proposed amendments would not accomplish the intended result.

It should be noted in this connection that if the second proviso in section 206 (a) (1) of the act is repealed, as recommended by the Commission in its 70th Annual Report (Legislative Recommendation No. 9), the reference thereto in proposed new section 203 (c) in the attached draft bill should be stricken.

JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOMMENDATION 20

The attached draft bill is designed to make the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission under section 11 of the Clayton Antitrust Act applicable to contract as well as to common carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.

At the time the Clayton Act was passed, the Commission had jurisdiction under the Interstate Commerce Act only over certain common carriers, principally common carriers by railroad. Since that time it has been given jurisdiction over various other common carriers, and also over contract carriers by motor vehicle and by water. The Commission's jurisdiction under section 11 of the Clayton Act, however, still applies only to common carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. It appears, therefore, under the present provisions of section 11, that jurisdiction over the acquisition by one corporation of stock in another corporation, where the effect would be to substantially lessen competition, would be in the Federal Trade Commission where contract carriers are involved, while at the same time the Interstate Commerce Commission would have jurisdiction under section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act over the establishment of common control of two or more contract carriers.

Under section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, the standards prescribed and used in determining whether or not a proposed transaction, within the scope thereof, should be approved by the Commission are different from those used by the Department of Justice and other agencies in determining whether or not any violations of the Clayton Act or other antitrust laws have been committed. This is necessarily so because a regulated industry is involved, which regulation in itself protects the public interest.

Inasmuch as the Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction over various activities and practices of contract carriers, and the issuance and transfer of permits authorizing the operation thereof, it seems logical and appropriate that the Commission should also administer the Clayton Act with respect to contract carriers as well as common carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. This would make for greater uniformity in the application of the Clayton Act to the transportation industry and would also serve to avoid the possibility of conflicting requirements being imposed upon such carriers by the different agencies.

JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOMMENDATION 24

The attached draft bill would give the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to establish rules, standards, and instructions for the installation, inspection, maintenance, and repair of power or train brakes.

Under section 3 of the act of March 2, 1903 (45 U. S. C., sec. 10), the Commission is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the power or train brake provisions of the Safety Appliance Acts (45 U. S. C., secs. 1-16). It does not, however, have the authority to prescribe rules, standards, and instructions for the installation, inspection, maintenance, and repair of such equipment. (Promulgation and Enforcement of Rules, Standards, and Instructions for Installation, Inspection, Maintenance and Repair of Power

Brakes, — I. C. C. —, Docket No. 31938, decided January 3, 1957.)

Section 1 of the act of March 2, 1893 (45 U. S. C., sec. 1) provides, in part, that it shall be unlawful to run any train that does not have a sufficient number of cars equipped with power or train brakes so that the engineer of the locomotive drawing the train can control its speed without requiring brakemen to use the common hand brake for that purpose, and section 2 of the act of March 2, 1903 (45 U. S. C., sec. 9) provides that any train which is operated with power or train brakes shall have such brakes on 50 percent of such cars used and operated by the engineer and all power brake cars associated together with such 50 percent shall have their brakes so used and operated. The Commission's order of June 6, 1910, increased this percentage to 85. Subsequent orders of the Commission requiring, with certain exceptions, the installation of power brakes on all cars has had the effect of increasing this percentage to 100 percent.

Since almost all cars are now equipped with power or train brakes, all such cars associated together must have their brakes used and operated. Inoperative train brakes associated together with operative brakes are in violation of the law. To assure compliance with the law, some method must be adopted to determine if each such brake is operative. The only way in which this determination can be made is by actual visual inspection of each brake after the cars are assembled in the train.

Because of the nature of the power or train brakes, rigid maintenance standards must be maintained in order to assure operative brakes. The design of these brakes is such that their efficiency is dependent upon correctness of adjustment. A train brake may be operative, but in such poor adjustment that its braking effect is practically nonexistent.

In order to insure that power or train brakes are kept in proper adjustment and properly maintained, and to insure efficient operative brakes, the Commission in 1925 cooperated with the mechanical division of the Association of American Railroads in the formulation of a code of rules for maintaining and testing air brakes. This code, which has been revised from time to time, represents minimum requirements for inspection, maintenance, and repair of train brakes. It was last revised in 1953. The Association of American Railroads, however, has no authority to require adoption of the code by the carriers or to enforce compliance with its rules; nor is there any provision in the law requiring compliance with these rules. Each railroad is free to adopt, amend, or disregard the rules in whole or in part. Some railroads have adopted standards equal to or more exacting than the code, while others have chosen to adopt rules which do not meet the minimum requirements. Even among those railroads that have adopted the association's code, there is widespread noncompliance of the rules, particularly with respect to train brake inspections.

During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1956, the Commission's inspectors made train-brake inspections on 2,484 trains, consisting of 117,399 cars, before departing from terminals. A total of 8,007 cars were found to have inoperative or inefficient airbrakes. Of this number, 3,221 were detached from the train and the airbrakes subsequently repaired, 4,634 had their airbrakes repaired while still in the train, and 152 with inoperative airbrakes were allowed by the carriers to depart in the trains. These trains had been prepared for departure by the carrier's employees, yet when afterward tested by the Commission's inspectors it was necessary to set out or repair the brakes on an average of 3.16 cars per train, and 6.7 cars per hundred were found with defective train brakes. Air-brake tests were also made on 1,588 trains,

consisting of 96,962 cars upon arrival at terminals. Brakes were found to be operative on 94,879 cars in these trains, or on 79.9 percent thereof. Of these operative, however, 8,867, or 9.14 cars out of every 100 inspected, had train brakes with impaired efficiency due to excessive piston travel.

During the same fiscal year the Commission's inspectors observed many instances where the minimum requirements of the association's code had not been met. These matters were brought to the attention of the railroad managements involved, but with little or no improvement.

The records of the Commission indicate a progressive deterioration of train brake inspection and maintenance practices. It is therefore apparent that the carriers are either unable to enforce their own rules or are deliberately ignoring minimum requirements for safety.

In the past the railroads have generally cooperated with Government inspectors in the administration of the Safety Appliance Acts. Recently, however, several instances of lack of such cooperation have been reported. Our inspectors have been deliberately prevented from making train-brake inspections at certain terminals. This has been done by not providing the inspectors the opportunity to make their inspections, or by permitting the trains to depart before their examinations of the train brakes have been completed, notwithstanding that delays resulting from such inspections are trifling.

The industry's self-imposed rules have not produced the desired results. The Commission believes that the problem can be met by giving it statutory authority to prescribe and enforce adequate power and train brake rules. It is therefore urged that the Safety Appliance Acts be amended as proposed in the draft bill in order to provide the degree of safety contemplated therein for employees and the traveling public.

PROPOSED NATIONAL POTATO GRADE LABELING ACT

Mrs. SMITH of Maine. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, my colleague, the junior Senator from Maine [Mr. PAYNE], and Senators AIKEN, ALLOTT, BARRETT, BRIDGES, BUSH, CHAVEZ, DWORSHAK, IVES, JAVITS, MAGNUSON, MANSFIELD, MORSE, NEUBERGER, and YOUNG, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill relating to the quality requirements for, and the inspection, certification, and labeling of, Irish potatoes. I ask unanimous consent that the bill lie on the desk through Friday next, to permit any Senator who desires to cosponsor it to do so.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill will lie on the desk, as requested by the Senator from Maine.

The bill (S. 1393) to authorize the National Potato Grade Labeling Act, which provides quality requirements for, and the inspection, certification, and labeling of Irish potatoes, introduced by Mrs. SMITH of Maine (for herself and other Senators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

DISCONTINUANCE OF POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, and the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill providing

for the discontinuance of the Postal Savings System.

The Postal Savings System was established by an act of Congress on June 25, 1910, and has rendered a useful service. I think, however, that on the basis of a decline in deposits and the number of depositors, it has become increasingly uneconomic in its operation. This is because fixed overhead remains relatively stable, and offices with few depositors must maintain records, file reports, and account for balances and for certificates, and so forth.

It is interesting to note that the amount on deposit as of June 30, 1956, dropped to \$1,765 million from \$3,393 million on June 30, 1947, or a decrease of about 50 percent. The decline for the past 3 years has been well in excess of \$200 million a year.

The number of depositors has dropped from a peak of 4,196,517, as of June 30, 1947, to 2,482,026 depositors, as of June 30, 1956. For the past 3 fiscal years, respectively, the number of accounts closed out have been 228,000, 223,000, and 229,000.

The convenience of the public no longer seems to be served as it was at the time of the creation of the Postal Savings System in 1910. At that time there was no protection of depositor savings in the case of the failure of a bank.

The Postal Savings System provided a convenient means whereby savings could be deposited at earned interest with complete assurance of repayment by the Government. Since then, however, this assurance to the public is now provided through the availability of United States savings bonds, which earn interest, and through the guaranty by agencies of the Government of bank and of savings and loan deposits.

At the time of enactment of the Postal Savings Act, in 1910, the convenience of small-town patrons was undoubtedly taken into consideration. This is not so important today, when less than 2 percent of the aggregate deposits and of all depositors are served by third-class and fourth-class post offices. In fact, the fourth-class post-office depositors account for only one-fiftieth of 1 percent of all depositors. Ninety percent of the depositors are in first-class offices, and 8½ percent are in second-class offices. Thus, deposits are concentrated in post offices in communities which have commercial banks. For the very few which do not, the growth of automobile transportation since 1910 and the increased popularity of banking by mail have provided ready alternatives.

The Comptroller General of the United States in his reports to Congress on the survey and audit of the Postal Savings System has consistently concluded that the purpose and justification of the system are no longer applicable, and has consistently recommended that the Congress give consideration to the further need for the System.

The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government recommended, in May 1955, that a plan for orderly discontinuance of the Postal Savings System be inaugurated. In prior Congresses, bills calling for the

abrupt termination of the Postal Savings System have been introduced.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator from Kansas whether he has looked into the matter of the small depositors in the banks of the Nation during the past 3 or 4 years.

Mr. CARLSON. Let me say to the distinguished chairman of my committee that I have not done so, but I have followed with interest the record of postal savings.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. I should like to have printed in the RECORD a statement showing what the personal savings have been. I shall furnish the statement in the near future. I may say the records show that personal savings have dropped while the Nation as a whole has been prospering, which is an indication that the small people are not prospering at this time.

Mr. CARLSON. I think it would be very helpful to have that information printed in the RECORD.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I have been associated with my colleague, the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], as one of the sponsors of the bill. I was its original sponsor in 1952, as a result of a statement made at that time by the Comptroller of the Currency—namely, that, in his opinion, the usefulness of the Postal Savings System had ended. That was 5 years ago.

If the deposits continue to drop, the burden on the Department will continue to increase. Furthermore, because the interest rates being paid by the banks and savings and loan associations are so much higher than the rates paid by the Postal Savings System, I also hope that the transfer can be made with a minimum of inconvenience.

I think this service has been very valuable, but I feel that it has outlived its usefulness. I hope that when the time comes, the Senate will pass the bill which the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] has introduced today, on behalf of himself and myself.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, I think I should make clear that in the statement I made a moment ago, I was not opposing the bill as chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Certainly we shall hold hearings on the bill. In making my statement, I was only pointing out that the deposits by the small depositors of the Nation have been decreasing.

Mr. CARLSON. I appreciate the statement the Senator from South Carolina has made. We are confident that he, as chairman of the committee, will have ample hearings held on the bill; otherwise we would not have introduced it.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill, together with an explanation of it, may be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and explanation will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 1394) to provide for the discontinuance of the Postal Savings System established by the act of June 25,

1910 (36 Stat. 814), as amended, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. CARLSON (for himself and Mr. BENNETT), was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That (a) the 30th day after the date of the enactment of this act is hereby established as the closing date for the Postal Savings System created by the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 814), as amended, and thereafter no deposits shall be accepted in any existing postal savings account nor shall any new postal savings accounts be opened.

(b) Commencing with the 30th day after the date of the enactment of this act, interest on all postal savings deposits shall cease to accrue on the interest anniversary date of each outstanding deposit certificate.

SEC. 2. After June 30, 1958, the total amount of the unpaid deposits, including the accrued interest due thereon as shown by the books of the Board of Trustees of the Postal Savings System shall be transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall deposit the sum so transferred under the authority of this section in the trust fund receipt account in the Treasury as "unclaimed moneys of individuals whose whereabouts are unknown (postal savings)." Expenditures are authorized to be made from this account as provided by section 17 (a) of the act of June 26, 1934 (48 Stat. 1230; 31 U. S. C. 725p).

SEC. 3. In order to facilitate the settlement of the account of a depositor who cannot be located or who is deceased, the amount to the credit of such depositor, including such interest as may be due thereon, shall be paid in the following order of precedence, and such payment shall be a bar to recovery by any other person of amounts so paid:

First, to the spouse of such depositor;

Second, if there be no surviving spouse, to the child or children of such depositor, and descendants of deceased children, by representation;

Third, if none of the above, to the parents of such depositor, or survivor of them; and

Fourth, if there be none of the above, to the duly appointed legal representative of such depositor, or if there be none, to the person or persons determined by the Board of Trustees of the Postal Savings System to be entitled thereto under the laws of the State in which the deposit was made.

SEC. 4. Where any payment of a postal savings account, including such interest as may be due thereon, is to be made to a minor, except in the case of an account maintained by a minor in his own name in accordance with section 4 of the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 815) or to a person mentally incompetent or under other legal disability adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction, such payment may be made to the person who is constituted guardian or other fiduciary by the law of the State of residence of such claimant or is otherwise legally vested with the care of the claimant or his estate. Where no guardian or other fiduciary of the person under legal disability has been appointed under the laws of the State of residence of the claimant, the Board of Trustees of the Postal Savings System shall determine the person who is otherwise legally vested with the care of the claimant or his estate. Payments made under this section shall be a bar to recovery by any other person of amounts so made.

SEC. 5. To facilitate the liquidation of the Postal Savings System, the Secretary of the Treasury shall redeem or purchase the public debt obligations of the United States, held for the account of the Postal Savings System, at their par value whenever it will not be advantageous to sell such public debt obligations on the regular market.

SEC. 6. Until June 30, 1958, the Postmaster General shall continue to cover into the postal revenues the excess of interest and profit occurring from the deposit or investment of postal savings funds after the payment of interest due depositors in the Postal Savings System.

SEC. 7. The Board of Trustees of the Postal Savings System, commencing with the 30th day after the enactment of this act, shall not be required to maintain the 5-percent reserve of postal savings funds required to be maintained by the provisions of section 9 of the act of 1910 as contained in section 2 of the act of May 18, 1916 (39 Stat. 159), as amended.

SEC. 8. Effective June 30, 1958, all powers, functions, and duties vested in the Board of Trustees and in the Postmaster General by the act of June 25, 1910, as amended, shall be and are hereby transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of completing the liquidation of the Postal Savings System.

SEC. 9. The Board of Trustees is hereby authorized and directed to prescribe such rules and regulations and make such delegation of authority as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this act.

The explanation presented by Mr. CARLSON is as follows:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON POSTAL SAVINGS BILL

EXPLANATION

Section 1 of the bill establishes the 30th day after enactment as the date upon which the Board of Trustees will close the Postal Savings System. After that date, no deposits in existing accounts will be accepted and no new accounts will be opened. Interest will cease to run on all outstanding certificates on their anniversary date falling between 30 days after enactment and June 30, 1958.

Section 2 of the bill provides for the transfer of the records and unpaid deposits, including the accrued interest as shown by the books of the Board of Trustees to the Secretary of the Treasury. He will deposit the sums in the trust fund known as Unclaimed Moneys of Individuals Whose Whereabouts Are Unknown (Postal Savings).

Section 3 sets up a descent and distribution table for the payment of accounts to the representatives of deceased depositors. In the absence of this, we would be required to observe the laws of each State with respect to the descent and distribution, administration of estates, and similar provisions of State law. It would hamper us tremendously in the orderly closing out of the accounts of the postal savings if we have to apply the various laws of the States.

Section 4 is a special provision with respect to the payment of postal savings accounts to minors.

Section 5 of the bill provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall redeem or purchase public debt obligations of the United States which are held for the account of the Postal Savings System at their par value whenever it is not advantageous to sell them on the regular market. I am sure you will appreciate that a serious situation could occur if we were forced to sell our securities purchased with depositors' moneys at less than par.

Section 6 provides that any interest accruing on bank accounts and from securities over and above that necessary to pay the interest due to depositors will be covered into the postal revenues during the liquidation year.

Section 7 authorizes the immediate use of the 5-percent cash reserve now maintained in the Department of the Treasury. This will, of course, make ready cash available for liquidation purposes.

Section 8 merely provides for a shifting of all powers and duties of the Board of Trus-

tees to the Secretary of the Treasury for the completion of liquidation.

Section 9 authorizes the Board of Trustees to issue rules and regulations and to make delegations of authority to accomplish the objectives of the law.

CONSTRUCTION OF FLOOD PROTECTION WORKS ON MISSISSIPPI RIVER AT ST. PAUL AND SOUTH ST. PAUL, MINN.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill authorizing the construction of local flood-protection works on the Mississippi River at St. Paul and South St. Paul, Minn. I wish to make a brief statement relating to the bill.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 1400) authorizing the construction of local flood-protection works on the Mississippi River at St. Paul and South St. Paul, Minn., introduced by Mr. HUMPHREY, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Public Works.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, during 1951 and 1952 two savage floods—the latest in a long series of lesser floods—devastated large areas of the cities of St. Paul and South St. Paul, situated at approximately the confluence of the Mississippi and Minnesota Rivers at a point where the Mississippi River becomes for the first time a formidable stream.

One would not expect that a flood so far upstream could cause such severe damage as the Mississippi River did in St. Paul and South St. Paul in 1951 and 1952, and which it has with considerable frequency caused throughout the more than 100 years of St. Paul's existence.

Yet it is a fact that the damage to private property and the cost of restoration efforts in the west side of St. Paul following the 1952 flood was estimated at \$3,160,000. This, I point out, is substantially the same as the estimated Federal cost for the St. Paul section of a proposed project to provide flood-protection works for the west side of St. Paul and for the city of South St. Paul.

A study and report by the district and division engineers covering a proposed flood-control project at St. Paul and South St. Paul was approved by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors on January 28, 1957. This approved report will, within a few days, be sent to State and local authorities and to other Federal agencies for review, which can be expected to take place within 3 weeks.

Estimated Federal costs of the twin project are \$3,137,700 for St. Paul, and \$2,567,700 for South St. Paul.

I wish to emphasize that not only has it been thoroughly demonstrated that a flood in the west side of St. Paul can cause, and has caused, more than \$3 million in damages in a few short days, but that a flood in the industrial section of South St. Paul—a few miles downstream—strikes the site of the second largest livestock market in the Nation. Thus, not only is there extensive damage and suffering to the immediate inhabitants of South St. Paul, but it also causes

the serious disruption of an industry which serves a hinterland comprising 14 States and 3 provinces of Canada.

For these reasons I feel it necessary to bring this urgent flood-control project before the Congress at the earliest practicable moment, in the hope that it will be possible to include authorization for the project during the present session of Congress.

TAX RELIEF FOR SMALL BUSINESS— ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF BILL

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. President, on January 7, 1957, for myself and Senators IVES, BEALL, CAPEHART, BRICKER, and BUSH, I introduced the bill (S. 245) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in order to provide tax relief in small corporations and more equitable tax treatment for persons engaged in small businesses. This bill would, if enacted, implement the small-business tax recommendations of the President's Cabinet Committee Report on Small Business issued last August.

My good friend, the senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER], who shares our interest in small-business tax problems, has indicated his desire to cosponsor this bill. I am happy, indeed, to ask unanimous consent that the name of the senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER] be added to the list of cosponsors of Senate bill 245.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INCREASED PENSIONS TO CERTAIN ANNUITANTS

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, on yesterday I introduced a bill to increase the compensation of certain annuitants. The bill has been designated as S. 1355, and has been referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. In my remarks on yesterday, I requested, at the conclusion of my statement, unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the body of the RECORD. However, although my remarks were printed in the RECORD, the text of the bill was not printed in the RECORD. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that in today's RECORD there be printed both my remarks on the bill and the text of the bill itself.

There being no objection, the statement and bill were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to increase annuities payable to certain annuitants from the civil-service retirement and disability fund, and for other purposes.

In introducing this bill I desire to call attention to the fact that those who are having the most difficult time today in gaining the necessities of life, and in paying their way of livelihood, are persons with small fixed incomes, and particularly older people who are confronted with the costs of living without capacity to add to their incomes.

The bill would give to all annuitants under civil service a reasonable increase, and in particular it would take care of those who were not covered in the increase of 1948.

I therefore introduce the bill, and ask that it be appropriately referred, and I hope that

at an early date the Congress will enact it into law. I, therefore, ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the body of the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 1355) to increase annuities payable to certain annuitants from the civil-service retirement and disability fund, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. REVERCOMB, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

Senate bill 1355, introduced by Mr. REVERCOMB is as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That (a) the annuity of each individual who, on October 1, 1956, was receiving or entitled to receive an annuity from the civil-service retirement and disability fund shall, in addition to any increase in such annuity heretofore provided by law, be further increased, effective on the effective date of this act, in accordance with the following schedule:

If annuity commenced on or after—	Portion of annuity not in excess of \$1,500 shall be increased by—	Portion of annuity in excess of \$1,500 shall be increased by—
October 1, 1955, and prior to October 1, 1956.	25 per centum.	10 per centum.
October 1, 1954, and prior to October 1, 1955.	26 per centum.	10 per centum.
October 1, 1953, and prior to October 1, 1954.	27 per centum.	10 per centum.
October 1, 1952, and prior to October 1, 1953.	28 per centum.	10 per centum.
October 1, 1951, and prior to October 1, 1952.	29 per centum.	10 per centum.
August 20, 1950, and prior to October 1, 1951.	30 per centum.	10 per centum.

(b) No increase provided by subsection (a) shall exceed \$756 per annum for any individual or be computed on any part of the annuity purchased by voluntary contributions. Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), the increases provided by this section when added to the annuities of retired employees shall not operate to increase the annuities of their survivors.

(c) The annuity of a widow, widower, or designated survivor annuitant of an individual referred to in subsection (a), which (i) is payable from the civil service retirement and disability fund, (ii) is based on the service of such individual, and (iii) commences after October 1, 1956, shall be increased, effective on the beginning date of such annuity or on the effective date of this act, whichever is later, by such amount if any as may be necessary to provide such widow, widower, or designated survivor annuitant with an annuity equal to one-half of the annuity which such individual was receiving at the date of his death excluding any part thereof purchased by voluntary contributions, but such increased annuity in the case of a widow or widower of an individual who retired prior to April 1, 1948, shall not exceed \$756.

(d) The annuity of each surviving child of an individual referred to in subsection (a), which (i) is payable from the civil service retirement and disability fund, (ii) is based on the service of such individual, and (iii) commences after October 1, 1956, shall be increased, effective on the beginning date of such annuity or on the effective date of this act, whichever is later, by such amount if any as may be necessary to provide each such child with an annuity which—

(A) in any case in which such individual is survived by a widow, shall be equal to one-fourth of the annuity which such individual

was receiving at the date of his death (excluding any part thereof purchased by voluntary contributions), except that no such increased annuity shall exceed the lesser of \$1,200 divided by the number of such children or \$600; or

(B) in any case in which such individual is not survived by a widow, shall be equal to one-half of the annuity which such individual was receiving at the date of his death (excluding any part thereof purchased by voluntary contributions), except that no such increased annuity shall exceed the lesser of \$1,500 divided by the number of such children or \$720.

SEC. 2. The limitation contained in the last sentence of section 8 (d) (1) of the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, as enacted by the act of August 11, 1955 (69 Stat. 692; Public Law 369, 84th Cong.), is repealed effective as of August 11, 1955, but no increase in annuity shall accrue by reason of the enactment of this section for any period prior to the effective date of this act. In computing, for the purposes of subsections (c) and (d) of section 1, the amount of annuity which an individual who died after September 30, 1956, and prior to the effective date of this act was receiving at the date of his death there shall be included any amount which he would have received had this section been enacted prior to such death.

SEC. 3. The widow of an employee where such employee had completed 20 or more years of Federal service and was subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, the Canal Zone Retirement Act, or the Alaska Railroad Retirement Act at the time of his death, before April 1, 1948, while in the service of the United States or retired from such service, on or before such date, if such widow had been legally married to such employee or retiree for a period of at least 10 years prior to his death and was not entitled to any annuity based upon the service of such employee or retiree under any other provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act and has not remarried, shall be entitled to receive an annuity equal to one-half of the annuity to which such employee or retiree would have been entitled to receive under the annuity computation formula in effect at the time of his death or received (excluding any part thereof purchased by voluntary contributions), but not to exceed \$756 per annum. Any annuity granted to a survivor under this section shall commence on the first day of the month following the month in which application therefor has been duly filed with the Civil Service Commission, and shall cease upon the death, or remarriage, of the annuitant.

SEC. 4. The monthly installment of any annuity increased or provided by this act shall be fixed at the nearest dollar.

SEC. 5. The annuities and increases in annuities provided by this act shall be paid from the civil service retirement and disability fund; but such annuities and increases in annuities shall terminate on the 30th day of June of any calendar year, after the calendar year 1959, in which an appropriation shall not have been made by the Congress prior to July 31 of such year to compensate such fund for the cost, as determined by the United States Civil Service Commission, of such annuities and increases in annuities during the fiscal year ending on June 30 of the following calendar year. After such termination the preceding sections of this act shall not be in effect and annuities and increases in annuities within the purview of this act shall be determined and paid in the same manner as immediately prior to the effective date of this act and as though this act had not been enacted.

SEC. 6. This act shall take effect on the first day of the second calendar month following the date of enactment of this act.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE RECORD

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

By Mr. MANSFIELD:

Address entitled "United States Foreign Policy Today and Tomorrow," delivered by him at Georgetown University on February 25, 1957.

By Mr. McNAMARA:

Statement prepared by him discussing Federal aid for school construction.

By Mr. ANDERSON:

Remarks made by him before Bernalillo County Democratic Convention, Albuquerque, N. Mex., on February 18, 1957.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON SENATE BILL 11, TO AMEND SECTION 2 (B) OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, on behalf of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly Legislation of the Committee on the Judiciary, I desire to give notice that public hearings have been scheduled to commence on Tuesday, March 12, 1957, at 10 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, on S. 11, a bill to amend section 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act so as to provide that the good-faith defense is not a substantive defense when the discriminatory price practices are of such magnitude as to tend to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.

The subcommittee consists of the Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNING], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY], and myself as chairman.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON H. R. 2528, TO AUTHORIZE THE SALE OF THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED ALCOHOL BUTADIENE FACILITY AT LOUISVILLE, KY., KNOWN AS PLANCOR 1207

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, on behalf of the Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, I desire to give notice that a public hearing will be held on the bill H. R. 2528, to authorize the sale of the Government-owned alcohol butadiene facility at Louisville, Ky., known as Plancor 1207, on Thursday, March 7, 1957, at 10 a. m., in room 301, Senate Office Building.

All persons who desire to appear and testify at this hearing are requested to notify Mr. J. H. Yingling, chief clerk, Committee on Banking and Currency, room 303, Senate Office Building, telephone National 8-3120, extension 865, as soon as possible.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR KNOWLAND, A UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, CONCERNING COMPLAINT BY SOVIET RUSSIA

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD the text of a statement I made yesterday in the United Nations Special Political Committee in my capacity as United States Representative on the Special Committee, and speaking in behalf of the Government of the United States in answer to a complaint by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics relative to the Government of the United States.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WILLIAM S. KNOWLAND, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON THE SOVIET ITEM ENTITLED "COMPLAINT BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF INTERVENTION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF ALBANIA, BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, POLAND, RUMANIA, AND THE U. S. S. R., AND ITS SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AGAINST THOSE STATES"

Mr. Chairman, the torrent of abuse against my country which the Soviet Union has launched in recent months is nothing new. It is a disagreeable old story brought up to date.

We Americans naturally dislike hearing our country attacked from any quarter. But we know that what the Soviet representative says, like many accusations he has made here in the past, will be recognized as false by this General Assembly and by the whole free world.

Most of these charges by the Soviet Union are familiar in the United Nations. The Soviet representative himself has noted that fact. As he said, his country put forward many of them in the General Assembly in 1951. And they were rejected by the Assembly—he forgot to mention this—on January 10, 1952, by a vote of 42 to 5. The wide variety of other false and sensational accusations which his delegation has brought against my country here nearly every year for 10 years past has likewise been rejected, and by overwhelming majorities. In this process the very term "Soviet item" has become a synonym to United Nations delegations for a propaganda offensive against the United States.

By reviving these charges, the Soviet Union is merely trying to divert world attention from its own year-in and year-out program of using foreign Communist parties to subvert and undermine the government of free countries all over the world. Also, no doubt, the Soviet Union would like to obscure the truth revealed in recent discussions by the Assembly of the situation in Hungary, and for that purpose produces its own myth of United States intervention in Eastern Europe. Once again we call upon the Soviet Union to permit free access to Eastern Europe, and thus to the facts.

It is well to remember that a story does not become true merely by being detailed. Often here in the General Assembly the Soviet delegation has produced reams of material to support charges they thought it expedient to make, but always the charges have been discredited and rejected.

We regret that the Assembly's time must be taken up by these well-known charges, particularly now when new grave international problems need to be discussed, but the United States appreciates this opportunity

to clarify matters once again. When we are falsely accused we cannot remain silent.

Naturally, we would like to see improved and different conditions in Eastern Europe. We shall never cease to hope that the now captive peoples will be permitted to enjoy those fundamental rights and freedoms recognized in the United Nations Charter. If we can say or do something here that can help to reassure our Soviet colleagues that our motives and policies in no way menace Soviet security, and indeed, that they reflect an objective on which all must agree—to preserve and maintain international peace—this discussion will have served a useful purpose.

II. UNITED STATES AIMS TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE

Mr. Chairman, it is necessary at the outset to put the record straight about United States policy. As the Soviet Government knows, the chief spokesmen of United States foreign policy are the President of the United States and the Secretary of State. They are the sources to whom I shall refer in this discussion.

In Moscow's picture of United States policies regarding Eastern Europe there are two chief distortions. One of these is the idea that the United States wants to impose its political and economic ideas on Eastern Europe. That is untrue. In a speech at Dallas, Tex., on October 27, 1956, Secretary Dulles said:

"The captive peoples should never have reason to doubt that they have in us a sincere and dedicated friend who shares their aspirations. They must know that they can draw upon our abundance to tide themselves over the period of economic adjustment which is inevitable as they rededicate their productive efforts to the service of their own people, rather than that of exploiting masters. Nor do we condition economic ties between us upon the adoption by these countries of any particular form of society."

The second Moscow distortion, even graver in its import, is that we want to turn the Eastern European countries into military allies or even military bases from which to attack the Soviet Union. In the same address at Dallas Secretary Dulles said:

"And let me make this clear, beyond a possibility of doubt! The United States has no ulterior purpose in desiring the independence of the satellite countries. Our unadulterated wish is that these people, from whom so much of our national life derives, should have sovereignty restored to them, and that they should have governments of their own free choosing. We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies. We see them as friends and as part of a new and friendly and no longer divided Europe."

Further on this point, President Eisenhower in his television report to the Nation last October 31 said:

"We have also—with respect to the Soviet Union—sought clearly to remove any false fears that we would look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military allies. We have no such ulterior purpose. We see these peoples as friends, and we wish simply that they be friends who are free."

Again on December 18 in his press conference in Washington, Secretary Dulles emphasized that we have no wish to turn these countries into our allies. He continued:

"The United States is very openminded to any suggestions that might be made as to the status—whether neutralization or otherwise—of satellite countries which would take away any fear, I would hope, by the Soviet Union that it would be physically or militarily endangered if it facilitated this evolution to independence."

Mr. Chairman, once again the Soviet Union seems determined to misrepresent the United

States as a power bent on conquest by producing its familiar file of press clippings which prove nothing. But if the Soviet leaders honestly seek to know that the true purposes of the United States are toward Eastern Europe and the entire world, I suggest they study without prejudgment the statements I have just quoted. I suggest also that they study with equal seriousness the inaugural address of President Eisenhower a month ago, in which he said:

"We honor the aspirations of those nations which, now captive, long for freedom. We seek neither their military alignment nor any artificial integration with our society. And they can know the warmth of the welcome that awaits them when, as must be, they join again the ranks of freedom."

"We honor no less in this divided world than in a less tormented time, the people of Russia. We do not dread—rather do we welcome—their progress in education and industry. We wish them success in their demands for more intellectual freedom, greater security before their own laws, fuller enjoyment of the rewards of their own toil. And as such things may come to pass, the more certain will be the coming of that day when our peoples may freely meet in friendship."

III. TRUE SOURCES OF TENSION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Mr. Chairman, what I have said makes it clear enough that there is nothing in United States policy in which the Soviet Union can find cause for alarm. Obviously we must look elsewhere to find the true causes of tension and unrest in Eastern Europe. Recent tragic events in Hungary illustrate conclusively the root of the problem—the complete and total suppression of every expression of independence which the Soviets, in their psychopathic concern for security, regard as a threat to their control of the area.

How did this state of affairs come to pass in Eastern Europe? It came about as a result of the aggressive policies and repressive actions of the Soviet Union for nearly two decades.

The Soviet Union has denied the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Eastern Europe for national independence.

The Soviet Union has denied to these peoples basic human freedoms recognized in the Charter of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union has imposed puppet governments on the states of Eastern Europe and has used its armed forces to keep those governments in power.

The Soviet Union has plundered the economies of these countries for the benefit of the Soviet state.

The Soviet Union converted the three Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into Soviet Provinces in violation of their solemn treaties of friendship and non-aggression.

The Soviet Union has built up large satellite armies staffed by Soviet officers.

The Soviet Union has cut off the captive peoples from contact with the free world by monopolizing all channels of communications.

The Soviet Union has filled the newspapers and schoolbooks of Eastern Europe with "Hate America" slogans.

The Soviet Union has persecuted the churches and intimidated and harassed those who worship God.

The Soviet Union has erected physical barriers against escape, including barbed wire, mine fields, and lookout towers.

The peoples of this area unceasingly seek ways and means of piercing this Iron Curtain which separates them from contact with the rest of the world. Clearly it is the Soviet Union which has intervened directly in the internal affairs of the countries of Eastern Europe.

These, Mr. Chairman, are some of the major sources of tension in Eastern Europe. All of them arise from the actions and poli-

cies of the Soviet Union itself. Were it to change these actions and policies, the Soviet Union would find its own security enhanced and the cause of international peace would be immeasurably advanced.

IV. THE TRUTH ABOUT HUNGARY

Mr. Chairman, no event of our times has more clearly illustrated the nature of these tensions than the uprising of the Hungarian people against their Soviet masters.

There is no need to recite here the history of Hungary, which is still fresh in the minds of all of us. The Special United Nations Committee on the Problem of Hungary has made an excellent beginning on its assignment in the report which it issued on February 21, which I commend to the attention of the members of this committee. It is enough for me to mention such highlights of the Hungarian story as have a bearing on the absurd Soviet charge that the United States instigated these tragic events.

I quote from a letter presented on February 4 to the Secretary General from Mr. Peter Mod, who signed himself permanent representative of Hungary to the United Nations. This letter was circulated as Document A/3521, February 5, and here is what it says about the calling in of Soviet forces to crush a patriotic outburst of Hungarian national feeling:

"The Hungarian Government exercised its sovereign rights and called for the assistance of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Defense Pact so as to avoid further bloodshed and disorder and to defend the democratic order and the peoples' power."

Mr. Chairman, I have three comments on this story.

First, if the Hungarian Government had to call for troops, it is strange that it did not call for the Hungarian Army, a sizable military force. It is clear throughout the years of Soviet rule over Hungary, the regime was unable to arm Hungarians to handle an anti-Soviet fight in Budapest.

Second, the allegation that Soviet troops intervened to avoid further bloodshed cannot be passed over without comment. In fact, the massive intervention by Soviet tanks to avoid further bloodshed brought death to an estimated 25,000 on the Hungarian side, as well as several thousand Russians.

Third, it is all very well for Mr. Mod on February 5 to tell us about the calling in of Soviet troops, but there is an earlier message to the United Nations which will not soon be forgotten here, and which I wish to quote at this point. It was a cablegram addressed on November 1 to the Secretary General, and signed by Imre Nagy, President of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, designated Minister for Foreign Affairs. This telegram stated as follows:

"Reliable reports have reached the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic that further Soviet units are entering into Hungary. The President of the Council of Ministers in his capacity of Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned M. Andropov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union to Hungary, and expressed his strongest protest against the entry of further Soviet troops into Hungary. He demanded the instant and immediate withdrawal of these Soviet forces. He informed the Soviet Ambassador that the Hungarian Government immediately repudiates the Warsaw Treaty and at the same time declares Hungary's neutrality, turns to the United Nations and requests the help of the four great powers in defending the country's neutrality. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic made the declaration of neutrality on November 1, 1956. Therefore, I request Your Excellency promptly to put on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly of the United

Nations the question of Hungary's neutrality and the defense of this neutrality by the four great powers."

I come again to the Soviet charge that this resolution was instigated by the United States. Mr. Mod's letter appears to be the only attempt at a systematic summary of these specific charges that we have seen to date. Under the heading of "Facts That Have Come to Light," it names 5 Hungarians as spies and counterrevolutionaries, and it alleges that 1 of these had sent 20 others into Hungary—it quotes 2 broadcasts by Radio Free Europe advising the Freedom Fighters not to trust Imre Nagy—and it says that a 2-way radio and various small arms of German, Belgian, and American manufacture, were captured in one of the Freedom Fighters' strongholds.

Examine that letter as you will, Mr. Chairman, those are the only concrete details it contains to support the Soviet charge that the United States instigated the Hungarian revolution. We are being asked to believe that a foreign plot, resting on the work of some 2 dozen emigre agents, caused the population of Budapest to rise en masse, and that the resulting insurrection had to be crushed at the cost of 25,000 Hungarian lives. Clearly, we must look for the real origin of the events not outside Hungary, but inside—in years of brutal misrule by the servants of Moscow.

It is not necessary to go to so-called "capitalist" sources to find support for this statement. Here is part of an editorial from the Budapest newspaper, Szabad Nep, dated October 29, 1956:

"The latest issue of Pravda carries a dispatch from its own correspondent about the events in Hungary entitled 'Collapse of the Antipopular Adventure in Hungary.' This is an error. What happened in Budapest was neither antipopular nor an adventure. What is more, it did not collapse. For 5 days this city, torn by fate, shed blood and suffered. But through hundreds of deaths, the ideals of true patriotism and democracy were burning in the fires.

"The slogans of Socialist democracy were the loudest to be heard and not those of the reaction and counterrevolution. The revolutionary people of Buda and Pest want a people's freedom without tyranny, terror, and fear. They want more bread and national independence. Is this then an antipopular adventure?"

"What collapsed could indeed be called antipopular. It was the reign of the Rakosi-Gero clique."

"The Pravda article further states that manifestations of the people of Pest and the revolt were instigated by the subversive work of the British and American imperialists. We can safely say that all 1.5 million inhabitants of Budapest are deeply hurt and insulted by this assertion. In body or in spirit, a large portion of the population of Budapest was present at the demonstrations on Tuesday, October 23. They sympathized or agreed with the basic patriotic and democratic aims of the great popular uprising."

"The bloody, tragic, but at the same time ennobling fight, lasting 5 days, was not instigated by some sort of subversive work. It was caused, alas, by our own faults and crimes. The greatest of our faults and crimes was our failure to protect the sacred flame which our ancestors had bequeathed to us—our national independence."

And not only Budapest, Mr. Chairman, but Moscow, also began to admit the same truth, however reluctantly. On October 30 the Soviet Government issued a remarkable statement.

"The Soviet Government and all the Soviet people deeply regret that the development of events in Hungary has led to bloodshed. On the request of the Hungarian People's Government the Soviet Government con-

sented to the entry into Budapest of Soviet Army units to assist the Hungarian People's Army and the Hungarian authorities to establish order in the town. Believing that the further presence of Soviet Army units in Hungary can serve as a cause for even greater deterioration of the situation, the Soviet Government has given instructions to its military command to withdraw the Soviet Army units from Budapest as soon as this is recognized as necessary by the Hungarian Government."

Mr. Chairman, despite all the elliptical phrases in that Soviet Government statement, two things are noteworthy:

1. Not one word in the whole statement—which is much longer than the part just quoted—alleges outside instigation, by the United States or any other country. That line began to be played vigorously only after the Soviet Union had proceeded, through an act of classic perfidy, to crush the revolution and disperse the Nagy government.

2. On October 30, Moscow admitted in effect that its army was fighting against a genuine patriotic outburst. That is the only possible meaning of its admission that the further presence of Soviet Army units in Hungary can serve as a cause for even greater deterioration of the situation. The Soviet leaders can never unsay that admission.

October 30 was the high tide of Soviet candor. On November 2, after the Nagy government repudiated the Warsaw Pact, and declared neutrality for Hungary, hundreds of Soviet tanks descended on Budapest. Then Moscow began to tell a different story—that the United States had planned the mass uprising of the Hungarian people.

Mr. Chairman, to most of us here this Soviet argument is a mockery of the facts. We wonder how any man can present it with a straight face. We must remember, however, that the Soviet measure of truth consists solely of whatever advances the interests of the party and the regime.

V. CONCLUSION

There is much that we could propose in the way of Assembly action on this subject, and we would willingly make proposals if we thought that new and constructive resolutions at this time were likely to be a beneficial influence on Soviet policy. However, there is little reason to hope that that would be the case.

The General Assembly has adopted many resolutions pertinent to the problems raised here, most recently with regard to Hungary. The Soviet Union has always failed to observe them. The United States feels that this is not the time for the General Assembly to add new resolutions to what has already been so well expressed. As in so many cases, the need is for Soviet compliance.

Yet we do not despair. We look for the time when the Soviet Government will see fit to restore to the peoples of Eastern Europe their national freedom; to open up their borders to the fresh air of genuinely free interchange with all nations; and to concentrate on promoting the genuine safety and welfare and creative power of their own remarkable people. No event within the power of governments could be of greater benefit to world peace. Someday the Soviet Government must recognize that freedom in Eastern Europe is not incompatible with Soviet security.

If progress is to be made along this road, Mr. Chairman, it is the Soviet Union which must help itself. Today its leaders remain committed to a grim totalitarian philosophy of conflict which leads to suppression of human liberty, to battling all ideas differing from their own.

Mr. Chairman, I close with this word of hope. Long after the Soviet slanders we have heard today are forgotten, this General Assembly will be remembered for the devoted efforts made here in favor of a just peace. The settlements for which we strive are based

on the idea that disagreements between nations, no matter how stubborn, can be solved without war. The United States believes that the political warfare which Soviet Communist feels obligated to wage against the free world need not be an exception to that rule. It is of human origin, it is limited, and it will end. May the Soviet Union understand this fact, so that, with its prompt and indispensable help, we can begin to end the conflict peacefully, and in the justice and friendship for which humanity longs.

NOMINATION OF DAVID K. E. BRUCE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO WESTERN GERMANY

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, one of the more unusual manifestations of partisanship has appeared in this morning's newspapers. It was carried in a story by the very careful and very responsible Associated Press correspondent, Jack Bell.

The story describes protests carried all the way to the White House by some of our colleagues against the nomination of David K. E. Bruce to be Ambassador to West Germany. The protests have an overtone that deserves careful consideration.

The protests do not claim that Mr. Bruce is unqualified by temperament, training, or inclination to fill this responsible post. They do not claim that he has taken any actions that would hamper his service to the United States.

Those who are doing the protesting base their anger on one point and one point only—that Mr. Bruce has allegedly contributed \$1,000 to 1956 Democratic campaign funds.

Mr. President, since when has this Nation operated on the theory that only Republicans can deal with diplomacy? Since when is the sole criterion of a man's ability to serve the use to which he puts his campaign checkbook?

The President of the United States has selected Mr. Bruce without regard to his partisan affiliations. Presumably, the President feels that his qualifications outweigh this factor.

A decision of that kind is one that most Americans would applaud. I do not believe that they would agree with the influential Republican Senator, who asked not to be quoted by name, but who said, according to Jack Bell:

Senate Republicans were angry at the appointment of a Democratic contributor to one of the choice posts as ambassador often given as a reward to those who have given financial support to the party in power.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Not at this time. I shall be glad to yield when I have concluded my statement.

Mr. President, I do not pose as an expert in the methods by which our Ambassadors are selected. But I think it is an outrage to assume that an ambassadorial post is nothing but a reward for faithful partisan service.

I would take that stand regardless of which party made the appointment.

Our Ambassador to Germany is a key figure in our foreign policy. The American people have only one question about the man who will fill the job—is he ca-

pable of representing the United States with ability and with loyalty in a post that is crucial to our future?

I do not recall that Mr. Bruce has ever been overly partisan. He has his convictions—but he has not denied others the right to their convictions.

His nomination will go to a committee which can determine his qualifications. There will be ample time for all the testimony that is needed as to his experience, his faithfulness and his capacity.

Once we have all the facts, we can make our decision. But it will be a sad day for the Senate if it is a political decision rather than a decision as to what course best serves our country.

I ask unanimous consent that Jack Bell's article be printed in the body of the RECORD at this point as pertinent to my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BRUCE CHOICE AS ENVOY IRKS GOP LEADERS—SENATORS REPORTED IN UPROAR OVER NAMING OF DEMOCRAT

(By Jack Bell)

President Eisenhower's appointment of a \$1,000 contributor to 1956 Democratic campaign funds as Ambassador to West Germany threw Senate Republicans into an uproar last night.

Overruling protests carried to the White House by some Republican leaders, Mr. Eisenhower sent to the Senate the nomination of David K. E. Bruce, 59, an Under Secretary of State and an Ambassador to France in the Truman administration.

Bruce, who replaces James B. Conant, was among three diplomatic assignments announced yesterday. The others were Amory Houghton, chairman of the board of the Corning (N. Y.) Glass Works, to replace C. Douglas Dillon as Ambassador to France, and William J. Sebald, a State Department career officer, who fills the vacancy caused by the death of Ambassador to Australia, Douglas Moffat.

Bruce was listed by a Senate elections subcommittee as having contributed \$1,000 to Democratic organizations in a report covering the period from January 1 to November 30, 1956.

Senator GEORGE D. AIKEN, Republican, of Vermont, said his colleagues were incensed at the appointment of another Democratic campaign contributor to an important diplomatic post.

"That eliminates any ardor we Senate Republicans might otherwise have to defend the administration from the attacks the Democrats are making on it," he declared.

"They ask us to defend Secretary John Foster Dulles and the President when they are criticized by the Democrats," AIKEN said. "But every time there is an important job to be filled—they give it to a Democrat."

AIKEN, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said it was too early to say whether there would be any organized effort to block confirmation of Bruce's appointment.

Bruce is the son of the late Senator William C. Bruce, a Maryland Democrat, and formerly he was married to a daughter of the late Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury in three Republican administrations.

There was no immediate Senate reaction to Mr. Eisenhower's appointment of Houghton. Corning Glass has been involved in 1 criminal and 5 civil antitrust actions brought by the Government since 1939.

James C. Hagerty, White House press secretary, was asked whether the President was aware of the antitrust cases against Corning and whether the White House had

any comment on why Houghton resigned from the War Production Board in 1942.

"I have no comment," Hagerty said, "although before an Ambassador is appointed he has a complete check made on him."

PROTESTS OVERRULED

An influential Republican Senator, who asked not to be quoted by name, said Senate Republicans were angry at the appointment of a Democratic contributor to one of the choice posts as Ambassador often given as a reward to those who have given financial support to the party in power.

This Senator said protests had been made more than 2 weeks ago to Meade Alcorn, Republican national chairman against the appointment. He described Alcorn as disturbed by the prospective appointment. Alcorn was reported on his way to Washington from his home in Hartford, Conn., and could not be reached.

The Republican Senator said direct protests against the appointment had been made to Sherman Adams, Mr. Eisenhower's chief assistant. But he said Adams had overruled these objections.

Senator JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Republican, of Maryland, said he was disappointed at the President's action in nominating Bruce but would not oppose confirmation.

"I don't think it's a good practice to appoint Democrats to these jobs when there are plenty of Republicans capable of filling them," BUTLER said.

[Senator FRANCIS CASE (Republican, of South Dakota) said that the "mere fact that he (Bruce) happened to be a Democrat wouldn't disqualify him in my opinion."

"I think the Foreign Relations Committee would want to inquire into the cause of his (Bruce's) espousal of the Stevenson candidacy in relation to the Eisenhower foreign policy and the position of West Germany in the European picture," CASE said.]

Over the last 16 years, Houghton has had several Government jobs. He served as Assistant Deputy Director of the Materials Division, Office of Production Management, in 1941-42, and later in 1942 he was Deputy Chief of the War Production Board's Bureau of Industry Branches. In 1943-44 he was chief mission officer for the Lend-Lease Administration.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. BUTLER. It is very unlike the very able and distinguished majority leader to regard all objections to this appointment as being in the same category. If he will read the article carefully he will find that I made no objection to the qualifications of Mr. Bruce; as a matter of fact, I said I thought he was qualified. Likewise I made no mention of political contributions.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I have not charged the distinguished Senator from Maryland with anything.

Mr. BUTLER. But I happen to be one of the Senators mentioned in the article, and I have a right to say on the floor that I made no objection to this nomination. I stated publicly that I had no objection. I could not complain of Mr. Bruce's qualifications. I did not wish to play politics with his nomination. I said and now repeat that there are plenty of qualified Republicans from whom to choose an ambassador and that we do not have to go outside our party to find one. There is nothing evil in Mr. Bruce's appointment, but I say it is better practice at this juncture to choose a Republican.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wish to associate myself with the distinguished majority leader, and to state that on the basis of personal knowledge, in my opinion David Bruce is one of the best qualified men this country can produce for any post in the diplomatic service, regardless of party.

I recall full well that under Democratic administrations Republican Ambassadors have been appointed. I recall a former colleague of ours, Warren Austin, who was appointed as the first Ambassador to the United Nations. He was a Republican in good standing.

I recall our late colleague Dwight Griswold, a Senator from Nebraska, who was appointed head of the Economic Mission to Greece with the rank of Ambassador.

I recall John McCloy, who was a Republican, and who was appointed High Commissioner to Germany. A High Commissioner is the same as an Ambassador. All of these men were of exceptional ability and all of them served our country well.

I think the President of the United States and Mr. Dulles are to be commended for showing the good judgment they have displayed in selecting a man with the qualifications and the capabilities of David Bruce. He is an honor, an asset to this country, a man of real value, and we need him now.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I appreciate very much the statement which my friend from Montana has made.

I have made no charges against my friend from Maryland [Mr. BUTLER]. I merely said that I hoped that we had not come to the point where we operate on the theory that only Republicans will be called to work in the foreign policy field.

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield to my friend from Connecticut.

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, when I read the newspaper this morning, I was very unhappy to see David Bruce's appointment headed for political controversy.

I was personally unhappy, because I have known Mr. Bruce for, I think, about 30 years, and I have watched his record and his interest in our national affairs, which I think have been admirable at all times. I believe he has become one of the most effective men we have seen in the State Department in a good many years.

I should like at this point to make a further statement. I had not realized that the majority leader was going to raise this issue—

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I will say to the Senator from Connecticut that the majority leader did not raise the issue. The issue was raised by the article written by Mr. Bell.

Mr. BUSH. I understand that. I had hoped that the matter would not boil up, so to speak, as it appears to have done.

Mr. Bruce has had considerable experience in the Western European area.

As early as 1926 he served as a Foreign Service vice consul in Rome. He returned to Great Britain as chief representative of the American Red Cross in 1940, and from that date until 1954 he was continuously associated with the activities in Western Europe except for a brief period when he served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce.

In 1953, in keeping with the principle of bipartisanship in foreign affairs, Mr. Bruce was appointed United States observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and special American representative to European High Authority for Coal and Steel. Both of these positions carried a considerable amount of responsibility, were extremely important to United States foreign affairs, and required the utmost in diplomacy. Mr. Bruce served in this capacity at the request of the President. Quoted below is an excerpt from a White House press release of February 18, 1953:

In view of the importance which the United States attaches to the progress being made in Europe toward developing a unified six-nation community, the President has asked Mr. David K. E. Bruce, former Under Secretary of State, to serve as United States observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and special American representative to the European High Authority for Coal and Steel.

The position of Ambassador to Germany is today one of our most sensitive positions, and requires a man of unique background and the qualifications which Mr. Bruce possesses. And again, in keeping with the principle of bipartisanship, Mr. Bruce was considered the best qualified man for the position.

Mr. President, at this point in my remarks I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement which will give background information on Mr. David K. Bruce.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON DAVID BRUCE

1921: Admitted to the Maryland bar.

1921-25: Practiced in Baltimore.

1926-28: Vice consul, United States Foreign Service, Rome.

1928-40: Engaged privately in business and farming.

1940: Chief representative in Great Britain for the American Red Cross.

1941-45: With OSS (1943-45, Director of European theater OSS).

1947-48: Assistant Secretary of Commerce.

1948-49: Chief of ECA mission to France.

1949-52: United States Ambassador to France.

1952-53: Under Secretary of State.

1953: Appointed special United States observer at Interim Committee of the European Defense Community.

1953-54: Special American representative to European High Authority for Coal and Steel.

MISCELLANEOUS

1924-26: Member of the Maryland House of Delegates.

1939-42: Member of the Virginia House of Delegates.

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, Mr. Bruce is a Democrat. He was a member of the Maryland House of Delegates for 2 years, 1924 to 1926. He was also a member of the Virginia House of Delegates from 1939 to 1942.

In 1953, as a member of the Randall Commission, I was in Paris, and we held hearings there. We heard American Ambassadors assigned to different countries of Europe testify. I believe the members of our commission agreed that Mr. Bruce's testimony was the clearest, the best, and the most effective given to our commission by anyone representing the United States.

So I hope, Mr. President, that this nomination will be considered on its merits. We know that during the Truman administration numerous Republicans were appointed to high office.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

Mr. BUSH. I yield.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement of examples of prominent Republicans who served during the administrations of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Harry S. Truman.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The following are examples of prominent Republicans who served during the administrations of Roosevelt and Truman:

Secretary of Navy Knox.

Secretary of War Stimson.

John Foster Dulles, who served as adviser to Secretary Acheson on the Japanese treaty.

Warren Austin, first United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

Robert Lovett, Under Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense.

John J. McCloy, United States High Commissioner to Germany.

Paul Nitze, head of the policy planning staff, Department of State.

Dwight Griswold, chief of United States aid mission to Greece.

Milton Eisenhower, representative of the United States to 3d session of UNESCO.

Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator for Economic Cooperation.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, recalled from retirement at Columbia University to serve as commander in chief, NATO.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I shall supply additional names later.

Mr. BUSH. I wish to thank the majority leader for the courtesy he has shown me.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I deeply appreciate the statement which the Senator from Connecticut has made.

I shall be glad to yield to all Senators to express themselves on the subject.

I have not known Mr. Bruce as long as has the Senator from Connecticut. I do not know Mr. Bruce as either a Democrat or a Republican, but I believe him to be a patriotic American.

I believe also that the Committee on Foreign Relations will hold hearings and take testimony to determine whether Mr. Bruce is qualified for the post to which he has been appointed. I shall await the action of the committee and the recommendations it may make to the Senate.

The only point which the Senator from Texas desired to make was that he hoped we have not reached the point in the Senate where it is felt that only Republicans are qualified to hold diplomatic positions.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield to my friend, the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. First, I thank the majority leader, the distinguished Senator from Texas, for bringing forth from our colleagues these testimonials in behalf of Mr. David Bruce. They are testimonials which are surely merited.

I also wish to thank the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BUSH] for his very able and accurate statement relating to Mr. Bruce.

Then I should like to add, in connection with the list which the Senator from Texas has mentioned, that only recently the Committee on Foreign Relations reported favorably the nomination of Mr. Zellerbach to be Ambassador to Italy. Mr. Zellerbach formerly was Chief of the ECA mission in the Truman administration. He served then with the rank of Ambassador, and now he has been named by this administration to be Ambassador to Italy.

A former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, a position which is the chief, choice, top ambassadorial post, was Mr. Gifford, a Republican, who served in the Truman administration. The Ambassadorship to Great Britain is one of the most important ambassadorial posts, if not the most important, in the gift of this Nation.

Mr. Eric Johnston, a Republican, served the Truman administration ably, loyally, and patriotically. He was selected because of his competence rather than because of his political persuasion.

It appears to me that although undoubtedly there are many Republicans who are capable of filling ambassadorial posts, the criteria should be the skill, the ability, and the knowledge of those who are called upon to fill the posts; their politics should be a secondary consideration.

In Mr. Bruce, the administration has selected a man who was Under Secretary of State, and is keenly aware of the problems which face this country and the world. He served in France during the time when the relationships between France and Germany were of a most critical and crucial nature. His assignment now to one of the most important diplomatic posts is certainly in line with his previous experience. I, for one, not knowing Mr. Bruce personally, except in a casual way, but knowing him chiefly because of his splendid service record, feel that the President is to be commended for making this appointment.

I urge the President to reach deep into the talent of this Nation for further such assignments. It is a national shame that great talents, skill, and ability, which are so sorely needed at this terrible hour in our Nation's history, are being lost to the Government while they cruise around the world, so to speak, on a private basis. The Government needs the best assistance it can get.

There are men of the stature of the former Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Benton, and Mr. Chester Bowles, and also, to mention him again, John McCloy, who are needed for the service of this Government, rather than in private industry or in the writing of articles. They are desperately needed to bring our

Nation peace and security, and to give us better faith and better image in the world in which we live.

I hope the President will make more such appointments.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I appreciate the comments of my friend from Minnesota. I thoroughly subscribe to the sentiments which he has expressed.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I rise to make a brief comment on the colloquy concerning the nomination of Mr. David Bruce to be Ambassador to West Germany. I think it has been generally realized, both during this administration and in the previous one, that it was important in the field of our foreign policy to have bipartisan representation and support. It is perfectly obvious to every observer, both within the Senate and without, that with the parties so closely divided as they are, and with the Democratic Party holding the control of both this body and the body on the other side of the Capitol, if our Government is to function as the Government of the United States, and not as two warring coequal branches of the Government, it is necessary that there be cooperation.

I have commended Senators on the other side of the aisle on various occasions throughout the first 4 years of this administration for having supported administration proposals on a basis which placed the country above any narrow partisanship. I think it is entirely proper that from time to time Members of the other party be selected, just as it has been pointed out that during the 20 years of Democratic administrations many Republicans were appointed to office.

I hope my friends on the other side of the aisle will not become overanxious, because I think by the time we Republicans have been in power for 20 years, our list will equal in size their list. But that does not necessarily have to be done in the first 5 years.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I want the record to show that I do not share the Senator's optimism. [Laughter.]

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think it is entirely proper, as the President of the United States and the Secretary of State have felt it is, to have the nomination of Mr. Bruce submitted to the Senate. Based on the information I have concerning the caliber, character, and background of Mr. Bruce, I should imagine, without trying to prejudge what the Committee on Foreign Relations will do, that the nomination will probably be reported favorably to the Senate by a substantial majority; and after due discussion, the nomination probably will be confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I am grateful for the comments which the distinguished minority leader has made. The contribution which he has made to the discussion is the type of statement which I would expect to come from BILL KNOWLAND.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the distinguished majority leader for his statement. The junior Senator from Arizona merely wishes to make the observation that he does not desire to enter the colloquy about the merits or demerits of Democrats for appointment to foreign posts or for other political assignments.

The distinguished majority leader read a list of Republicans who had served under the Democrats, and while the junior Senator from Arizona is perfectly willing to accept almost all of those names unequivocally, and a few of them with some reservations, I suggest that, in my book, Paul Hoffman does not fulfill the requirements of being a Republican.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. The Senator from Arizona and Mr. Hoffman can debate that matter between themselves. I never become involved in such discussions.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I simply wanted to remind the Senator from Texas that Collier's is no longer in business.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I was not aware of the Bruce controversy until this morning. Frankly, I was deeply shocked to hear of the story that was reported in the newspapers.

I have known Mr. David Bruce for a considerable time. I was very closely associated with him in his operations abroad during the days when this Nation was trying to develop the Marshall plan and similar operations in Europe.

I feel that his appointment constitutes one of the finest appointments this administration has made. He is a man eminently well qualified and trained for the post. He has been living with the western European situation practically since the close of World War II. It never occurred to me to question whether he was a Democrat or a Republican. I agree with the distinguished majority leader completely on that score.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I never have entertained any doubt about my able and scholarly friend from New Jersey associating himself with the theory that Ambassadors should come from only one party. The senior Senator from New Jersey is not that partisan.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, We are having a very important discussion. I am in favor of more appointments from the Republican Party, but certainly in the field of diplomacy or foreign relations, we must try to pick the best Americans available.

I know from personal experience that David Bruce is one of the outstanding and one of the best-informed Americans of today; and from my experience on the Foreign Relations Committee, I have felt that he is one of the most intelligent Americans we have had serving us abroad, where he has reported accurately and faithfully the existing conditions.

I wish to state that I do not believe politics should enter into our consideration of nominations to ambassadorships.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield to me?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield to my delightful friend, the Senator from

California, if he wishes to take part in this discussion.

Mr. KUCHEL. I do; and I thank the Senator from Texas for yielding to me.

I wish to state that I very much regret that the article to which reference has been made, written by a distinguished newspaperman, has caused my friend, the majority leader, some concern and, beyond that, has provoked the long colloquy which has occurred here.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I wish to point out to my friend that not only has it caused the majority leader some concern, but it has caused others some concern. When we reach the point where protests are made to the White House because an ambassadorial appointee may have supported one party or contributed to one party, we come to a sad day in America.

Mr. KUCHEL. I wish to attempt to allay a little of the apprehension which apparently the newspaper article has caused.

Mr. President, I do not doubt that in the past 25 years, political considerations have—perhaps unfortunately, perhaps not—sometimes motivated national administrations in making appointments to specific positions. But in the present instance I am glad to say that, like the Senator from Texas, I want the person nominated to serve our Nation as Ambassador to West Germany to be judged on his merits, and on his merits alone.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I welcome the Senator from California to the fold; I am always delighted to be associated with him, and I am glad that he feels that the standard of merit should control in the making of appointments.

Mr. KUCHEL. However, with all due respect, I suggest to my friend, the Senator from Texas, the relevancy of the Good Book:

Judge not, that ye be not judged.

For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.

And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?

I suggest that the Republican Party and the Democratic Party equally have within them great men of the Nation, and equally have within them men who are motivated by politics and by political considerations and by nothing else.

Good appointments and bad appointments have been, and will be, made by any and every administration. Neither holding public office, nor party labels, are any guaranty of ability.

In this instance a Republican administration has seen fit to designate one who apparently is an able American citizen, registered in the Democratic Party, to participate in the nonpartisan foreign policy of the Government of the United States. The Senate will now await the recommendations of the Foreign Relations Committee. Then we here will make our judgment.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I appreciate the statement the Senator from California has made. Evidently he did not hear my statement when I said that I would take the stand that I have taken today in the Senate

regardless of which party made the appointment.

Mr. KUCHEL. I am sure my friend would do so.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, referring to the colloquy regarding the nomination of Mr. Bruce to be Ambassador of the United States to West Germany, may I say that I think the apprehension of the distinguished majority leader may be exaggerated. However, I do not wish to address myself to that.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield at this point?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I deplore the fact that the Senator from Kentucky feels that I exaggerated any apprehension. I merely quoted from an article quoting certain Republican Senators. I said—as I have stated many times in the past, when Democratic administrations have named Republicans to ambassadorial posts—that I did not think partisan affiliations should be the sole qualification for appointment to diplomatic posts.

Mr. COOPER. I understood perfectly the statement made by the Senator from Texas.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I would not want my friend, the Senator from Kentucky, to think that I exaggerated anything.

Mr. COOPER. I only say that I think the Senator has exaggerated the political significance of the newspaper report.

However, I wish to address myself to the appointment itself.

Because of the positions Mr. Bruce has held, and with distinction—as our Ambassador to France, and in other positions connected with NATO and ECA—I am sure that his background of experience will be very valuable in the position of Ambassador to West Germany, for which he has been nominated.

The relationships of France and Germany are important, as they have always been. Mr. Bruce understands these relationships and he has played an important part in the development of our relationship with our European allies. I am happy the President has nominated him. I have no doubt, and I am sure the distinguished majority leader has no doubt at all, that his nomination will be confirmed by the Senate. While consideration of the appointment by the Foreign Relations Committee is required, I have no doubt of the confirmation of Mr. Bruce's nomination, nor of the great abilities he will bring to the post.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I express the hope that my good friend from Kentucky will carefully read the statement of the majority leader, which will appear in the RECORD tomorrow morning, and then draw his own conclusions.

Mr. MONRONEY subsequently said: Mr. President, I wish to compliment the distinguished majority leader for raising the question whether political membership in one party should deny to a proven able diplomat the right to serve his country. Certainly if the State Department thought Mr. Bruce could properly fill the toughest diplomatic position today, that of being Ambassador to West Germany,

and selected him for that purpose, he was selected not because of his membership in a particular political party, but despite his membership in it. He was selected because throughout the years, when he was tested by the State Department in various diplomatic posts, where decisions had to be made, Mr. Bruce met the tests.

In meeting the challenge which appeared in the form of complaints to the White House, I feel the distinguished majority leader has raised a most important point, and one which should prevent future attacks on individuals and attempts to blackball their appointments simply because they are not members of the party of the President who happens to be in power.

Mr. JAVITS subsequently said: Mr. President, I should like to identify myself with Senators who spoke earlier expressing confidence in David Bruce as our prospective Ambassador to the Republic of West Germany.

I have known Mr. Bruce for a long time, and have great confidence in him. I may observe that it is the essence of bipartisanship when the best from both parties are picked for important appointments.

Perhaps the majority leader looks for too much when he expects every member of both parties to be convinced that bipartisanship is best. We can hardly expect that in our country. We have seen today some of the differences which exist. The expression of views on both sides has been helpful. It has shown what I think is true; namely, that the great majority of opinion supports bipartisanship, including appointments to high office.

SCHEDULED ADDRESSES BY THE PREMIER OF FRANCE AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF WEST GERMANY

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I have an announcement to make concerning the program for the Senate. As previously announced, the Premier of France, Guy Mollet, will address the Senate tomorrow at 3:30 p. m.

I had earlier advised the Senate that a joint meeting of the House and Senate had been arranged for March 7 to hear an address to be delivered by the President of the Republic of West Germany, Adolph Huess. Unfortunately, President Huess is ill, and has postponed his visit to the United States. I am sure that at a later date similar arrangements will be made, and the Senate will be advised.

INCREASE OF THE INTEREST RATE ON GI MORTGAGES

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, it was with great satisfaction that I noted that the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs firmly rejected, last week, the administration's proposal to raise the interest rate on GI home mortgages from 4½ percent to 5 percent, and, instead, proposed to the House a bill similar to my own bill, S. 88, which would provide substantial funds derived from the na-

tional service life insurance revolving fund to purchase GI mortgages at par.

It is typical of this administration to take the sterile line that the only way out of the current home mortgage problem is to raise the interest rate.

Mr. President, this administration seems to have only two answers to the great economic problems of this Nation. One is to lower price supports on agricultural commodities wherever possible, and the other is to raise the interest rates wherever possible. The result is that the farmer is desperately trying to keep his farm together, the construction worker and the whole construction industry are slipping frantically into a truly desperate situation, and veteran home buyers are unable to find financing; and, on the other hand, the great financial houses of the country are enjoying unprecedented profits.

A recent issue of the St. Paul Pioneer Press carried an article, written by Mr. Relman Morin of the Associated Press, entitled "Tight Money: High Loan Rates Drag on Housing." I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD this article from the February 20, 1957, issue of the St. Paul Pioneer Press.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TIGHT MONEY: HIGH LOAN RATES DRAG ON HOUSING

(By Relman Morin)

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—Tight money is not a mysterious condition confined solely to banks, bond houses, or Wall Street. It touches the blueprints of the home you may be planning or the house you want to buy. In this third article of a series on the Nation's economy Relman Morin, AP staff writer, shows how it has affected the home building industry and the people in industries affected by building.)

Most Americans want to own their own home today, and most of them do. Of all the astonishing changes of the last 25 years, this is one of the most spectacular. Today nearly 60 percent of America's 43 million families live in their own homes. Before World War II the figure was nearer 40 percent, and there were fewer families.

Well, wedding bells ring for 1½ million couples a year now, and young people don't wait, as their parents had to wait, to accumulate so much cash for the down payment on a house.

Babies arrive—over 4 million a year at the latest count—and they tend to set people thinking of a home with a backyard.

Government help on financing spurred these urges.

Thus the home-building industry has become a gigantic segment of the Nation's economy. Every year since 1948 it has erected a million or more dwelling units. Into them went mountains of wood, glass, metal, bricks, concrete, plaster, and plastics—quickly followed by other mountains of furniture, rugs, household appliances, textiles.

Estimates say 1 out of every 15 wage earners (not counting those on farms) owes his livelihood today to home building.

So this is big business, involving millions of people. And right now it is a wide-screen headache for many of them.

A builder here is angry, a would-be buyer there frustrated. Congress is examining problems of both. The Federal managers of money have come under hot fire.

LOAN PROBLEMS

Home building dropped off in 1956. It went down from the 1,300,000 units of 1955 to

1,100,000. Some estimates, but by no means all, are that it will drop again this year.

Looking at 1956, analysts saw a sharp reduction in total GI home-loan applications to the Veterans' Administration. Did that mean fewer ex-GI's are trying to buy homes?

"No," said the builders. "It's money." They pointed out that GI applications are not accepted by the VA until lenders have agreed to put up the money for the proposed purchase.

Tight money has brought a rise in interest rates on loans. The VA rate is 4½ percent. It is 5 percent for the Federal Housing Administration. Investigators found they could do better elsewhere than on these mortgages.

Allied with the drop in GI applications was another aspect.

Requests from builders to the VA to appraise the value of homes to be made available for GI loans also fell off sharply.

That could mean more builders plan to concentrate on putting up higher priced dwellings. Along with interest rates, the cost of land, labor, and materials have risen.

But George Sullivan Goodyear, president of the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB)—himself a builder—said tight money was the chief item in the headache.

"The cost of money has gone up more than any other single item in the cost of a house," he said. "It has forced us to price ourselves out of the market."

Late last year, the NAHB questioned 800 contractors across the country on the situation and the outlook for this year. Some findings—

1. Most thought money would remain tight, and many expect it to get tighter.

2. Median prices on homes were expected to rise from \$14,700 last year to \$15,200 this year.

3. A majority reported that they, personally, expect to do as well or better in 1957 as last year. But nearly 70 percent predicted a nationwide drop in home building.

"Uncertainty . . . is the dominant note," said the NAHB, summarizing the outlook for 1957.

To see the picture at a closer range, take an individual case.

Samuel Block is a contractor in Detroit suburbs. He has been building 7 years. No specialist, he put up different types of homes, ranging from \$7,000 to \$30,000 in price.

"I've got 12 VA-type homes standing empty," he said. "Every time I sell one, I lose close to \$500. I would have been better off just to hold the land."

EARLY DAYS IN MONTANA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, steamboat travel on the rivers in Montana is rather remote, and a point of history; but in Montana there is one lady who has a vivid memory of days when steamboat travel on the Missouri River was an accepted mode of transportation. Mrs. Jessie Robertson, when 11 years old, came up the Missouri River by steamboat with her mother. She has lived in the Great Falls-Sun River area for 81 years.

Mrs. Robertson is very alert at 92, and can relate many interesting incidents in the transformation of Montana Territory into the great Treasure State.

A feature story in the February 12, 1957, issue of the Great Falls Tribune contains a number of Mrs. Robertson's recollections of her earlier years in Montana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled "Great Falls Woman, 92, Recalls Early Days at Sun River," be printed in the body of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SHE CAME UP THE MISSOURI RIVER BY STEAM-BOAT—GREAT FALLS WOMAN, 92, RECALLS EARLY DAYS AT SUN RIVER

(By Tribune staff writer)

Montana residents in this year of 1957 who can remember steamboat days on the Missouri River are, in the nature of things, extremely few. One Great Falls resident who has such memories is Mrs. Jessie Robertson, who lives at the Elmore Apartments, each winter, and in an historic brick house at Sun River town each summer.

She is Mrs. Jessie Robertson, who at the age of 11 came up the Missouri River by steamboat with her mother, and who has lived in the Great Falls-Sun River area for 81 years.

It was in June 1876—the month of the Battle of the Little Big Horn—that Jessie and her mother, Mrs. John Vorus, boarded the steamboat *General Meade* at Sioux City, Iowa, for the trip to Fort Benton. Jessie's father, a Civil War veteran, was hospitalized at the Soldiers' Home in Milwaukee because of disabilities resulting from war service. Mrs. Vorus and daughter were en route to Montana Territory to make their home with Mrs. Vorus' father, James Strong, who had a ranch near Sun River town.

The Strong ranch was a mile and a quarter from the town, near the James Adams place. On arrival at Fort Benton, Mrs. Vorus and Jessie boarded a stagecoach for the final leg of their journey.

Today, Mrs. Robertson's memory, sight, and hearing are excellent. She observed her 92d birthday January 19.

What does she recall of the trip up the Missouri?

"I recall that among our fellow passengers was a brother of Nick Kessler, Helena pioneer, and his three daughters," Mrs. Robertson said. "The girls' mother had died, and their father was taking them to Helena to make their home. The Kessler girls' names were Louisa, Mary and Emma."

At one point on the river where the steamboat halted to take on wood, Indians came aboard.

"They wanted to buy the second Kessler girl and me," Mrs. Robertson said. "They offered 20 ponies for her and 10 ponies for me. I don't think they were joking, either."

Every time the boat stopped to take on wood, Jessie and the Kessler girls would go ashore to play. At one point, some of the men took rope and put up a swing to amuse the young passengers during the stopover.

The up-river trip from Sioux City to Fort Benton took 4 weeks.

Jessie Vorus attended the old Sun River School, later going to Helena to study at a Catholic convent. At the age of 18, she married B. A. Robertson, who worked at the George Steell store in Sun River. Robertson died at Havre in 1933.

Mrs. Robertson now maintains the former Steell home as a summer residence. Steell, long a leading citizen of Sun River, later became agent for the Blackfeet Indians and still later was a pioneer resident of the Flathead North Fork area, at Polebridge.

She recalls the days when troops were stationed at Fort Shaw.

"I remember riding horseback from Sun River to Fort Shaw with a girl friend, and seeing the soldiers at target practice. We rode side-saddle, of course; it was considered quite improper for girls and young women to ride in any other fashion in those days."

"What did we do for recreation besides riding? Well there was a dance almost every Friday night in the hall above the Sun River store. Usually we danced all night and would go to the hotel for breakfast. I remember that when Negro troops were stationed at Fort Shaw, an excellent orchestra

from the post, conducted by a tall Negro named Whittaker, supplied the music."

Mrs. Robertson also recalls the lynching of a Negro soldier at Sun River, following a shooting affray there. This was only a short time before the Army post was deactivated and the troops removed forever.

"Sun River residents were apprehensive about this lynching," Mrs. Robertson recalls. "They were afraid of a reprisal by the soldiers, but nothing of the kind occurred."

"Negro soldiers at Fort Shaw were not allowed to have their wives and families on the post, and some of them maintained their families in Sun River. Normally, relations between the townspeople and the soldiers were friendly."

Did the soldiers from Fort Shaw visit Sun River much during their leisure hours? Not much, Mrs. Robertson said. The Negro troops appeared to frequent the neighboring town more than the white troops which had preceded them, possibly because of the ban on Negro families at Fort Shaw.

Mrs. Robertson knew Will Hanks, editor of the Sun River Sun, very well. Hanks subsequently moved his printshop to Great Falls and established the Great Falls Tribune.

Other pioneers of the valley she recalls were Robert Vaughn, for whom the town of Vaughn was named; the Dunn brothers, Matt and Tom; John Largent, Robert S. Ford, father of Lee M. Ford, chairman of the board of the Great Falls National Bank, who still lives in the paternal home near Sun River; John Healy, and, of course, James Adams, who was her uncle.

Mrs. Robertson's mother died at the age of 102, at Billings, and is buried at Sun River, as are her grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. James Strong.

The Robertsons had 5 children—2 sons and 3 daughters. Only the daughters survive. They are Mrs. Norma Ketchum, Ephrata, Wash.; Ruth Robertson, Puyallup, Wash., and Mrs. Dorothy Davies, Missoula.

Mrs. Robertson has 10 grandchildren, and 9 great-grandchildren. Mrs. Fred Traber, 1512½ First Avenue South, is a granddaughter.

THE NATIONAL DEBT

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I read in yesterday morning's issue of the New York Times a most interesting list of the public obligations of the United States which must be paid in the next 12 months. The brief article to which I refer is headed "One-Year Maturities Are \$75,770,817,783."

It reads:

Direct obligations of the United States Government in the hands of the public that will mature within 12 months amount to \$75,770,817,783. They consist of Treasury bonds, certificates of indebtedness, bills, and notes as follows:

I shall not read the entire list, but I point out that this list, as published yesterday, shows obligations almost \$200 million greater than the list published a week ago; that it is more than \$6 billion greater than the maturities which were coming up a year ago.

I have been making it a practice, Mr. President, to call the attention of the Senate and of those who read the RECORD to the enormous debt of the United States. These figures in the article published in the New York Times, which occupy less than 4 inches of space, tell us that the obligations which we must pay during the next 12 months are greater than was the entire national debt before we entered World War II. The

debt has been steadily increasing, and, more important than that, the interest upon the national debt has been increasing during the last 4 years.

Beginning with 1953, it has been the policy of the Treasury Department to raise the interest on the national debt. The budget which the President sent to Congress last January for the fiscal year 1958 calls for \$100 million more to pay the interest upon the national debt than during the previous fiscal year. The interest upon the national debt has been steadily increasing, until now it amounts to about \$7,500,000,000. The \$7,500,000,000 which we now will have to pay to the holders of the obligations of the Treasury is more than the cost for the operation of Congress, for the operation of the courts, and for the operation of all the other normal activities of government.

Only back in 1939 and 1940, before we became involved in World War II, the total appropriations made by the Congress of the United States for all purposes was scarcely more than \$10½ billion. It is important to bear this in mind when we are considering resolutions such as that which will presently be before the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that the clipping to which I have referred may be printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the clipping was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ONE-YEAR MATURITIES ARE \$75,770,817,783

Direct obligations of the United States Government in the hands of the public that will mature within 12 months amount to \$75,770,817,783. They consist of Treasury bonds, certificates of indebtedness, bills, and notes as follows:

Date	Bonds, etc.	Amount
Feb. 25	Discount bills.....	\$1,600,093,000
Mar. 1	Series E savings bonds.....	2,221,561,610
1	Series F savings bonds.....	439,668,849
1	Series G savings bonds.....	1,576,728,600
7	Discount bills.....	1,600,005,000
14	do.....	1,599,968,000
15	2½-percent Treasury notes.....	575,000,000
21	Discount bills.....	1,600,310,000
22	2½-percent tax anticipation certificates.....	3,220,612,000
22	Tax anticipation bills.....	1,005,647,000
28	Discount bills.....	1,614,593,000
Apr. 1	1½-percent Treasury notes.....	9,000,000
4	Discount bills.....	1,599,988,000
11	do.....	1,600,455,000
18	do.....	1,600,483,000
25	do.....	1,600,512,000
May 2	do.....	1,700,238,000
9	do.....	1,700,188,000
15	1½-percent Treasury notes.....	4,154,930,000
16	Discount bills.....	1,700,438,000
23	do.....	1,800,319,000
June 24	Tax anticipation bills.....	3,351,464,000
24	3¼-percent tax anticipation certificates.....	1,311,980,000
Aug 1	2½-percent Treasury notes.....	12,056,091,000
15	2-percent Treasury notes.....	3,792,028,000
Oct. 1	1½-percent Treasury notes.....	824,196,000
1	3¼-percent certificates of indebtedness.....	7,270,942,000
1958		
Jan. 1	Series E savings bonds.....	2,343,258,752
1	Series F savings bonds.....	210,232,572
1	Series G savings bonds.....	1,667,867,400
Feb. 14	3¼-percent certificates of indebtedness.....	8,422,000,000
	Total.....	75,770,817,783
	Week ago.....	75,584,325,783
	Year ago.....	69,490,985,203

¹ Maturing monthly within a year from this date forward.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BLAKLEY in the chair). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate the unfinished business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Barrett	Holland	Neuberger
Bible	Humphrey	O'Mahoney
Blakeley	Javits	Saltonstall
Carroll	Johnson, Tex.	Stennis
Ervin	Long	Thurmond
Gore	Mansfield	Watkins
Hayden	McClellan	
Hennings	Morse	

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, may I inquire of the Senator from Oregon whether he wishes the quorum call continued? I am addressing the junior Senator from Oregon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No debate is in order at this time.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. MORSE. I object. If we are going to have the practice of holding Members to a quorum call, it cannot be had only for the convenience of the leadership of the Senate, but will have to be had—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No debate is in order. Objection is heard. A quorum is not present. The clerk will call the names of the absent Senators.

The legislative clerk called the names of the absent Senators, and Mr. AIKEN, Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. BEALL, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BRICKER, Mr. BUSH, Mr. BUTLER, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CAPEHART, Mr. CARLSON, Mr. CASE of New Jersey, Mr. CASE of South Dakota, Mr. CHAVEZ, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. CLARK, Mr. COOPER, Mr. COTTON, Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. DWORSHAK, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. ELLENDER, Mr. FLANDERS, Mr. FREAR, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. GREEN, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. HILL, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. IVES, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. JENNER, Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, Mr. KEFAUVER, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. KERR, Mr. KNOWLAND, Mr. KUCHEL, Mr. LAUSCHE, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. MALONE, Mr. MARTIN of Iowa, Mr. MCCARTHY, Mr. McNAMARA, Mr. MONROE, Mr. MORTON, Mr. MUNDT, Mr. MURRAY, Mr. NEELY, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. POTTER, Mr. PURTELL, Mr. REVERCOMB, Mr. ROBERTSON, Mr. RUSSELL, Mr. SCHOEPEL, Mr. SCOTT, Mr. SMATHERS,

Mrs. SMITH of Maine, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. TALMADGE, Mr. THYE, Mr. WILEY, Mr. WILLIAMS, and Mr. YOUNG answered to their names when called.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

DISQUALIFICATIONS OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to address a few remarks to the question of the qualifications of the Secretary of State to perform the duties of his very important position in this hour of great crisis in American foreign policy. I base my remarks on an interesting article entitled "John Foster Dulles: A Very Complicated Man," written by Joseph C. Harsch, and published in Harper's magazine. The article reads, in part, as follows:

John Foster Dulles' father was a Presbyterian clergyman, dally and earnestly concerned with righteousness and duty. Both his maternal grandfather, John W. Foster, and his uncle, Robert Lansing, were men who achieved prominence, wealth, and an identical title: Secretary of State of the United States.

Matching the achievements of his grandfather and uncle, without breaking faith with his father, is not a task which our present Secretary of State consciously assigned to himself in his boyhood. Yet this difficult ambition is woven unmistakably in his career—and it has helped make him the most intriguing and the most controversial figure in the Eisenhower administration.

Dwight D. Eisenhower has called Mr. Dulles the greatest Secretary of State he knows anything about. RICHARD NIXON once said, "Isn't it wonderful to have a Secretary of State who stands up to the Russians?" But to Randolph Churchill is attributed the remark that he "smells of nonconformism," and the Democratic view is typified by Senator HENRY M. JACKSON's contention that Mr. Dulles is "the original misguided missile, traveling fast, making lots of noise, and never hitting the target."

Mr. Harsch goes on to say:

Assessments of Mr. Dulles seem usually to fall into one or the other of these extremes.

The article is a very interesting one. It continues by analyzing the complex nature of this man. I wish to make it a part of my remarks about the Secretary; therefore I ask unanimous consent that the entire article be printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES: A VERY COMPLICATED MAN

(By Joseph C. Harsch)

John Foster Dulles' father was a Presbyterian clergyman, dally and earnestly concerned with righteousness and duty. Both his maternal grandfather, John W. Foster, and his uncle, Robert Lansing, were men who achieved prominence, wealth, and an identical title: Secretary of State of the United States.

Matching the achievements of his grandfather and uncle, without breaking faith with his father, is not a task which our present Secretary of State consciously assigned to himself in his boyhood. Yet this difficult ambition is woven unmistakably into

his career—and it has helped make him the most intriguing and the most controversial figure in the Eisenhower administration.

Dwight D. Eisenhower has called Mr. Dulles the greatest Secretary of State he knows anything about. RICHARD NIXON once said, "Isn't it wonderful to have a Secretary of State who stands up to the Russians?" But to Randolph Churchill is attributed the remark that he "smells of nonconformism," and the Democratic view is typified by Senator HENRY M. JACKSON's contention that Mr. Dulles is "the original misguided missile, traveling fast, making lots of noise, and never hitting the target."

Assessments of Mr. Dulles seem usually to fall into one or the other of these extremes. One of the many curious things about him is the fact that he tends to arouse either approval bordering on veneration, or disapproval ranging close to moral contempt. Those who have worked closely with him in business and in government seldom view him dispassionately. This is surprising, when it is noted that in his personal relations Mr. Dulles is gregarious, sociable, a genial dinner-table companion, lucid in exposition, reasonable and openminded in discussion.

British diplomats—who were prepared to dislike him after their relatively successful relations with Dean Acheson—will tell you privately (never publicly, for that would do too much violence to a British folklore presumption of original Dulles sin) that he is very good in private negotiations, and much better than Acheson, you know, on the colonial question.

Mr. Dulles himself has probably contributed more than anyone to the confusion and controversy which surrounds his career. Because of him, "liberation," "unleashing," "massive retaliation," "agonizing reappraisal," and "brink of war" have become clichés in the current vernacular of Washington. They are often used with a connotation of an empty pose.

He is more vulnerable to criticism from his own publicly spoken record than from any other source, because in his official life he is given to overstatements, oversimplification, and less than total candor—flaws which are usually absent from his private conversations.

A substantial explanation of the dualism between his public and private behavior is that he progressed from being a small-town preacher's son to his present eminence by way of the legal profession. For years his daily task was to make the best case he could for his client. He is reputed to have been the most highly paid corporation lawyer in the history of New York City. A lawyer is not expected to believe the partisan side of the case which he presents for his client. He does not carry it into his personal beliefs or private conversations. Nor is consistency expected. He may take the opposite side of the same argument on behalf of his next client. Such professional habits are not easily shaken off.

COURTROOM DIPLOMACY

Mr. Dulles earned his position in the legal profession against odds. He got his job with the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell at \$50 per month on the insistence of Grandfather Foster and against the better judgment of the senior partners. The partners consented to give him a chance, but they took negligible interest in a boy from the back country who had slight connections with the big families or big corporations—and who, besides, had taken his law at George Washington University, not at Yale or Harvard. The fact that he had graduated with the highest marks ever granted at George Washington was no compensation in their eyes for his other shortcomings.

The quality which broke through the resistance of Sullivan and Cromwell and made him, ultimately, the senior partner was his

ability to make a case for a client. He did it so successfully that not until he reached the age of 61 did he experience what could be called a check to his career. Then, in 1949, he ran for the Senate, and was beaten by Herbert Lehman.

The technique of making a case for a client has persisted into his conduct of American diplomacy, and not surprisingly it has involved him in instances of embarrassing inconsistency. When he was in Pakistan last March, for example, he argued to members of the SEATO alliance that it pays to be an ally of the United States—citing facts and figures to prove that allies get better treatment at the United States Treasury than nonallies. Seven days later he was in non-allied Indonesia saying, "there is no connection whatsoever" between our financial aid and membership in a military-security pact with the United States. He cited as evidence the fact that India and Ceylon receive such aid although they are not allied with the United States.

In between he stopped over in New Delhi and tried to persuade Prime Minister Nehru that he had not been unfriendly to India when he had previously referred to Goa, that much debated Portuguese enclave on the Indian coast, as a province of Portugal.

Another striking example of making a case was provided by Mr. Dulles on February 24, 1956. The new Soviet diplomacy had for months been running rings around Western diplomacy. Soviet arms had gone to Egypt, Soviet trade delegations were roving as far afield as Latin America, Pakistan had agreed to send a trade mission to Moscow, and the administration had entangled itself in the on-again, off-again fiasco of tank shipments to Saudi Arabia. Yet Mr. Dulles asserted: "At this moment in Moscow they are having to revise their whole program. They have failed."

This was followed by one of the rare explosions of Senate, and public, criticism of Mr. Dulles (there had been an earlier explosion over his "massive retaliation" phrase). It evoked an explanation at the State Department that Mr. Dulles' doctrine of Soviet failure was based on a comparison of the Soviet position in 1948 with the Soviet position in 1956. Now the West was undoubtedly better off in 1956 than it had been in 1948—but what critics had been talking about was the appearance of a Western decline from 1953 to 1956. Mr. Dulles had built his case for Soviet failure on a convenient selection of dates which gave him the advantages of the Marshall plan, formation of the NATO alliance, successful resistance to aggression in Korea, and the refurbishing of Western military power—all pre-1952 Truman-Acheson achievements, which Mr. Dulles had tended to minimize in the 1952 election year. He may have felt, however, that his client had changed, after the Democrats regained control of Congress in 1954.

Certain inconsistencies between remarks made by Mr. Dulles during the 1952 campaign and in a 1949 Senate speech were raised at the Senate hearing on his confirmation in January of 1953. Mr. Dulles explained that "under our constitutional system we have a general election every 4 years * * * one side presents his case, and the other side presents the other case, as two lawyers do when they go into court. At that stage the two parties are not judges and they are not judicial. In my opinion they should not be * * * but when that time is past, then I believe we should try to work together on a bipartisan basis."

When Life magazine came on the streets in early January of 1956 with an article based on recorded conversations with Mr. Dulles which pictured him as almost the sole bulwark of the peace, Democrats concluded that Mr. Dulles' quadrennial release from judicialness had come around. Even Vice President Nixon commented dryly that "the rest of us can take care of the campaigning."

Another characteristic of many distinguished lawyers is the lack of an administrative flair. (This is, perhaps, natural, since they ordinarily work alone or with a handful of close associates, and thus have little chance to learn the techniques of managing a large organization.) In Mr. Dulles this trait seems to be pronounced.

Sullivan & Cromwell partners recall that when Dulles was senior partner he exhibited more than usual aversion to administrative work. The senior partner normally oversees this part of the firm's operations—as the present senior partner, Arthur Dean, does. During the Dulles term, however, one of the other partners took over this work by mutual and tacit consent.

Shortly before taking office as Secretary of State Mr. Dulles expressed a wish that he might have an "ivory tower" office off in some obscure corner of the White House where he could just think about foreign policy, and not have any formal connection with the vast, complex, hierarchical structure of the Department of State. He did not get his wish, but his subordinates have sometimes suspected that in his own subconscious mind he did. It is frequently said that he carries the foreign policies of the United States around in his coat pocket. He seldom delegates policy responsibility and it is noteworthy that—as in the case of the Saudi Arabian arms shipments—no one was quite sure what the policy was until he came back from his Duck Island vacation retreat.

The once-powerful secondary officials of the Department have tended to become merely executors of his policy (when they are informed of what it is) and the rank of Ambassador has steadily declined in importance during the Dulles incumbency. When there is any important negotiating to be done Mr. Dulles usually goes himself, leaving his Ambassadors no function higher than that of reporters. Even this residual function has been of declining relevance, since Mr. Dulles has his own views of each situation clearly in mind. Ambassadorial reports bear upon Dulles' thinking, but seldom influence it; and, it is said, they never cause a reversal of a strong Dulles view. Ambassadors have been called home for consultation without being consulted by Mr. Dulles.

During the Acheson period, policy was generated out of the impact upon each other of many and diverse minds in the Department. Mr. Acheson set up and used an institution called the policy planning staff. He frequently overrode its conclusions, but he did not assume that his thinking alone could generate foreign policy. Today the policy planning staff has fallen into disuse: Department policy begins and ends in Mr. Dulles' own mind. Dulles' policy is influenced heavily by the Senate. It is sometimes reversed by the President. It is adjusted within the limits of tolerance of public opinion. But the machinery of the State Department plays the least of the roles in the process.

The fact that Mr. Dulles is one of the most traveled Secretaries of State in history is a direct result of his unfamiliarity with the use of an administrative apparatus. To him, his staff of experts, his farflung Foreign Service, appear to be not an instrument, but a baffling encumbrance from which he disengages himself insofar as he is able.

James F. Byrnes—another lawyer—exhibited a similar inclination, although to a lesser degree. When he was negotiating with the Soviets in Moscow in 1945, one of his aids (now an Ambassador) suggested that the delegation ought to send a report of its work back to the State Department. "Why?" Mr. Byrnes inquired in genuine bewilderment. "What would be the point of that? I'm here."

Mr. Dulles also is capable of assuming that wherever he happens to be at the moment, there, too, is the Department of State. In

his case, however, it comes closer to being true.

A related quality is his facility for disentangling himself from embarrassments. In 1947 he had nominated Alger Hiss, with the highest recommendations, for the post of director of the Carnegie Endowment. When the pumpkin papers were unearthed in August 1948 he and Dean Acheson were both vulnerable to criticism, because of their past associations with Hiss; Mr. Dulles was, if anything, more so because he had provided Hiss with refuge at the Carnegie Endowment after Hiss had been maneuvered out of the State Department under Mr. Byrnes.

A MATTER OF THEOLOGY

At once Mr. Dulles relieved Hiss of all active duties at the Carnegie Endowment. He appeared as a prosecution witness at both of the Hiss trials. He contradicted Hiss testimony on five specific points during the final stage of the second trial. By the day of the verdict, January 21, 1949, he was ready to say:

"The conviction of Alger Hiss is a human tragedy. It is tragic that so great promise should have come to so inglorious an end. But the greater tragedy is that seemingly our national ideals no longer inspire the loyal devotion needed for their defense." (Some 25,000 American boys were shortly to challenge Mr. Dulles' lugubrious generalization by giving their lives on the battlefields of Korea.)

Precisely 4 days later Dean Acheson—citing as his text the 25th chapter of the Gospel according to St. Matthew, verses 34 through 46, the theological basis on which the ministers of the Christian church follow even a convicted murderer to the scaffold—said:

"I should like to make clear to you that whatever the outcome of any appeal which Mr. Hiss or his lawyers may make in this case, I do not intend to turn my back on Alger Hiss."

Some philosophic observers of the two men see in this disparity of reaction to the same incident an outbreak of the ancient conflict between Presbyterian and Episcopalian: the one prudently turning his back, the other defiantly wearing past mistakes. If there is self-righteousness in either position, or both, it is a matter for a panel of theologians to determine.

The triple reconciliation of righteousness, duty, and success is not always an easy one. Theologians would also be intrigued by the way Mr. Dulles resolved it when he had to deal with the controversial personnel cases which he inherited from his predecessor. The McCarthy group in Congress had declared total war against a number of Foreign Service career officers, in particular, John Carter Vincent and John Paton Davies.

Mr. Dulles dutifully went through the long records and found—as Mr. Acheson had—that there was no basis for dismissal on the ground of doubtful loyalty. But he divested himself prudently of Mr. Vincent on the ground that his China reporting had been a failure, and of Mr. Davies for disregard of proper forbearance and caution in making known his dissents outside privileged boundaries. His personal feelings about the Davies case may or may not be suggested by the fact that on the day after he had announced his decision he telephoned Mr. Davies and authorized him to use his (the Dulles) name as a reference if it would be helpful in obtaining another job. His final session with Mr. Vincent ended on the Dulles observation (apparently conclusive to Mr. Dulles) that Mr. Vincent's critics in the Senate talked louder than his supporters.

The rationale of Dulles' defenders in these matters is that when a man is trying to do something as important as preserving the peace of the world he cannot afford to carry excess baggage, any more than can a man

trying to climb Mount Everest. Mr. Dulles found ways and means of shedding the liabilities which had plagued Mr. Acheson unless, as in the case of Charles E. Bohlen, the defenders could muster stronger support than the critics. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Senator Robert Taft both spoke up for Mr. Bohlen. Dulles' detractors on the other hand use such words as "hypocrisy" and "moral cowardice" in speaking of these cases.

It is not clear whether the free run which Senator McCARTHY enjoyed around the State Department in the early Dulles days represented Dulles' prudence or orders from the White House. It has been noted that when Harold Stassen did talk back to Senator McCARTHY in those same days he was repudiated by the White House.

Dulles' adaptability to changed circumstances was tested, and confirmed, by his relations with his son Avery. Mr. Dulles himself has been loyal to his father's Presbyterianism in personal faith, in constant references in his public life to moral and spiritual values, and in considerable prominence as a layman in the work of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, an organization of Protestant churches. When Avery Dulles entered the Roman Catholic Church to study for the Jesuit priesthood, Mr. Dulles broke off relations with his son. Relations were established before photographers when Dulles became a candidate for Senator.

There are plenty of other examples of Mr. Dulles' adaptability. When he visited South Korea just before the outbreak of war he promised the South Koreans that they would "not stand alone" in the event of attack. Back in Washington, he confided to reporters that he was vastly relieved when President Truman ordered United States troops into the Korean battle, for otherwise his promise of support to the South Koreans would have remained unfulfilled. From the outbreak of the war until the 1952 campaign he defended the Truman decision to enter the war. He then became critical of that decision during the campaign; but returned to its defense after the 1954 mid-term elections put a Democratic majority back in control of the Senate.

He contributed comfort and usable quotations to the Bricker amendment cause during the 1952 campaign, but turned against the amendment when it came toward a vote in 1953.

WHAT HE SAYS AND DOES

The qualities which make Mr. Dulles controversial show up in his control of foreign policy. One usually knew with Acheson what his policy was trying to achieve. With Mr. Dulles one is not quite sure whether the American attitude toward Communist China, for example, is to be measured by the fact that he refused to shake hands with his Chinese opposite number, Chou En-lai, when they were in the same room in Geneva in 1954, or by the fact that since July of 1955 a United States Ambassador and a Communist Chinese Ambassador have been accredited to each other in Geneva.

Dulles' admirers cite his famous brink-of-war doctrine as evidence of his mastery of the technique of foreign relations. They take seriously his version of events, which is that he has deliberately taken the United States to the brink and thus saved the peace by his boldness.

His own version of how he got the Chinese Communists to agree to the truce in Korea is that when in India, on his first of many trips around the world, he told Prime Minister Nehru that if there were no truce the United States would open up the war and carry it across the Manchurian frontier. In the Dulles version of history Mr. Nehru presumably relayed this stern warning to Peking, after which the truce was concluded. But Mr. Nehru has since been reported as saying that if Mr. Dulles ever told him any such

thing on that trip he, Mr. Nehru, didn't take it seriously enough even to remember it, let alone relay it to Peking.

The greatest single controversy over Dulles' conduct of foreign policy is whether Mr. Dulles has shaped events, or adjusted himself to them. Facts permit one to say only that at the end of Mr. Dulles' third year in office his policy was almost diametrically opposed to what he said it was going to be when he started out. His opening declaration was to take United States policy off the alleged dead center of Acheson's containment, inject boldness into it, and by boldness liberate the captured peoples of the Soviet realm and roll back the Iron Curtain.

Perhaps the most characteristically Dullesian operation was the one involving the famous Formosa Resolution. Congress was asked for what amounted to a blank check, authorizing the President to do almost anything to save Formosa. The country braced itself for war with China, and the world shuddered. But when the 7th Fleet steamed westward under cover of the resolution it did not fire its broadsides against the Communists on the China coast, but merely evacuated the Chinese Nationalists from the Tachen Islands, then turned quickly away. The affair left people wondering whether the resolution was intended to protect the Chinese Nationalists in the Far East or to cover the Dulles flank on Capitol Hill. And was the 7th Fleet spared from attack by Chinese Communist planes because of the much publicized resolution, or because urgent unpublicized advices sent from the State Department to Peking by way of London, Moscow, and New Delhi had explained that the fleet maneuver was solely intended for the evacuation of the islands?

In pre- and early-Secretarial days Mr. Dulles spoke often and critically of the Acheson containment policy. The implication always was that he intended to go over from passive containment to an active roll-back of the Soviet frontiers of power. But the fascinating fact is that as the months elapsed and the Communist frontiers rolled over half of Indochina, Dulles' pronouncements on foreign policy more and more frequently included passages which sounded much like the theories of George F. Kennan, author of the containment doctrine.

The essence of Kennan doctrine was stated in the following passages from Mr. Kennan's Stafford Little Lectures of March 1954:

"I can conceive that Soviet power will some day recede from its present exposed positions, just as it has already receded in Finland and Yugoslavia and northern Iran. But I can conceive of this happening only precisely in the event that the vital prestige of Soviet power is not too drastically and abruptly engaged in the process, in the event that change is permitted to come gradually and inconspicuously as the result of compulsions resident within the structure of Soviet power itself, not created externally in the form of threats or ultimata or patent intrigues from the outside."

In 1952 during the election campaign and long thereafter, Mr. Dulles advocated policies toward the Soviet Union which bore some of the external earmarks of threats, ultimata, and patent intrigue although he would not himself of course put such labels upon them. Instant and massive retaliation sounded rather like a threat. The warning to the Chinese Communists extended through Mr. Nehru partook of the quality of an ultimatum. And the liberation policy sounded rather like a patent intrigue, for Mr. Dulles never made it clear how he intended to bring about this desirable end; he just kept hinting at various ways and means of giving the Soviets homework and difficulties in their own backyard. He seemed to imply an intensified psychological warfare and propaganda offensive abetted by undercover CIA work. He never spelled it out in detail beyond the creation in the

free world of political task forces to develop a freedom program for each of the captive nations.

There does seem to have been a stepup in CIA undercover operations against the Communist bloc in the early days of Dulles' regime. The Committee for Free Europe was also for a time stimulated to greater activities. But by 1954 Washington had begun to demobilize the Chinese Nationalist division which had tried to operate in northern Burma against the Chinese Communist southern flank, and had begun to dismantle the CIA operation on Formosa known as Western Enterprises, Inc. Mr. Dulles had formally assured the United Nations, as early as September 15, 1953, that "our creed does not call for exporting revolution and inciting others to violence." Long after this the Committee for Free Europe continued to float its "freedom balloons" across the Iron Curtain, but everyone knew that the forward strategy of the early Eisenhower days had been laid aside. The Free Europe people, whose hopes had been focused on liberation by revolution, wondered plaintively just what was their continuing function.

So much attention was paid to the massive retaliation phrase in the famous speech of January 12, 1954, that few at the time noticed the balancing Kennanesque passage: "If we can deter such aggression as would mean general war, and that is our confident resolve, then we can let time and fundamentals work for us."

On March 17, 1954, in an expansion of this thesis, he was sure that "there is going on, even within the Soviet empire, a silent test of strength between the powerful rulers and the multitudes of human beings * * * their aspirations in the aggregate make up a mighty force." This was further documentation for the thesis that "time and fundamentals will work for us, if only we will let them."

On the day Mr. Kennan had his final farewell session with Mr. Dulles he spent a long evening of soul-searching with an old friend. At the end of the conversation, Mr. Kennan remarked that he supposed that Mr. Dulles could not after all pursue a Kennan policy as long as he, Kennan, remained in the State Department. Mr. Dulles continued to use bold words along with his Kennanesque passages, but certainly by February 8, 1955, the men of the Kremlin had taken the real measure of the bold words. On that date Vyacheslav Molotov said to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union: " * * * the Republicans won the presidential elections not because they proclaimed a more aggressive foreign policy, but, on the contrary, by virtue of the fact that they actually appeared to be for a certain time the political party which was furthering not the continuation of aggression in Korea but the ending of the war and the reestablishment of peace in that country."

Paul Nitze, Mr. Acheson's last chairman of the Policy Planning Staff, studied the Dulles record and published an article in Foreign Affairs (January 1954) analyzing the difference between declaratory policy and operation policy. The Dulles declaratory policy has been all that the most ardent warhawks on Capitol Hill could desire, but his operating policies began with a private explanation after Chiang Kai-shek had been "unleashed" that real United States policy in the Far East was one of disengagement from the mainland of Asia.

The United States has not yet disengaged entirely from the coast of Asia, but its armed power, its psychological warfare, and its propaganda have steadily receded from the frontiers of the power struggle. Under Mr. Dulles the actions, though not the voice, of the United States have beat less and less vigorously on the vital prestige of Soviet power and have given increasing opportunity for the compulsions resident within the structure of Soviet power to operate.

Whether Mr. Dulles ever consciously practiced Kennan policy, while declaring a contrary policy, is a secret Mr. Dulles has never disclosed. But it is obvious that there has been a gradual flow of Dulles policy around the clock from denunciation of Kennan doctrine toward the actual practice of Kennan policy.

INSIDE HIS OFFICE

Did Mr. Dulles play it this way from the start, or simply adjust himself to events as they changed? The answer is obscured by many things, including Mr. Dulles' own methods of operation as a Secretary of State. An Assistant Secretary of State who attended his daily staff conference for many months is sure that if he entered the Dulles office at any other than the scheduled time, Mr. Dulles would not be able to recall his name.

In Mr. Acheson's day the upper levels of the State Department seethed with new ideas. Under Mr. Dulles, policy originates with Dulles texts. The fitness of one Ambassador for promotion was questioned on the ground that he had exhibited ignorance of a particular Dulles speech.

Two theories are equally permissible about Dulles' conduct of our foreign policy. One is that with a truly Machiavellian skill he has kept the Senate war-wing happy by his public pronouncements, while quietly paying the way for a settlement with the Communist world by his actual operations. The other theory is that the domestic Soviet aftermath of Stalin's death—coupled with a vast American urge for peace which seized upon Dwight Eisenhower as its instrument—have together produced a more relaxed world with which Mr. Dulles has, if sometimes tardily, come to terms.

One theory among those who have worked with him is that Mr. Dulles is more preoccupied with the record of John Foster Dulles on the pages of history than with history itself. He seems to be singularly unaware of other people around him, and their possible corollary contributions to events. The "brink of war" article in *Life* attributes the peace exclusively to Dulles' technique—leaving one to wonder what Dag Hammarskjöld, Nehru, Anthony Eden, Winston Churchill, Dwight Eisenhower, and several others were doing with their time.

At a ceremonial occasion convoked for the presentation of an award in international jurisprudence to Dr. Manley O. Hudson, Mr. Dulles made a long speech on international jurisprudence. He made no mention whatever of Dr. Hudson. One person present remarked that it seemed to him "an extraordinary example of gracelessness in an intelligent man." The thoughts of more than one member of the audience went back to Mr. Dulles' opening letter to the employees of the State Department when he took over command with the announced expectation of receiving their "personal loyalty."

Mr. Dulles is unquestionably intelligent. He is beyond doubt a highly skilled negotiator. He is a brilliant pleader of a case. There is no record of any client ever having been dissatisfied with the Dulles handling of his legal affairs. He is a candid and articulate expounder of a complex problem in foreign affairs. His knowledge of such problems and his ability to grasp their ramifications is probably unequaled by any other foreign minister of these times.

But, curiously enough, there seems to be a lurking lack of self-confidence, or perhaps nonfulfillment, somewhere in his makeup—as though in his own mind grandfather John Foster still loomed unmatched over him. Mr. Dulles has made a far larger splash on the pages of history than the grandfather whom others have long since forgotten; but perhaps the grandson is still subconsciously a member of the clergyman's branch of the family, made uncomfortable

by grandfather's condescension toward his poor and more obscure relatives.

In the process either of making the peace, or of adjusting his record to the peacemaking work of others (take your choice), Mr. Dulles has chalked up one incontrovertible score over his predecessor. There have been grumblings on Capitol Hill from time to time, but never any real revolt against Mr. Dulles. The Senate voted its nonconfidence in Dean Acheson just before Mr. Acheson went to Brussels to negotiate the NATO alliance (which the Senate then ratified). No such public humiliation has ever been visited upon Mr. Dulles.

It can certainly be said of Mr. Dulles that he has successfully shielded himself and President Eisenhower's foreign policies from attack in the Senate. Whether he has actually generated American foreign policy is a further question which cannot be answered surely from the existing public record. Mr. Acheson and Mr. Kennan did generate policy. Mr. Dulles has steered old policies through a number of storms, and often steered wisely and well. At least, he kept the policies afloat.

Technically, Mr. Dulles has initiated only two new policies since he took office. One was the treaty of alliance with Chiang Kai-shek. The other was the "northern tier" policy in the Middle East which the British converted into the Baghdad Pact. It is not necessarily a mark against him that neither of these policies has produced spectacularly successful results, nor that there are only two. It may be that he best served the needs of the times by steering old policies along old courses. Congress has unquestionably been more comfortable during Dulles' steering than it was during Acheson's generating—although it did vote, and heavily, in favor of every Acheson policy presented to it (albeit attacking Mr. Acheson personally). Mr. Dulles has yet to test his ability to carry a major new policy of his own through Congress.

But the conduct of foreign policy does not consist exclusively of negotiating formal treaties, implementing formal statements of policy, and generating concepts like the Marshall plan and the NATO alliance. Policy can also be the absence of action. It may even involve the absence of action under the cover of much verbal sound and fury. Mr. Dulles inherited from Mr. Acheson a public opinion which demanded bold statements of defiance against the Communist world, but which also yearned for an end to the Korean war, and release from the fear of a greater atomic war.

THE TWO-WAY CHARGE

The Secretary has marvelously served these conflicting desires. He has appeared to be the crusading knight bearing the cross of righteousness on his shield, his sword upraised against the foe and his voice calling for the charge. But if your glance descends from this stirring picture, you notice that the charger he bestrides is ambling placidly in the opposite direction.

The spring crisis in Arab-Israeli affairs shows the characteristic earmark of a Dulles operation. At suitable intervals Mr. Dulles loudly called upon the Soviets to prove their good intentions by deeds, not words. But when Soviet arms flowed into Egypt Mr. Dulles inconspicuously noted that Moscow had a legal right to do what it did. Britain, in anguish over the apparent threat to its Middle East oil supplies, reversed its ancient pro-Arab inclination, sided with Israel, and tried to involve the United States under the 1952 Tripartite Declaration. Mr. Dulles deftly sidestepped this London move by invoking the United Nations, thus leaving the door open for Soviet participation in a settlement.

There was no formalized declaration or implementation of policy in this operation.

There were no documents. There was a risk that the Soviets would seek dangerous advantage from the leaning of Mr. Dulles away from London. But it was not the kind of risk Mr. Dulles takes in the picture of his behavior beloved alike by his adulators and his detractors. History is likely to record that Mr. Dulles has taken more and bolder risks on the brink of appeasement than on the brink of war.

It is perhaps premature to suggest that whereas the times of Stalin called for a Secretary of State who literally did stand up to Russians, the times of Khrushchev call for one who will make peace with them behind a smokescreen of threatening words. We know that the men of Moscow were shaken out of some of their illusions by the resistance of the West in Korea. We do not know yet whether they understand and will respond to Mr. Dulles' extraordinary way of riding foreign policy backwards. And it is much too early to decide whether the Dulles way of riding is intentional or accidental.

In the meantime, in spite of all criticism, Mr. Dulles continues to ride American foreign policy as though it belonged to him by inherited right.

He took office with the following statement to his assembled employees in the courtyard of the State Department:

"I don't suppose that there is any family in the United States which has for so long been identified with the Foreign Service and the State Department as my family. I go back a long way—I'd have to stop and think of the date—when a great-great uncle of mine, Mr. Welsh, was one of our early Ministers to the Court of St. James. In those days, you know, they were Ministers, not Ambassadors.

"My grandfather, John W. Foster, was for a long time in the diplomatic service and then ended up as Secretary of State under President Harrison. His son-in-law, my uncle, Robert Lansing, was Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson.

"Coming down to my own generation, my brother, Allen W. Dulles, was for many years in the Foreign Service of the United States. My sister, Eleanor Lansing Dulles, is today in the State Department and has been for several years. I, myself, have had at least sporadic association with the Department of State and with the Foreign Service throughout most of my life. So you can see, from the standpoint of background and tradition, it is to me an exciting and thrilling thing to be with you here today, as Secretary of State."

To Mr. Dulles the State Department has become a family fief. He inherited it by feudal right, he and his family, of which he is the senior living member.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I have not changed my opinion, as previously expressed on the floor of the Senate, about the Secretary of State, namely, that I think his usefulness in his position has long since passed. It is only necessary to look at the sorry mess in the Middle East to have all the proof one needs.

The Senate has before it for consideration a resolution which I do not think anyone can deny was principally authored by the Secretary of State. As I brought out in my colloquy yesterday with the distinguished junior Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE], the committees listened to the Secretary of State over a period of days. Questions which ought to have been answered by him specifically were answered with lengthy, evasive language. It was too bad we did not have Mr. Dulles in a courtroom, where he could have been tied down to answering directly, under the rules of

examination which prevail in courtrooms.

Mr. President, I cannot possibly vote for a resolution which is so strongly recommended by the Secretary of State until he supplies the Senate with a bill of particulars, which we are entitled to receive from him, as to exactly what he, as Secretary of State, proposes to do under the resolution if the broad blanket power is voted as provided in the resolution.

I recognize the seriousness of the comments which I make when I express publicly my lack of confidence in the Secretary of State. But I shall not vote for a resolution which gives this blanket authority to the administration with John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. I want to know what deals he has in mind under the Middle East program. I am not going to accept him on faith. I think the taxpayers of the country are entitled to know specifically what John Foster Dulles will recommend to the administration if the blanket authority contained in the resolution is voted to the administration.

As I said earlier this morning, I think there are increasing thousands of people in the United States who, day by day, as the debate proceeds in the Senate, are beginning to ask themselves some very interesting and penetrating questions. Senators need only to read their mail each morning to know how true that statement is. The people of the Nation are entitled to know what the administration intends to do under the resolution, because the foreign policy of the country belongs to the people and not to the President of the United States and the Secretary of State.

Mr. President, I have made these brief comments this morning, based upon the article published in Harper's magazine, because I think the article itself raises very serious questions as to the competency of the Secretary of State to continue to perform the duties of that office.

Mr. President, I now desire to address myself to another subject.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon has the floor.

RUSSIAN POWER PRODUCTION IS INCREASING

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I desire to discuss an excellent article entitled "Russia Increasing Power Production," written by Marquis Childs, and published in the Washington Post and Times Herald of today.

A group of us in the Senate have for a long time sought to point out the very great danger to the security of our country which is being created by this administration through its power program. After all, it is the sources of energy available to private enterprise in the United States which give us the assurance of whether our productive power will increase in relation to Russia's, or whether we shall find ourselves secondary to Russia in a very few years. As Marquis Childs points out:

Public power development was a conspicuous feature of the New and Fair Deals. It figured, too, in the election campaign last

fall in many Western States, including those in which the Democrats scored unexpected gains.

When Douglas McKay came in as Secretary of the Interior, this concept was quickly vetoed and a study recommending it was put on the prescribed list. But from areas where power shortages are acute there is evidence of dissatisfaction with this veto.

The Portland Oregonian, a Republican paper—

And, I may add parenthetically, one of the most active anti-Morse newspapers in the recent campaign—

expressing editorially the hope of a change in power policy, noted that the Interior Department under McKay "had even sold its transmission line through central Oregon to Klamath County to California-Oregon Power Co."

"This prevented," the editorial noted, "effective interconnection between the Federal Bonneville system and the Federal Central Valley system of California. Had this connection been completed, the Northwest probably could be utilizing power from California on an exchange basis this winter rather than cutting off a third of its aluminum production."

The President of the United States is saying much these days—and rightly so, in my opinion—about the dangers to the security of our country; but I direct his attention to what I believe to be the fact, namely, that his own power policy, with the give-away partnership program which the President is underwriting, also endangers the security of our country in the years not too far ahead, because that policy deals with the matter of developing the maximum energy potentials of this Nation.

The President of the United States, I charge, is following a policy in the power field which will not develop the maximum energy potential of the great river basins because he has been drawn in by unsound advisers, in my judgment, and is following the bad advice of those advisers in regard to his partnership scheme, which will turn over great power resources to the private utilities, not for the maximum power development, but for underdevelopment.

That is why I think it is so important that the Senate give consideration to the excellent article written by Mr. Marquis Childs and published this morning. Mr. Childs has hit the nail on the head, in my judgment, in regard to the issue of the development of a power program in Russia as compared with the underdevelopment program in the United States.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed at this point in the body of the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RUSSIA INCREASING POWER PRODUCTION

(By Marquis Childs)

The startling statement that the United States has already lost the lead in science to Soviet Russia, made with the authority of Edward Teller, who developed the hydrogen bomb, should shake the complacency which assumes that high prosperity and shiny new automobiles are evidence of superiority.

What Teller confirmed was what many scientists and educators have long suspected. The extraordinary push of Soviet technical

and scientific education has achieved in a relatively short time the leadership that this country has held for many years.

But it is not alone in science that America's preeminent position is threatened. In many fields the rate of growth in the Soviet Union exceeds that of the United States. One of these is the development of electric power production.

Recent estimates made by power specialists show that in the period 1951-55 Russia's installed hydroelectric power capacity increased at the rate of 80 percent, while the rate of growth in this country was 29 percent.

These are rough estimates, especially in view of the uncertain nature of Soviet statistics. But they give a general idea of the order of difference in the growth of this element vital to the development of industry, technology, and science.

Soviet power production today is only a fraction of that in the United States, which has 42 percent of all the installed capacity in the world, according to a study made by the International Cooperation Administration.

But if the rate of growth continues to be 2 or 3 times that of the United States, then we may wake up one day to discover the same thing has happened in power production as has occurred in science. In power produced from coal and natural gas, the rate of growth for the Soviet in the same period was 63 percent against 30 percent for this country.

Among those concerned over this threat are advocates of public power production who believe the policy of the present administration is preventing the construction of large-scale projects that only Government can build.

Public power development was a conspicuous feature of the New and Fair Deals. It figured, too, in the election campaign last fall in many Western States, including those in which the Democrats scored unexpected gains.

When Douglas McKay came in as Secretary of Interior, this concept was quickly vetoed and a study recommending it was put on the prescribed list. But from areas where power shortages are acute there is evidence of dissatisfaction with this veto.

The Portland Oregonian, a Republican paper, expressing editorially the hope of a change in power policy, noted that the Interior Department under McKay "had even sold its transmission line through central Oregon to Klamath County to California-Oregon Power Co."

"This prevented," the editorial noted, "effective interconnection between the Federal Bonneville system and the Federal Central Valley system of California. Had this connection been completed, the Northwest probably could be utilizing power from California on an exchange basis this winter rather than cutting off a third of its aluminum production."

A vast intercontinental grid is the core of Soviet power development. This was described by Shelton Fisher, publisher of Power, a McGraw-Hill business publication, after a visit to the Soviet Union last fall.

In a 3-hour interview, Georgi Malenkov, Minister of Power, explained how the grid would link up the great hydroelectric resources in Siberia with the central power area around Moscow, including eight nuclear powerplants to be in operation by 1960. Fisher made an extensive tour of Soviet power facilities.

The Bratsk Dam under construction in Siberia will be 3 miles across and 425 feet high. Yearly production at Bratsk is expected to total 20 billion kilowatt-hours. Total hydro production consumed in Russia in 1955 was 28 billion which gives some idea of the scale of development now going forward. Bratsk will be producing power by 1960.

DISPLAY OF THE AMERICAN FLAG OVER SCHOOLHOUSES

Mr. POTTER. Mr. President, the schools of the United States are the fountainhead of civic responsibility. In the classrooms of poor communities—often overcrowded, filled with worn desks, smelling of chalk—and in the bright glass-walled school buildings of wealthier areas, young people from every walk of life are learning and practicing the great principles upon which our concept of government rests.

Sixty-three years ago, the first United States flag to be raised over a school building was raised in the small town of Gaylord, in my own State of Michigan. Today that patriotic idea has become a great American tradition, sanctioned by law. Every school in the land flies the red, white, and blue symbol which throughout the world is synonymous with freedom and equality.

I offer for inclusion in the RECORD an excerpt from the Otsego County, Mich., school directory, which recounts this story from its beginnings in Gaylord, Mich., to its present status in our national patriotic lore.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WE MUST WORK FOR FREEDOM TO MAKE FREEDOM WORK FOR US

"PLEDGE TO THE FLAG"

"I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."

Sixty-three years ago the first United States flag to be raised over a school building, was raised in the small town of Gaylord, Mich., in Otsego County, and over a small, insignificant school.

There was opposition to this from Civil War veterans.

The school fought for a referendum and won out. The issue was carried to the State legislature and it was made a State law that the United States flag be flown over school buildings. Eventually every State in the Union made it mandatory to display the United States flag over the buildings or grounds of every school.

This move to make display of the flag mandatory was initiated by Gaylord High School 63 years ago. Its principal was Frank H. Farnham, who now lives in Pensacola, Fla.

Gaylord can be very proud of its contribution to the patriotic history of our country.

INVESTIGATION OF INCREASING NEWSPRINT COSTS

Mr. POTTER. Mr. President, zooming newsprint costs have become the center of an investigation by the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

At the time when I proposed the investigation, I pointed out on the Senate floor that these rising costs work a hardship on publishers, and therefore curtail the functioning of the free press of America. The small-business man finds himself squeezed in a vise which becomes tighter and tighter as his advertising costs rise along with newsprint costs. And beyond that, the average American is in the unpleasant position of paying almost twice as much for his daily newspaper as he did a few years ago.

On February 4, Mr. President, in my weekly report to the people of Michigan, I pointed out some of the underlying facts in this situation, and laid the blame on the doorstep of an international newspaper cartel which experts seem to think is manipulating prices for its own benefit. A distinguished Michigan newspaper, the Dearborn Independent, reprinted the newsletter in the form of an editorial. This is most gratifying, for it carries the assurance that efforts to identify the offenders are meeting with approval at home. Furthermore, it serves the laudable purpose of bringing the newsprint situation to the attention of a wider audience.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from the Dearborn Independent of February 8, 1957, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"Here you are, son," the man smiled as he tossed a nickel on the stand and picked up his daily paper.

"Sorry, mister," the boy replied, "it's 7 cents."

The man's smile faded. And with good reason, for the cost of newspapers everywhere is rising. It is happening in the big cities and spreading to the smaller communities. And as this occurs, it raises a very important question: Are you, the newspaper reader, trapped in the meshes of a cartel? Is the small-business man who must advertise to live—is the newspaper publisher himself—trapped in the same web?

The price of newsprint, which represents one-fourth of the cost of publishing a paper, has skyrocketed in the past few decades. Now comes a new increase of \$4 per ton, bringing newsprint costs to an all-time peak.

Advertisers once paid nominal rates for advertising. But now, rates have climbed steadily to a point where small-business men find it difficult to advertise at all.

The publisher suffers, too. Back in 1946, newsprint cost \$67 per ton. Last year, it was \$130 per ton. Such increases are forcing many newspapers out of business, causing some advertisers to stop advertising, and making John Q. Citizen pay more for his paper.

Naturally, the cost of manufacturing those bulky rolls of paper has gone up during the passing years. But production costs are way out of line compared to selling prices. For example, in 1946, it cost the mill \$44 to produce one ton of newsprint. Now, it costs \$76. Freight charges have risen only \$9 per ton in the last 10 years. In other words, manufacturing costs rose \$41 per ton. But the selling price rose \$63 per ton. All told, since 1933, the price of newsprint has zoomed by 325 percent.

That brings up the subject of profits. The St. Lawrence Corp. showed a 58.7 percent increase in profits for 1955 over 1954. Other companies had profits ranging from 20 percent to 45 percent for 1955 over 1954. When the new \$4-per-ton increase becomes effective on March 1, chances are that profits will soar again. American publishers will be paying \$23 million more than they did last year for the very same product. And in the end, the individual newspaper reader picks up the tab.

Incidentally, these price boosts always follow the same pattern. One newsprint manufacturer announces an increase and immediately the other producers follow suit with an identical price hike.

Is this a cartel fixing prices and restricting trade? It certainly looks that way and I've called for a Senate investigation. Probes of this kind have occurred before in the

newsprint industry in 1917, 1927, 1939, 1947 and 1951. Last week, on the Senate floor, I traced the long history of indictments in the background of this latest price hike. It may take international cooperation to get at the bottom of this—for 75 to 80 percent of our newsprint comes from Canada—but we intend to see that the offenders are identified and prosecuted.

CHARLES E. POTTER,
United States Senator.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I favor the Mideast Resolution, and support the policy of the President as submitted to the Congress. I believe that the resolution is all-important if the problems of the Mideast are to be solved, and that it marks a beginning in the firm recognition by the United States that leadership on Mid-East policy is not alone necessary within the United Nations, but also is necessary outside the United Nations, in order to deal with the major problems of this area, so critical to international peace.

Yesterday I listened to much of the debate upon this question, and I heard the protestations of the opponents of the pending joint resolution, partially based upon the number of things which we have to do in our own country in the development of our own resources. When I was in the other body, I think I voted for and advocated actively as many measures for the development of the natural resources of our country as did most other Members, perhaps as much as any other Member; but it struck me that the protests made against the pending joint resolution were directed to the state of the world, rather than to the state of our own country.

What we in the United States should understand is that we are dealing with abysmally low standards of living in the Mideast, generally lower than anything we can imagine, let alone so much worse than obtain in our own country as to be hardly comparable. Without in any way wishing to consider ourselves to be do-gooders—though I do not see why that would be considered invidious—it is a fact that the Soviet Union is competing with us, especially for the support of the people of the underdeveloped areas. We should know that if the largely uncommitted 1,200,000,000 people of the underdeveloped areas fall under the domination of the Soviet Union instead of being free, then our days could well be numbered. The Soviet mounts, in this competition, force plus fanaticism while we juxtapose productive power plus faith in human worth and dignity.

Unless we evidence in world affairs, the strength we possess, then we shall have yielded the field to the other side, with results which could be fatal.

One further point which has come into the discussion is the urgency of the

Mideast Resolution. It is my deep conviction that the resolution is urgent. Very properly and necessarily, time has been taken in a discussion of the resolution, but there is no reason for extending the time beyond that required to permit adequate debate and consideration. I am convinced the resolution is not only sound, but urgently needed, and for the reasons which I shall now submit.

Tension in the Mideast has been brought to the boiling point right now, not alone by the conditions, inherent in it, of medieval standards of living, health, sanitation, and social organization, not alone by hostility to European administering powers by the indigenous peoples, explosive as are these forces, but also by the fact that both of these explosive forces were manipulated by the Soviet Union for the purpose of creating the greatest amount of discord, confusion, hatred, and incitement to war in the area right now. The fact that the Soviet Union became a "big brother" to Egypt and Syria made out of intense nationalism a burning crisis and a dire threat to international peace.

The fever-heat period of the Mideast crisis began on September 27, 1955, when Egypt announced the conclusion of an agreement with Czechoslovakia to exchange Egyptian cotton for Czech arms. It was followed on October 10 by Soviet announcement that it was ready to give the Arab countries any help they needed "to carry out economic development projects." The years from 1953 to the end of 1955 had marked a concentrated effort by the Soviet Union to break into the Mideast. Finally, when the agitation of the Arab countries against the Baghdad Pact was at its height, and when Britain had withdrawn its forces from the Suez base, pursuant to agreement with Egypt—which we had a great deal to do with bringing about—and was preoccupied with its trouble in Cyprus, the Soviet bloc struck, in the diplomatic sense, by the arms deal with Egypt. The culmination of this phase of intensive Soviet effort at infiltration and disruption was realized on July 26, 1956, when Egypt assumed full control of Suez Canal operations and seized the assets of the Suez Canal Co. It is the crisis set in motion by the Suez seizure by Egypt which we have since been in the process of liquidating.

In short, the present grave threat in the Mideast is not alone the result of action of the Middle East countries, but a result of the Soviet Union's activities which have aggravated the problems in the Mideast countries. Therefore any measure by the United States setting forth to meet the dangerous Soviet policies in the Middle East, is urgent in character for the United States.

Under these circumstances it is important to note the size and consequence of the military aspects of the Mideast Resolution which is before the Senate. It has been the pattern of operation of the Communist bloc, particularly in underdeveloped areas, to induce internal subversion by external aggression and coercion, either direct or indirect. This was certainly the pattern in Indochina. It was tried and failed against Burma,

and it was the pattern in Korea. Going back in history it was the pattern used on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Hence, the military phases of this resolution, by serving notice upon the Communist bloc that aggression or coercion by armed forces will produce an immediate reaction from us, would be insulating the area against the most direct threat of hostility which exists in it. With the states in the Mideast knowing that the Communist bloc cannot intervene by force directly or indirectly, or through "volunteers," without involving United States counterforce, we restore our capability of dealing with the situation in the Mideast on the basis of the states and problems indigenous to the region.

This does not mean that the Soviets will not try to have their hand in every situation, but so long as they cannot use force without meeting similar force from us, we deprive them of the great advantage which they have in international affairs in tense areas; the advantage of being able to order secretly the use of force or to disguise its use through "volunteers" or by some other means which are not available to a free nation like our own. The adoption of this resolution, therefore, becomes a condition precedent to doing anything really effective with respect to the problems in the area, notably the Arab-Israel conflict.

The real point about this resolution is the advance notice which it serves on the Soviet bloc. I repeat that statement. The real point of the resolution is the advance notice which it serves on the Soviet bloc. Surely, many Members have said, and we all understand, that Congress can declare war; but who wants that? This resolution is a new technique in the effort to prevent war. That is what we must understand about it. This technique began with the Formosa Resolution.

In the Formosa Resolution we served notice that, at the invitation of our friends, we would react to force by the use of force. In this particular case we serve notice that, if invited, we will exert force against force. This is a different type, but it is the same answer. It is a new technique in American policy. It is not a declaration of war; nor are we waiting for a situation to arise when it would be the prerogative of Congress to declare war. It is advance notice that we will combat force with force. In that respect I think it is a new technique in meeting Communist techniques which present us with a new situation, and one which the Senate should adopt.

One other point is essential. The masses of people in the Mideast outside of Israel live under such depressed economic conditions now, and so low is the standard of literacy, that psychological influences, especially as expressed through its popular leaders, like Colonel Nasser, have a disproportionate effect compared with the situation in our own generally literate society. One of the basic aspects of this psychology is the desire on the part of both the leadership and the masses to be with the winner. By decisively ruling out the possibility

of Soviet intervention with force in the Mideast and exercising, upon the highest level, authority which indicates our determination not to be on the losing side in this area, we speak in language which is unmistakable and understandable to the masses as well as to their leaders and realize an important gain, already.

It has been said that the resolution settles nothing, and that the major conflict in the Mideast area, the Arab-Israel struggle, remains unaffected by it. The essential purpose of the Mideast Resolution is well-stated on page 5 of the committee report:

But the authority granted by this resolution is essential to provide an atmosphere in which other measures can be brought to bear, and to provide time for those other measures to be effective.

To effectively implement this resolution and to take advantage of the time opportunity which it gives to us, it will be essential for our Government to develop an effective policy to settle the Arab-Israel conflict. It is already apparent that this conflict cannot be dealt with solely within the United Nations, as the United Nations does not have adequate powers or forces for the purpose.

I should like to take a few minutes to address myself to what must be an effort to resolve that conflict.

Extremely desirable as it is to bring about recognition by the Arab States that Israel exists, and peace negotiations with Israel, and vital as this is not only to the peace but to the development of the whole area, I deeply feel—and I have been there recently—it does not seem attainable under present circumstances. What we need to do, therefore, is to assure Israel of its essential rights as a state, while at one and the same time we adopt policies which will be most conducive to stability of the area and offer the best chance for ultimate peace.

The first priority in this would appear to me to require accounting of Egypt's responsibility to the free world; for too long Colonel Nasser and his predecessor, General Naguib, have been allowed to evade such responsibility. This responsibility includes guaranties for international transit, including the ships of Great Britain, France, and Israel, through the Suez Canal in compliance with the six principles adopted by the United Nations Security Council on October 1956—principles in which Egypt concurred—assurance of transit of international shipping, including the ships of Israel, for peaceful commerce through all international waterways in which Egypt has any part, including both the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal. It also requires cessation of violations of the armistice agreement with Israel, negotiated in 1949 under United Nations auspices. Further, it requires the cessation of governmental organization of guerrilla raids, largely from Egypt, upon the territory of Israel.

It requires also—and in this, too, the free world has a vital interest—the cessation of Egypt's agitation throughout north and central Africa; indeed, through all the Moslem countries against the free world, with Egypt acting, in effect, as a tool of the Communists.

Finally, it requires Egypt to quit blocking the resettlement of the Palestine-Arab refugees. There are grounds for optimism—and to me this is perhaps the most significant of recent developments—that our Government is now beginning to recognize the need for calling Egypt to task as to its international responsibilities, and is preparing to do it. No less than clearance of the Suez Canal and an end to Egypt-Israel hostilities wait on it.

The "fedayeen" or guerrilla raids, openly backed and organized by Egypt in the Gaza Strip and in the Sinai Desert, represent a clear violation of the armistice agreement with Israel, negotiated in 1949 under U. N. auspices. With the armistice agreement violated a vacuum is created which calls for administration of the Gaza Strip by the United Nations in the absence of some new agreement between Israel and Egypt. Also, I believe our Government should spell out such raids as being contrary to the guarantees of the three-power declaration of May 1950, entered into by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, which guaranteed the armistice borders between Israel and the Arab States.

I point out that there is adequate precedent for calling upon the United Nations to administer the Gaza Strip, and perhaps, as a first step, sending a United Nations commission there to ascertain exactly what will be the situation when Israel's forces withdraw and the United Nations emergency force steps in.

A similar situation existed in the case of Libya. Under the Italian peace treaty of 1947, Italy renounced all claim to her former colony, Libya. Its fate, according to that peace treaty, was to be determined within one year, that is, by 1948, by the United States, Britain, France, and Russia. When those four failed to agree upon a solution, as they did, the United States took the problem before the United Nations in 1949, and that organization handled it completely from then on, and, indeed, brought about the independence of Libya.

I respectfully submit that that is almost an exact precedent for a situation in which an armistice agreement, negotiated under United Nations auspices, has broken down, leaving a vacuum, which should now be filled by United Nations administration. The first step is the appointment of a United Nations Commission to ascertain just what the United Nations ought to do, and how it ought to handle the problem.

I spoke of action outside the United Nations. It seems to me that we have many areas for action which could be very helpful. For example, we should offer to join, at the request of the U. N., in a naval patrol to secure freedom of international shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba. That is the Canadian proposal, put forward by Lester Pearson, Canada's delegate to the United Nations. Also, we should offer to aid the U. N. in establishing its civil administration in the Gaza Strip. It may require money. It may require some logistical support, in the way of shipping. All these things we have made available in the past to facilitate United Nations action; and it certainly

is desirable that a similar course be followed in this instance.

Finally, upon withdrawal of Israel's forces, we should support the entry into the Sharm-el-Sheikh area bordering the Gulf of Aqaba and into the Gaza Strip of the United Nations Emergency Force, to remain there until the U. N. mission, the maintenance of peace, is accomplished, and the forces of Israel should accordingly withdraw.

Everyone agrees that the United Nations Emergency Force ought to step in when the Israeli forces move out; and there is a pretty grave question as to whether they should remain there until their mission is accomplished—namely, pacification of the area—or whether they are subject to being ousted whenever Egypt says they should go.

It seems to me that we ought to support the idea of the United Nations force remaining until such time as its mission is accomplished. If the United Nations is to deal with international brigandage and violations of international agreements, it will have to do so on someone's territory. Every piece of the world, for practical purposes, is owned by someone. So we had better make the determination now, that when the United Nations acts under the charter with the necessary authority it is acting in behalf of the people of the world. Therefore, to that extent, in the maintenance of international peace there must be some understanding of rights on the part of particular people in a particular country being recognized within the context of the right of the world to maintain peace. Such actions require United Nations resolutions.

Here I come to a very critical phase of the situation. Only yesterday we were told by the press that the Ambassador of Israel had conferred with the Secretary General of the United Nations presumably about U. N. resolutions dealing with Aqaba and Gaza. I suppose the question will be asked, "Suppose the resolution does not pass. What then?" Then the situation will be stalemated, while negotiations continue under the impasse. Such a stalemate is certainly to be preferred over the imposition of sanctions on Israel, sanctions which, it seems to me pretty clearly, now are unpopular in the United States, and, indeed, in the United Nations, as tending to make the United Nations an instrument of one-sided action. Indeed, Mr. President, it seems to me that sufficient progress has been made by now so that perhaps our Secretary of State could say that negotiations have proceeded to the point where sanctions are no longer being considered and thereby clear the air even further.

Mr. President, we must get over the idea that the United Nations can do everything, or that we must always be lined up with a two-thirds majority there, right or wrong. We need not help make the two-thirds majority and should in fact oppose it if we feel action is wrong. Where the United Nations is frustrated by the veto or has not the powers or means to act it is necessary for us to act outside the United Nations, at least in part, as the Mideast Resolution

itself shows. On occasion no action by the United Nations is better than action which is wrong or damaging to the United Nations and to the prospects for peace. Members of the United Nations are bound only according to their Charter obligations and by lawful United Nations actions, not by United Nations inaction or inability to act.

Mr. President, at this point I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, at the conclusion of my remarks, a document entitled "United States Foreign Policy and the United Nations." It is a draft study prepared at my request, and shows three alternative situations.

It shows cases in which we have acted outside the United Nations, cases involving international affairs in which we have acted partially within the United Nations and partially outside the United Nations, and cases where we have acted completely within the United Nations. This study shows that at this stage in the development of our international policies, all three alternatives are essential to the maintenance and the pursuit of our policy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, another one of the very grave problems which we face in the Middle East area is the resettlement of the Palestine-Arab refugees. More than 900,000 are on the rolls of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, financed to the extent of 90 percent of the necessary budget by the United States and Great Britain. Of the total number, it is estimated that only about two-thirds, or 600,000, are truly Palestine-Arab refugees in the sense that their original homes were in the area which is now Israel.

I had the privilege of seeing one of the large refugee camps outside Gaza only 2 months ago. About one-third of the refugees are located in the Gaza Strip, and the remainder are primarily in Jordan.

Subject to U. N. administration, it should be possible to induce Palestine-Arab refugees in the Gaza Strip to seek resettlement, for the major barrier toward such resettlement has been the intransigence of the Arab host governments and their propaganda directed toward the refugees, urging them not to be resettled.

Indeed, Mr. President, some of the nations in the Middle East themselves have enormous capacity from the standpoint of resettlement. For example, Iraq, in the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys, has a tremendous potential in that respect.

Once the way is cleared for the United Nations in the Gaza Strip, it could undertake to break the logjam by seeking resettlement projects through agreements with nations having the capacity to absorb immigrants. That is the same plan which worked satisfactorily in resettling the displaced persons in Europe beginning in 1948. The U. N. resolution passed Friday last already contemplates such independent U. N. activity to resettle the Palestine-Arab refugees. In that way, at long last, it would be possible to resettle

the unhappy and unfortunate Arab-Palestine refugees.

Also the U. N. could then open negotiations with Israel for compensation to these Palestine-Arab refugees for property left in Israel, and for some repatriation within Israel for those of them who sincerely wish it, with due and careful consideration to the requirements of Israel's security and the reuniting of families. I might say in this connection that the Government of Israel has already shown its receptivity to that kind of negotiation.

There is also involved in the compensation question consideration for the losses sustained by those of Jewish faith who emigrated to Israel following their expulsion by Arab States, including Egypt, Iran, and Yemen, and the persecution they endured, including the appropriation of their property there without any compensation.

An essential element of our Mideast policy is what we are to do about economic and technical assistance programs for the whole Middle East, and how we can best bring to bear our resources in a peaceful way as an element of our policy of seeking area stability and peace.

I have noted three major arguments which have been made against the adoption of the joint resolution. The first is that a number of the countries of the Middle East have very large resources which they obtain from their oil revenues, and therefore they ought to take care of their own economic and technical assistance programs.

The second is that there is no specific plan contained in the joint resolution for the spending of the \$200 million, or exactly how we are going to spend the money.

The third argument is that perhaps the aid will not be accepted by many of the Arab countries of the Middle East, and therefore will be of no use.

I should like to deal with each of these arguments. I may say, incidentally, that I am not new to this subject, as I served as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives for 8 years during the formative years of both the Marshall plan and the mutual-security program. I have had considerable experience with these questions, which have been debated before with respect to this and other areas of the world.

First, as to whether the nations of the Middle East will accept the aid that is offered to them. I think that question refers to the fundamental principle involved and to the fundamental question of American policy in the Middle East. I believe that policy ought to be to keep the door open to all nations for participation in economic and technical assistance efforts, and that we should not deny any aid to any other State because other nations refuse to accept it or resist terms for their participation.

This, of course, applies to Israel. As we know, there have been refusals in the Mideast to accept our aid by nations who stated that because they refused aid, it automatically meant a veto on giving aid to any other nation in the

Middle East, and therefore Israel should not receive aid either.

The aid which we give should be designed, as is true in the Middle East Resolution, on a regional basis, and we should contemplate constantly maximum joint action among the nations affected. The United States cannot always contemplate the fact that this area will remain unsettled and divided. On the contrary, we must look forward and beyond the present difficulties to our ultimate objective.

The aid which we give should be directed toward the maximum joint action among the nations affected. Such joint action is entirely practicable in the fields of irrigation and flood control, highways, regional development banks, power systems, education, public health, communications, immigration, and customs control. Aid should be programed in each country with a view toward integrating individual country plans into a regional plan for the rest of the area at such time as additional Arab States may join. In this process, too, there should be employed the multilateral technical assistance activities of the United Nations whenever advisable.

In that respect I might say that we have an automatic regulator with respect to how much multilateral technical assistance there should be through the U. N., because we are the main support of that activity, and it depends on our appropriations as to how large or how small it shall be.

Our appropriations amount to about \$17 million, in round figures, and we spend about 8 to 9 times that amount on our own technical assistance programs; so there is no great danger that the United Nations technical assistance program will run away with the ball. We must have faith enough to believe that men with full stomachs will choose the freedom road. If we are to believe that men, given a free choice, will choose the Communist road, then we are in a bad way, indeed. Therefore, Mr. President, much as I appreciate, together with my colleagues, the pleasure of seeing the tag "Made in the U. S. A.," on everything we do in the form of foreign aid, I do not believe it is not nearly so vital as doing the job in terms of getting results in the form of peace and stability and free choice on the part of people.

Examples of this cooperative approach, or keeping the door open to it, which is what I feel is the only thing we can do and what we should and must do with our economic and technical assistance, are found in the Nile River Dam project which too many people have forgotten as being a cooperative project with the Sudan and not solely a project of Egypt itself. It seems to me that at every stage we must keep all the pipelines, the ends of the road, the ends of the project, the planning for the project, always open. Though at the moment it may be necessary to have a program apply to one country in order to do the maximum job possible in that country, it must always be with the idea, in a decade or two, of extending what is done in one area to the rest of the region. For this, Mr. President, is a region. It has got to

be treated as a region. That is true of Israel as well as of every Arab State. I think some Arab leaders are giving their people the most misguided and misleading information that has ever been given to them in preaching the end of Israel.

The impact upon the chronically depressed Arab countries of modern, productive, and fruitful Israel, with a vital and functioning representative government controlled by the people under free institutions like our own must not be underestimated. Ultimately, Israel's achievements in the utilization of natural resources, in agricultural and in urban development, education, health, communications, and science will prove to be a model for the Arab world and the decisive factor in the modernization of the Near East and the defeat of the Communist threat to it. Therefore, Mr. President, Israel represents a pilot plant of what we are trying to do in terms of economic development in the entire area.

Mr. President, I now wish to take up another of the objections, and that is the objection that an Arab country with oil resources, like Saudi Arabia, should do its own developing. It is true that some Arab nations have large revenues from oil, and it is also true that often only small amounts of those revenues are spent for education and reconstruction purposes. These are the facts of life; and if we could afford to wait decades until such time as the situation were changed and improved by the internal determination of the people themselves, that would be a very fine idea. But we cannot wait, because we are not alone in the world. We have a big, tough, mean, and often angry, duplicitous, and constantly cunning competitor who challenges us at every step, who is delighted to let people of the Mideast area remain benighted because some governments will not look after their own. The Soviets are trying to accomplish the communization of the world. Therefore, we cannot wait. We must ourselves encourage projects in Saudi Arabia and in other countries by being willing to put up some seed money. We are trying to arouse a demand on the part of the people in those countries and bring about, sooner or later, the development of those countries which is so essential to—whose security? To our security. We are the most productive of the free nations. We are looking after our own security which is decisively linked with the security of the whole free world.

The reason why there are no specific projects today, the reason we are talking about \$200 million instead of \$2 billion—which is what it would take to complete some of these development jobs in those areas of the world—is so we can go forth with money and put it to the best use, because it can be used for the purpose of encouraging others to spend their money and arousing a public appetite for achievement not only by us, but by them in their own country.

Mr. President, that is the fundamental basis which underlies the question. I am rather interested that on the part of some of the strongest opponents of this particular phase of the resolution there is not some recognition of the fact that

we have to proceed—within the constitutional limits of our society—and not tell the other side everything we are going to do in the greatest detail.

I was deeply interested in the fact that my very distinguished friend, the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] for whom I have great admiration and respect, placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD yesterday an article by George Sokolsky of which he approved. He said it looked to him like a fine exposition of an important idea. The article begins with the following statement:

Soviet Russia has only one advantage over the United States and it is a tremendous one. The Russians can formulate a program of action based on a design for achievement and can put behind it all the resources of government. This the United States has not been able to do since John Hay was Secretary of State.

In other words, Mr. President, we have to find some way within our constitutional framework to give ourselves some of the advantages of not telegraphing every punch we are going to throw. The only way we can do it sometimes is by limiting what the Executive can spend, as we are doing here, to \$200 million, and giving the Executive the opportunity to spend it in the way in which it will do the most good.

A tremendous opportunity exists in this Mideast area in the utilization of private United States business, trade associations, professional, missionary, veterans and civic organizations, as well as institutions of learning, for the interchange of ideas and for the extension of their activities on an international basis, through the Middle East. This can result in the interchange of ideas and experience and the development of codes of good practice and conduct. Beginnings have already been made in the activities of certain professional engineering societies in some Middle East countries and in the activities of the International Bar Association, but the surface has hardly been scratched. In our aid programs, and bearing in mind the low living standards which we are seeking to raise, and the medieval society which we are seeking to affect, our aid should be on the simple level, touching the daily lives of the people, increasing their individual productivity, and relieving them of immediate hardships. This is the case to begin with.

My wife and I visited India only 2 months ago and saw with the deepest interest the so-called village-development program there, which is on a village level in the most elementary terms of a sheet-iron stovepipe to take out of a home the odor which is caused by cooking on a small, open fire. Little things like that are coming directly home to the people in the villages and are helping to transform the lives of the people right at their own fireside.

We should be wary of additional capital in the hands of leaders in some countries not yet concerned with social justice in the use of national resources, both public and private, as additional capital employed in this way in major projects may only widen the gulf between the very rich and the very poor, since there

is no middle class, by and large, in the great majority of the Mideast countries.

So, in developing our projects, I suggest, as word of caution and advice, that an effort should be made to develop projects which are the closest and most dear to the individual family and the individual village.

Finally, in dealing with the Middle East, we need to have clearly defined our understanding of the governmental situation in extending aid and operating under the resolution. Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt have basic governmental organizations and specialized functional agencies needed to correlate with our programs for economic and social development. Egypt, however, although it is equipped with such a basic governmental organization, now finds its Government in the hands of Colonel Nasser and his group, who exploit, as they have quite clearly shown, anything done with them for the purposes of their own power, and xenophobia at the very least, and on occasion as Communist tools, as well, as we have already seen from experience.

We are, in the Middle East, in an area of great conflict with regard to self-determination by peoples in various stages of nationhood. This aspect has some fundamental principles which need to be laid down, and which require our attention.

For one, the responsibility in the United Nations to maintain international peace must be considered as paramount. I expressed my views on that point a little while ago, in reference to the right of the United Nations to endeavor to maintain peace although it may affect the individual territory of any particular members.

Thus in the situation between Egypt and Israel, where the fomenting by Egypt of fedayeen raids was a direct cause of the outbreak of hostilities on October 29, 1956, the obligation existed on the part of the United Nations once it stepped into the situation to suppress this brigandage. Obviously, an event of this kind can only take place on the territory of someone. Accepting, therefore, a self-imposed condition that the United Nations Emergency Force could only remain in Egypt with Egypt's permission, was accepting a control of the United Nations efforts for the maintenance of international peace which threatened constantly to completely defeat it, and weakened and debilitated it at every stage.

Second, the right of self-determination which we honor so rightly must nevertheless exist within the context of other rights pertaining to other peoples. It does not stand alone. Also, it carries responsibilities implicit in the concept of nationhood, and these require a people who would attain nationhood to insure political, social, and economic viability in a modern world and to guarantee freedom from subjugation of its people to communism or any other hostile ism, as well as the ability to maintain free institutions among them.

These are inalienable rights, which must be dealt with in the context also of the other inalienable rights of man-

kind. These are the rights of peace and freedom, which all mankind must enjoy.

Our concept of our foreign policy leadership and responsibility is certainly maturing, and the pending resolution marks the further development and maturity of it. In the Formosa resolution, which preceded it, we responded to an urgent call from a close friend and valued ally whose security was imminently threatened. In the Mideast resolution we see chaotic and incendiary situation imminently dangerous to international peace, and we offer our resources and our leadership for the solution of the problem at one and the same time that we serve notice that we will not tolerate the subjugation of a region by force and coercion or infiltration, so far as the Communist bloc is concerned. Our devotion to the United Nations and our operations within the United Nations context, subject to our charter obligations, complete the developing concept of United States foreign policy leadership. The emphasis now needs to be upon the affirmative in resolving practical questions like Agaba and Gaza, like those which we now face in endeavoring to resolve the Egypt-Israel difficulty; and in mounting our own offensive against communism essentially by the exercise of our productive power and technical genius, and the expression of our moral ideology and belief in human dignity and freedom. The Middle East resolution opens this road to us in the critical and strategic Middle East region.

Mr. President, I think the Middle East resolution represents a step along the road to responsibility and maturity of leadership on the part of the United States. What is made of it will depend not only upon the President of the United States and his Cabinet officers; it will depend also upon the Members of the Senate, and upon our taking advantage of the opportunities which the resolution affords us to have some influence constructively upon the foreign policy of our country. The same is true of our great sister body, having equal powers, at the other end of the Capitol.

In short, Mr. President, the United States is growing up and is establishing and accepting a responsibility which is compatible with our power in the world. This is a good thing. It requires somewhat more flexibility and somewhat less restraint from the exact and precise rules and regulations in which we have heretofore allowed ourselves to indulge.

But, Mr. President, this responsibility is demanded of us, not by any ideas we have as to how great or how wise we are, but by the intense, the grim, the mortal competition which we face from the Soviet Union.

In all the arguments and discussions, let us not forget that there is only one end and aim of the Soviet Union, namely, the subjugation and the destruction of every value we hold dear. No matter how many smiles there are to disguise it, that is the fundamental proposition. Hence, the competition with the Soviet Union is real and final. So we must act in a spirit of awareness if we are to be effective, if we are to serve. That is the mission for which I deeply believe the Lord put us on earth.

EXHIBIT 1

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

This paper examines the use which the United States has made of the United Nations in attaining the objectives of its foreign policy. The United Nations is in essence a permanent conference of the nation states who are its members. As such its powers are basically those of an international conference, that is, action by the U. N. can only be accomplished by the power of the states that compose it. In some instances the United States has made no use of the instrumentality of the U. N., but has exerted its power and influence entirely through alternative channels of diplomacy. In other instances we have used the U. N. in conjunction with these other channels. Finally, there have been a few problems where the United States has found that the exclusive use of the U. N. offered the best possibility of successfully attaining our policy goals.

At tab A is a discussion of those cases in which no use has been made of the United Nations. In general these are cases involving regional security in Europe or southeast Asia. The U. N. is by nature not designed to deal with problems of regional security. Both NATO and SEATO are primarily meant to deter or meet Soviet aggression thus making it impossible for them to come within an organization like the U. N. which includes the potential enemy. The wars in China and Indochina were also dealt with exclusively outside the U. N. as they were matters of domestic jurisdiction and there seemed no desire on the part of even China and France to involve the U. N. in the situations.

Instances when the United States has utilized the services of the U. N. in addition to other means are discussed at Tab B. These include such cases as the fate of Trieste, Indonesia, the Berlin blockade, the Greek border incidents, the presence of Soviet troops in Iran, and the attack on the Republic of Korea. In some of these cases the United States utilized the U. N. in a merely perfunctory way while in others the bulk of United States energies were exerted under the sanction of U. N. resolutions and recommendations. Sometimes the role of the U. N. was to make known to the world the reality and extent of Soviet-bloc guilt for the threat to the peace. In others, the U. N. provided a means of settling a difficult problem within the free world in a way that prevented an extension of Soviet power into the area. In the case of Korea, the U. N. was used to establish objectively the fact of Communist aggression, to give international sanction to the military response of the United States and increase the number of nations supporting our fighting forces in a material fashion.

There have been a very few problems in world politics since the end of World War II that the United States has sought to resolve almost exclusively through the use of the United Nations. Those that seem to fall into this category are discussed at Tab C. They include the independence of Libya and Palestine, and the problems concerned with the control or reduction of armaments. Each of these situations has been so different it is impossible to generalize upon them in this introduction, except to say that at the time the United States Government of the day apparently felt that American interests could be more thoroughly realized by use of the U. N. than by any other possible diplomatic means.

The results of this study indicate clearly that the United States has made substantial use of the United Nations as an instrument through which to realize its foreign policy goals. However, it has never felt itself restricted to using only the U. N. When United States interests could not be served

by use of this general international organization it was not used at all. In each situation it has been necessary to decide if the nature of the U. N., its current membership, the nature of the problem, and so forth, were such that it would be worthwhile to exert our influence through the U. N. in attempting to resolve the question. When the circumstances that made the U. N. highly useful in handling a particular problem at one stage of its development have significantly changed, then it would clearly not be logical for the United States to continue to seek the solution of that particular problem exclusively through the U. N.

A. MAJOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS DEALT WITH LARGELY OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has not been found significant in assisting the United States in the attainment of its policy goals with reference to developing adequate economic and military security in Europe and Asia or in dealing with the war in Indochina or the Communist takeover of power in China.

After the great damage wrought by World War II, extensive economic assistance was necessary if Western Europe was to again become economically viable. The United Nations did not possess the funds necessary to do this. But almost from the beginning of the United States aid programs to Europe there was the second aspect of building the military defenses of the countries against possible Soviet aggression. When tension between Russia and the United States increased, economic aid to Europe became important in preventing Communist subversion and political victory at the polls. The North Atlantic Treaty and the program of military aid to Europe were of the utmost importance to the United States. They had nothing to do with the United Nations, despite the fact that NATO was justified under the terms of article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

It would not have been possible to accomplish through the U. N. the goals of rebuilding Europe economically and militarily to meet the threats of Communist subversion and overt aggression by the Soviet Union. The U. N. lacked the massive economic resources that were required. But more importantly, the U. N. contained the potential enemy, the Soviet Union. She would hardly have facilitated the development of West European internal strength against Communist subversion. It was hardly possible to make the U. N. a defensive military alliance of some members against an attack by other members of the same alliance. Also, an effective alliance required closer cooperation and integration of planning and armed forces than would be possible through a loose, general, almost worldwide organization like the U. N. Thus, the United Nations was irrelevant here by virtue of its very nature, its lack of resources, and inappropriateness of the members that composed it.

For much the same reasons the U. N. has been of no significance in developing military security in southeast Asia. The development of military security in that area is considered an extremely divisive program by many of the nations in the area. Thus it would not even have been possible to obtain a Security Council or General Assembly recommendation in favor of the formation of something like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Many of the states in that part of the world seek to avoid alining themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union for a variety of reasons. Again, of course, at least one of the potential enemies, Russia, was included in the United Nations and the representatives of the other, Communist China, were knocking at the door seeking to have their representative seated. Russia has called both NATO and SEATO threats to world peace and signs of United States imperialism around the world. SEATO, which is, of course, much looser and

less fully developed than NATO, is also supplemented by many unilateral United States commitments of military and other forms of aid to the member states.

The control of the Nationalist Government of China over the Chinese mainland was gradually whittled away until it now exercises sovereignty only on the island of Taiwan (Formosa). This matter was not considered by the United Nations. To the extent that the United States was able to fortify the Nationalist Government in its fight against the Communists the United States chose to do so by direct military aid and other forms of assistance. The United Nations is not designed to deal with internal problems such as a civil war. The change of government in China has come before the U. N. primarily in the form of a contest between the two governments for China's seat in the United Nations. The United States and some other members have sought to prevent the organization from accepting the credentials of the representatives of the Communist government.

The United Nations played no role in the long war which France waged against the independence movement in Indochina. This was a problem for United States foreign policy because of our desire to prevent the spread of Communist control in the world and our reluctance to oppose independence movements. France bore the problem alone except for extensive United States military and economic aid directly to France which she was able to divert to support her forces fighting in Indochina. Again, this was treated as an internal question which logically could not come before the United Nations.

B. MAJOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN-POLICY PROBLEMS DEALT WITH BOTH THROUGH THE U. N. AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC MEANS

There have been a number of instances since 1945 when the United States has felt its foreign-policy objectives could best be realized by using a combination of several resources of diplomacy, including the United Nations. In some cases the U. N. was the major channel utilized and only supplemented in part by other means. In others, the U. N. was used less significantly. The following are included here: The Trieste problem, Indonesian independence, the Berlin blockade, the Greek border incidents, the presence of Soviet troops in Iran, and the invasion of the Republic of Korea.

The free territory of Trieste was created by the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947. It was to be under the special protection of the United Nations Security Council, which was also supposed to name a governor for the territory. Great power differences prevented the Council from even naming a governor for this tense area claimed by Italy and Yugoslavia. This would have helped settle the problem and perhaps hurt Yugoslavia's chances to gain additional sections of Trieste. Early in 1948, prior to the Italian elections and the defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, the United States, Britain, and France declared all the territory should be returned to Italy and the peace treaty so amended. The U. N. ceased to play any role in the issue. After Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet bloc the problem became essentially one within the free world which the United States therefore sought to settle on its merits and in a manner that would be least upsetting to good Italo-Yugoslavian relations. The United States then urged direct negotiations between the two contestants and finally an agreement was reached in 1954. Thus, the role of the U. N. in the Trieste case was perfunctory. At first the United States sought to use it to keep more of Trieste from falling under Soviet (Yugoslav) control and later worked for direct negotiations to settle the issue when it was clear the U. N. would

not be useful in achieving a worthwhile settlement.

In the Indonesian situation the United Nations served magnificently as a means of resolving a difficult problem within the free world that was a problem for the United States because of the great power role it played. The essential job of the U. N. here was to provide an acceptable third party to usher the Republic of Indonesia (1949) into inevitable independence without increasing Soviet influence there as the Dutch power was withdrawn. In this situation the U. N. was useful in its own right as a mediator and a means of providing some pressure on the Netherlands to agree to Indonesian independence. The United States faced something of a dilemma because the Netherlands was our ally in the Marshall Plan and at the same time the United States wanted to win the approval of the Asian nations. The United States sought the independence of Indonesia outside the U. N. as well as inside the organization. One of the decisive factors in final Dutch agreement was the withdrawal of United States Marshall plan aid that was slated to be used in Indonesia. Without United States pressure on the Netherlands it is dubious whether the U. N. would have been successful. Without the U. N., it would have been much more difficult to pacify the situation and hammer out a workable agreement at the same time preventing the active intervention of the Soviet Union.

The Berlin blockade, however, is another instance in which the role of the U. N. was only formal and did not contribute to the substantive solution of the problem. When in 1948 the U. S. S. R. refused to permit trucks and trains to pass through her part of Germany in order to reach Berlin, the United States responded with the airlift that kept the city of Berlin supplied with the basic necessities. The Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution that the blockade should be lifted coincident with a settlement of a related currency problem in Berlin. Later the United States delegate, Mr. Philip Jessup, and the Soviet delegate, Mr. Jacob Malik, met in the corridors of the U. N. and more or less agreed on a settlement that had been hinted at earlier in the Soviet press. Thus, the U. N. helped focus world attention on the issue, provided the physical setting for an agreement and the daily availability of the diplomats concerned. But the U. N. did not in any way settle the problem itself. The U. S. S. R. had created a situation by which it hoped to force the United States and the other Western Powers to withdraw from Berlin. The only alternative seemed to be for the West to accept the consequences of starting a general European war to preserve their stake in Germany. The Berlin airlift provided a solution that evaded either alternative and made it necessary for the Soviet Union either to back down or itself start the big war to force back Western power in Germany. Russia ended the blockade. Thus, the U. N. played a significant, if small role.

In the case of the Greek border incidents (1946-48) the United States sought to prevent the conquest of the Greek Government by Communist guerrilla forces supported by Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. The major factors in accomplishing this goal were the Truman doctrine of United States aid to Greece, the stationing of the United States Sixth Fleet in close proximity to Greece, the defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, and the role played by the United Nations. Undoubtedly, a Communist takeover could have been prevented without the participation of the U. N., but the international organization served the purposes of providing internationally acceptable objective accounts of aggression from Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent from Albania and Bulgaria.

It also provided a greater measure of international support for the United States aid program to defend the Greek Government. The U. N. provided this added support because the membership of the international organization at that time was such that a clear majority could be obtained to adopt a position against the military expansion of Soviet influence in Europe.

One of the earliest cases to come before the U. N. Security Council was the complaint of Iran that Russia was interfering in her internal affairs by refusing to withdraw troops stationed there during the war. The United States, Britain, and Russia had agreed at the Teheran Conference that all troops would be withdrawn from Iran within 6 months after the end of the war. The Western Powers were vitally interested in securing the drawback of Soviet troops to preclude an increase of Soviet influence and control in the Middle East. The United States took a strong public stand in favor of the Iranian position in its complaint to the U. N. It is also reliably reported that the United States expressed itself very strongly to the U. S. S. R. in private. The Soviet troops were quickly removed from Iran. In this case the U. N. served the purpose of notifying the world of Soviet attempts to extend its position in the Middle East. This focusing of attention had some effect, but most observers agree that the vigorous response by the United States both inside and outside the U. N. was the key factor in forcing Soviet withdrawal. The Soviets did not want to have a showdown with the United States so soon after the end of World War II.

The invasion of the Republic of Korea is the final and perhaps most important instance to be noted in which the United States pursued the goals of its foreign policy concurrently within and outside the United Nations. Here was the first example of an attempt to extend Chinese-Russian domination by overt armed aggression. It was thus a direct challenge to the United States foreign policy of containing communism. Unless the United States acted decisively here, it would be apparent to the rest of the Asian nations that they could not depend on the United States for real security in case of armed attack. It was also a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations which had had special responsibilities since 1947 for the establishment of a democratic government in Korea.

The United States supplied large contingents of Armed Forces and material to repel the attack by the North Korean Communist Government. This was the essential basis for the degree of victory that was achieved in Korea under the U. N. But beyond this, it was vital to the United States that it be made clear this was not another instance of western imperialism in Asia. It was particularly important to have the support of other Asian governments. The United Nations provided these other requirements. The U. N. observation team was able to establish the objective fact of North Korean aggression on South Korea. The wide support in the U. N. for sending aid to the Republic of Korea gave a firm international if not disinterested character to the United States military assistance. This made it clear the United States action was merely to aid a nation that had been attacked and that it was not western imperialism. Thus, in this case, the U. N. was a vital channel through which the United States attained its foreign policy goal. But, of course, it was primarily the power of the United States and not the nonexistent power of the U. N. itself that halted the aggression.

C. INSTANCES IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS USED THE U. N. ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AS THE MEANS OF CARRYING OUT ITS FOREIGN POLICY

There are, of course, no instances where the U. N. by its own power effectuated the pacification of an international threat to the

peace. The only power possessed by the U. N. is that of its member states who may or may not choose to exert it through the U. N. or in support of the resolutions and recommendations of that organization. Thus, it would be well nigh impossible to find a case in which the goals of United States foreign policy were achieved merely by giving the problem to the United Nations and then sitting back. But there are at least three significant cases where the United States used the U. N. almost exclusively as the agency through which American influence and power was exerted. These are: independence for Libya and Israel, and the discussion of disarmament and the control of arms.

Under the Italian Peace Treaty of 1917 Italy renounced all claim to her former colony, Libya. Its fate was to be determined within 1 year by the United States, Britain, France, and Russia. When the four failed to agree on a solution, the United States took the problem before the U. N. in 1949 and that organization handled it completely from then on. The General Assembly decided Libya should become an independent state by January 1, 1952. A U. N. commission advised by a council of 10 which included the United States, but not Russia, made the necessary preparations. As a result the Soviet Union was unable to gain an entering wedge in that country, the United States airbase at Tripoli was preserved, and Libya remained firmly in the Western camp. The effect of the United States relying completely on the instrumentality of the U. N., after the initial four-power negotiations had broken down, was to achieve the United States goal of preventing a Soviet advance here. The U. N. was the perfect instrument for this because it could make Libya an independent nation and thus keep it within the free world. Without using the U. N. here it is not unlikely Libya would have become another instance of divided great power administration, for Russia might have insisted on taking part in the absence of a settlement.

The Palestine situation is one that the United States has up to now handled almost exclusively through the U. N., though the real decision in Palestine was rendered by the effectiveness of the Jewish fighting groups that carved out the State of Israel. There were two problems involved for United States foreign policy here. The first was how to settle this thorny dispute among members of the non-Communist world in a way that would be least damaging to our general position vis-a-vis the Middle Eastern countries, while at the same time seeking to realize popular desire that the oppressed Jewish people of Europe might have a homeland in Palestine. The second was that of resolving the situation in a way that prevented the intrusion of Soviet power into Palestine in the process of this withdrawal of the former British power in the mandated territory.

The United Nations apparently seemed to be a logical means to use in attacking the Palestine problem both because it was the legal successor to the League of Nations mandate and because the Arab-Jewish warfare was clearly a threat to the peace. The Palestine problem, in addition, presented the United States with a peculiar dilemma. The fact was that it was clearly impossible to devise any boundary solution for Palestine that would have satisfied both the Arab States that resented the very presence of any Jewish state and the Jewish Zionists who demanded the entire area of the Palestine mandate. Thus any boundary solution that the United States favored would alienate at least one group, if not both, to say nothing of having serious domestic political repercussions in the United States itself. Placing the problem before the U. N. would remove from the United States the onus of whatever solution was finally achieved. The

United States was pledged to support the U. N. and thus, beneath this banner, could lend its weight to the implementation of any U. N. decision that seemed fair and workable.

Another advantage to dealing with the problem through the U. N. was that whichever way the issue was decided between the two contestants, it would not involve any advance for Soviet influence in the Middle East. Thus the United States could support a decision on the merits of the case, or on whatever seemed a practical result of the combat of the two armed forces. Secondly, the Soviet Union was in favor of letting the U. N. deal with the issue, probably for the reason that it would guarantee the departure of British power from one important Middle Eastern country. The United States and its supporters in the U. N. were able to prevent the U. S. S. R. from using the device of the U. N. to increase its influence in Palestine.

One must distinguish, of course, between the Palestine situation and the present crisis in the Middle East. It was possible to utilize the services of the U. N. and this country did in the Palestine situation because, in the absence of great power conflict, membership of the organization in those years was willing to have the U. N. mediate the conflict and seek to give permanence to the solution that seemed most practical. Today, membership of the U. N. has changed significantly by the increase of a large number of states that have assumed a neutralist position in world politics. The Middle East, in addition, has become much more a center of great power conflict. It would therefore seem reasonable to suppose that the United States could not pursue a solution to the Arab-Israeli situation entirely through the U. N. with the same confidence today as it had in the earlier situation. The neutralist inclined states seem unwilling to vote against an Arab member state. Two Arab states that are dedicated to the extermination of Israel are also currently receiving extensive Soviet bloc military aid. Today, the solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute is very much bound up in the attempt of Soviet Russia to replace British and French influence in the Middle East and the consequent United States attempt to prevent this as well as defend the democratic State of Israel and maintain essential good relations with the neighboring Arab States.

The United States recognized the independent State of Israel immediately after it was proclaimed in 1948 and since then has supplied extensive public and private aid. Many commentators conclude that United States aid has been a basic factor in the continued economic well-being of Israel.

The United States has also pursued the solution to the problem of disarmament and the control and reduction of both conventional and atomic weapons almost exclusively through the U. N. This has also been the case with the Soviet Union. In this situation, the U. N. has offered the opportunity for each of the superpowers to demonstrate to the world its readiness to make agreements leading to these laudable goals and at the same time demonstrate that it is the obstructionist tactics of the other that prevent any positive accomplishments in that direction.

This is not to suggest that the United States has been insincere in its desire to lessen the dangers of atomic warfare or to halt the development of arms races. It is merely to indicate that in the presence of continuing worldwide tension between the Soviet bloc and the free world it has not been possible to make agreements that would seriously curtail their military strength. In these circumstances the U. N. provides both the arena where any possible agreements can be negotiated and the best facility for indicating to the world that the United States continues to seek a just and workable agreement.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. PAYNE. I wish to place myself on record as highly commending the excellent address which has been delivered by our colleague, the distinguished junior Senator from New York. He has set forth in very constructive form the aims, the ideals, and the objectives which the resolution seeks to accomplish. It is unfortunate that some Senators who have had questions about the exact meaning of the resolution and about the objectives of the administration and of Congress in trying to enact the resolution, were not present on the floor so that they might hear the very constructive address by the Senator from New York.

I thank the Senator from New York personally for what he has said.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator from Maine.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. CARROLL. I desire to commend the junior Senator from New York for a most excellent address. The Senator and I served together some 10 years ago in the other body of Congress. He was advocating then the same principles he has espoused today, and he was speaking as forcefully on those occasions as he has today. I am in complete agreement with his statement that what the United States needs is a dynamic, positive foreign policy to accomplish the objectives so ably outlined by the junior Senator from New York. It is unfortunate that more Senators were not on the floor this afternoon to hear his outstanding speech.

Although no reservation could come from anything which the junior Senator from New York said in his speech, it is true that some Senators may have reservations, either unconsciously or subconsciously, stemming from the fact that we have watched the development of a strong foreign policy over the last 10 years become more ineffective in recent months. We were present when a strong policy was formulated. We have seen it made effective. We have spent billions of dollars to implement such a policy. We know that it has cost much money. But there is a growing feeling that we no longer have a dynamic, positive foreign policy. The growing tendency is to form, for the most part, military alliances, and not to achieve the splendid objectives which the junior Senator from New York has so ably outlined in his speech. That is the concern of some Senators on this side of the aisle—at least, it is of concern to me.

I am not so much concerned with the amount which is covered in the resolution. The resolution asks for a large amount of money. That disturbs some Senators on this side of the aisle; it does not disturb me one iota. But I should like to know the purpose for which the money is to be used. It is the purpose for which the money will be spent which is hidden. I do not mean that we desire to telegraph our punches; but is there a positive, intelligent foreign policy which will give some purpose and direction to the solution of the problems of the Middle East?

I do not ask the Senator from New York to answer this question. I intend to study his speech carefully tomorrow, as I hope other Senators will. But if we could achieve the aims and objectives which were outlined in his speech, there would be no question, in my mind, that that would meet the overwhelming approval of the American people. I think that is what they want to have done. But there is a hidden doubt and deep concern that there has not been nor will not be that sort of foreign policy if present practices are continued. I repeat, the junior Senator from New York has made a most excellent address, one which has been sorely needed in this debate. I am very happy to pay tribute to the junior Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. WILEY. I agree with the sentiments expressed by the Senator from Maine and the Senator from Colorado, who have just commended the junior Senator from New York. I think he has laid the cards on the table very clearly.

One underlying purpose of the resolution which is sought by the President is very clear, namely, to put a brake against the onslaught of the Communists from the north by any means whatsoever. Why? In the first place, 70 percent of the known supply of oil in the world is in the Middle East.

If the Communists were to take over, it is agreed—as demonstrated by recent events—that there would be a throttlehold upon our allies in Europe, and the effect upon us should be apparent to anyone who is willing to observe and who does not wear blinders.

Second, I think it is very clear that, according to the military men, if the Middle East area were taken over by the Communists, it would provide a gateway for them to Africa. Let us be frank and admit that on our own continent we have less than one-third of the materials necessary for our own defense. If the Kremlin obtained the gateway to Africa and then obtained Africa and obtained Europe, I think anyone who wishes to see can understand what the effect upon our country would be.

So I wish to thank the Senator from New York for his very thought-provoking and very logical speech, which I believe should be read by all who seek the truth.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. President, I am very grateful to my colleagues, the Senator from Maine [Mr. PAYNE], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY], and the Senator from Colorado [Mr. CARROLL] for their kind words.

I desire to conclude with a brief word to my friend, the Senator from Colorado, with whom I enjoy serving and for whom I have great admiration. I think we should examine ourselves, too. If we feel that the foreign policy of our country does not have the inventive genius that it should have, I think some of that can be supplied by those of us who serve here. On the other hand, at times when

the foreign policy has perhaps too much inventive genius, it should be restrained. Let me give an example: It will be recalled that the United Nations essentially began from a resolution adopted in the Congress. The resultant study and development brought the United Nations into being; we proceeded on that basis, instead of proceeding on the theory that, in view of the end of the League of Nations, there was no longer a chance for an international organization.

The Senator from Colorado may recall that in respect to the Marshall plan, particularly the sections which dealt with the encouragement of private enterprise and the sections which dealt with the shipment of relief parcels—I am sure there were others, but those are the ones which occur to me at the moment—those sections were written into the bill by action of one or the other of the legislative bodies.

It will also be recalled that the so-called Kersten amendment—which was looked at askance for a time, and which purported to give the President sums of money, without strings attached, to be used for the purpose of encouraging escapees from behind the Iron Curtain—turned out to be very useful in providing a fund to be drawn on when needed for specific purposes in that connection. I think I could present quite a list of that sort. For instance, the NATO idea had its fundamental origin in the great interest in the Congress occasioned by the great pressure on Europe, both militarily and economically.

Certainly I shall never hesitate—regardless of whether the administration in power represents my party—to present ideas which seem to me to be good. Certainly all the Members of this body are very anxious to back useful, effective, and constructive ideas and proposals. Certainly all the brains capable of dealing soundly with foreign policy are not concentrated in the State Department; that is not the tradition of our country.

So I hope very much that not only from the Congress, but also from all of the great talent existing elsewhere in our country—in the universities, in the associations, in the unions, in the business organizations, and in the foundations—constructive proposals will come. I hope all our people will feel free to develop their ideas for positive dynamic action on foreign policy, and that they will be aided constructively by those of us who serve in the Congress, and who have a national, and, indeed, an international platform. As one Member of this very august body, I hope very much that I shall have the privilege of doing so, and I am sure that my colleagues will do the same.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield to me?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. CARROLL. I have no desire to encumber the very excellent speech made by the Senator from New York by making some observations about the concern which I tried to express a short time ago.

There is no question in my mind that any administration—including the present one—deserves bipartisan support in many instances. On that point, I agree very much with the Senator from New

York, based upon our years of service in the other body. We served during the consideration of the Marshall plan and the Berlin airlift and Korean aid. As those programs proceeded step by step, we knew that the way to stem the tide of international communism was to go forward with a strong, dynamic foreign policy.

In this body, the junior Senator from New York and I are new Members. As I listened to the debate a moment ago, it seemed to me that the Senator from New York, in the course of his speech, referred to the year 1953 and to 1955, referring to events which occurred in the Middle East. I think our foreign policy in regard to that area has not been intelligent; I think it has not been constructive; I think it does not solve the basic problems which have been so ably presented to us today by the junior Senator from New York.

I agree completely with him that there are in this body and in the other body Members who are able to formulate or to participate in the formulation of the sound plans.

For example, the other day I submitted an amendment to the Foreign Relations Committee. I did so with all due humility as a new Member. The amendment was not based upon my idea; it was based upon an idea conceived by one of the great Americans to serve in this body. I refer to the late Senator Arthur Vandenberg. The idea was his, as set forth in a speech he made on the floor of the Senate in 1948. He conceived the idea of having a watchdog committee established; the words watchdog committee were his own. He wanted to have such a committee protect the taxpayers of the Nation, inasmuch as we were then about to embark upon a great program of spending billions of dollars to aid Europe.

Without trying to recall the voting record of the distinguished junior Senator from New York, let me say that I believe that in those days sometimes he stood almost alone as a Republican Member in the House of Representatives. He was most progressive and most constructive. On many occasions he stood alone in the House of Representatives voting in favor of such measures.

Senator Vandenberg gave many reasons why a watchdog committee should be established. The amendment I submitted to the committee was based upon that idea. I do not know whether I shall submit the amendment to the Senate, because there are other pertinent resolutions which have been passed by the Senate setting forth the watchdog concept.

But, as I said in my statement, which appears in the RECORD, it is significant that there was, and in this body there is, an intelligent constitutional argument as to whether or not there is an improper request for a delegation to the executive branch of the war-making power of Congress. I stated there was a twilight zone of opinion as to whether there was or was not such a request, but the important point is that we ought to bridge the gap in an effort to truly create a bi-partisan foreign policy. I gave the names of the members of the

committee, and, for the RECORD, I refer to page 908 of the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. Recently, for the first time in years they have been called into conference at the White House. As the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] said, it was the first time he had ever been called into such a conference, at least since 1954, although he is the second ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The President, after he had called the conference, had a perfect right to speak to the people, as he did, over television.

I cannot agree with the handling of the sanctions situation with regard to Israel. By virtue of the fortitude and courage which has been shown by Israel in saying, "Give us further guaranties," there has been a decided change. I do not know what happened this afternoon at the United Nations, as I have not read a report of it. At any rate there has been a forcing, there has been clearer thinking, there has been a more constructive thinking by all of us concerning the Arab-Israeli problem and the resolution under consideration. Obviously the question arises if we cannot solve the sanctions issue should we commit ourselves to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in support of a policy that is foredoomed to failure?

I say to the junior Senator from New York that \$200 million will not be the end of it, for next year there will be another \$200 million, and the year after that another \$200 million. I do not believe, under those circumstances, that my constituents would particularly favor that.

If we spent \$1 billion in the Middle East on a good, constructive program, such as the junior Senator from New York has outlined in the Senate this afternoon, which would bring peace, stability, and the friendship of the people of the Middle East area, I say it would be well worth the price, rather than to muddle in and out of a situation which may throw us into an atomic war and world war III.

I again commend the junior Senator from New York for a very excellent statement, but despite the excellent speech I have heard I wanted to express the reservation which I had in mind, not as to the aims and objectives, but as to whether he has the insight—and I refer to the Secretary of State—and whether he has the vision, to carry out this program which is vitally necessary, in my own opinion, for the strength and security of our own Nation, and the peace of the world.

Mr. JAVITS. I believe the Senator from Colorado has uttered words which will find an echo in the hearts of many people in our country. In reply I merely wish to say that in order to resolve the debate and come to a vote, which the Senate will do before very long, it is necessary, as we sometimes do in law cases, to assume the Senator is right, but nevertheless support the effort, which is a beginning and is opening the door available to us. I urge that we pass through it and, having passed through it, give to the effort not only the

initiative of those in the present administration, but our own initiative. But as to the desirability of passing through the door, which is the point of my address to the Senate today, I have no doubt.

Mr. CARROLL. Does the Senator express the hope that the most inevitable thing in life has changed and there is hope for a more constructive effort to bring about the end which we all desire?

Mr. JAVITS. Yes.

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, I have been following closely the debate on the Middle East resolution so that I might inform myself as fully as possible concerning this vital issue before we shall have to vote on it.

However, I confess to being disturbed over the turn that the debate has been taking. We are hearing from both sides of the aisle what amounts to some indiscriminate and often reckless attacks upon the fundamental concepts of an internationalist foreign policy. These attacks have been directed not so much against the Middle East resolution as such, but actually against the United Nations, against all overseas financial expenditures, against our NATO alliance with the democracies of the Atlantic community, and against the entire conception of an American foreign policy founded on constructive relationships with other nations.

Already the leader of the Republican Party—the President's party—in the Senate has delivered a major attack at a college forum on the organization and composition of the United Nations. From both sides of the aisle, we have recently heard the idea of international cooperation denounced, ridiculed, and held up to disdainful contempt. My mail is beginning to reflect the impact of this kind of debate upon public opinion. People without information and extremists are sending in many letters which can only be described as inflammatory or hysterical and highly isolationist in tone.

Perhaps as a result of this trend in our mail, speeches on the Senate floor now tell us that the voters are overwhelmingly opposed to all sorts of international commitments—and that woe betide the public figure who dares to defy such sentiment.

SENATORS MUST EXERCISE RESPONSIBILITY AND COURAGE

To begin with, Mr. President, I doubt if the United States Senate is supposed to be some vast Univac machine which faithfully reflects each batch of letters and telegrams. We are supposed to be responsive to our mail, but not dominated by it. Furthermore, I know of no governmental activity easier or more tempting to level demagoguery against than the whole principle of overseas programs. We are hearing now that farmers will be prosperous, for example, if only we can choke off foreign aid. Well, this administration is appropriating much more money than ever for so-called farm programs, and still the family-sized farm does not enjoy prosperity. How do our overseas expenditures figure in that? Indeed, I always

have thought that an aggressive program of international trade and commerce might be the one way to dispose of some of our agricultural surplus production.

Mr. President, I have not made up my mind definitely on the Middle East resolution. I believe the purpose of the present debate is to clarify the questions at stake. I still eagerly await this clarification. It is urgently needed. But, to date, much of the debate has seemed to me more calculated to weaken our national faith in an enlightened, 20th century foreign policy than to analyze and discuss the Middle East issues.

Since the preset debate began, I have listened to Senators attacking foreign aid, hip and thigh. They have lambasted it—horse, foot, and dragon. They have found in it no good and much evil. Yet our postwar programs of international commitments and cooperation were initiated by a Democratic President, Harry S. Truman, and by Gen. George C. Marshall; and the successors to these programs are now carried on by Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Many other eminent leaders of both parties, or of no party, in the executive branch and in the Congress, have devoted their best efforts to these policies. Is it possible that this great Nation has been so unfortunate as to have only knaves or fools at the helm of its Ship of State for the past decade? I refuse to believe such an implication, yet that would be the inevitable logic of some of the speeches we have been hearing recently.

This is a time, Mr. President, for responsibility and not for reckless destruction of the whole basis of our postwar international policies.

Yet, unless the trend and tone of the debate change, it is my fear that the most significant result of these past few weeks will not be passage or defeat of a resolution involving certain relatively superficial phases of the Middle East problem, but the wreckage of any chances for responsible statesmanship in the realm of foreign policy for years to come.

ADMINISTRATION MUST BE CANDID WITH THE PUBLIC

If this fearful result were to emerge from the present debate, much of the blame must rest on the administration itself for the manner in which it has presented the substance of the resolution we are debating. Not only have the President and the Secretary of State failed to enlighten the public on the exact nature and dimensions of the problem with which the proposed resolution is to deal, in preparation for an intelligent discussion of that problem and our proposed policies toward it—no, Mr. President; there is every evidence that the administration has equally failed in the preparation of the supposed program itself, so that neither the public nor the Congress can form any real understanding of what is proposed, and why. Is it any wonder if the only impressions created—rightly or wrongly—are that, first, we are to risk American lives in defense of Arab selfish interests and desert sands, and,

second, that we are to spend vast amounts of American funds on unspecified projects in those areas?

Mr. President, such undertakings as our mutual security programs, technical assistance and reciprocal trade require a great deal of understanding on the part of the American people. For the sake of future gains in world peace, security, freedom and prosperity, such programs call for apparent self-sacrifice and altruism now, in an era when more than half the residents of the world are hungry and there is loose on the planet a destructive force which could totally wipe out the human race. Does anyone think the Senate debate of recent days has uniformly been calculated to produce that understanding, idealism and altruism?

Mr. President, if there is a scintilla of truth to some of the speeches delivered on the Senate floor during recent days, then this great democracy has suffered the misfortune to be governed during the past 10 years by some of the most misguided and ill-advised men on earth. Such instrumentalities as mutual security, the United Nations, international cooperation and reciprocal trade programs did not, like Topsy, "just growed." They were brought into existence, on our part, by American Presidents and American Secretaries of State. If these institutions are as foolish and wretched as some Senators claim they are, what can be said for the sort of men—Democrats and Republicans alike—whom the American people have been entrusting with foreign policy? Either Senators are speaking too passionately and too dogmatically, or else America has been in sorry hands, indeed. If certain Senate speeches are accurate in fact, I fear for the future of the United States.

PRESIDENTS ARE NOT ALWAYS WRONG AND SENATORS RIGHT

Of course, it is always possible that the men in the White House may sometimes have been right, and some Senators wrong. I will not venture that as an outright statement of fact, but I will merely vouchsafe such a possibility. It could be the case, however.

Mr. President, I am not yet ready to judge the issue in the present instance. I have been disturbed by the obvious incompleteness, both of the diagnosis given us by the administration of the asserted danger facing the free world in the Middle East, and of its prescription for it. I have been disturbed by the inconsistency of the President's simultaneous readiness to support sanctions against Israel, the most democratic and Western-oriented nation in the Middle East, while we are told that this central Middle Eastern crisis in Arab-Israel relations has no place in, or even bearing upon, the danger with which we are supposed to concern ourselves in the pending resolution. However, Mr. President, when the time comes to vote on the resolution, I shall do so on the merits of its purposes as I see them, in the light of the overall internationalist policies America has followed in the postwar years. I do not believe that the present debate

should serve as an occasion for destructive broadside attacks on the whole underlying conception of these internationalist policies, which do not need to stand or fall on the weakness of the Eisenhower administration's present proposals for the Middle East. After this one issue has been disposed of, we still must have left a bipartisan and effective foreign policy which will function to stem Communist aggression and bolster free government throughout the world.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. NEUBERGER. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am very pleased that I could be in the Senate Chamber at the time the Senator from Oregon made his remarks, because I gather that what the Senator is concerned about is the possibility that in the discussion of this resolution we may actually set loose forces, or at least generate attitudes, which could be injurious to the whole structure of international cooperation. Is that the Senator's view?

Mr. NEUBERGER. That is my view, and that is the fear I attempted to express in the comparatively brief remarks to which the Senator from Minnesota refers.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am sure the Senator would agree with me that we on this side of the aisle—and I trust also those on the other side—would not want to indulge in the kind of reckless invective and petulant argument which was so characteristic of the Republican leadership during the Truman administration.

I say that with a note of sadness, and yet of truth. I can recall the bitterness of the debates in this Chamber, and the unrelenting attacks not only upon the wisdom of the policies of Mr. Acheson, former Secretary of State, but actually upon his ability, his loyalty, and his character.

It is fair to say that Mr. Truman did not have the protective cloak around him that the present occupant of the White House has been privileged to enjoy. Yet under the Truman administration some of the greatest instruments of American foreign policy were consummated.

Therefore I hope that we on this side, while some may have good reason to be doubtful as to the wisdom of the resolution before us, will remember that in discussing it we should confine our remarks to the resolution and its strength and weaknesses, and not run wild over the entire area of American foreign policy, which has been meticulously and carefully built.

I ask that my colleague from Oregon note with me again—as he did in his remarks—that this resolution had an unfortunate beginning. The majority leader said he was a little tired of "government by leak." I am sure we all know to what he referred. There has been a tendency to give the "razzle-dazzle" public-relations treatment to matters of high policy; yes, of fundamental, basic policy relating to the very security of this country.

It is true that many Members of this body and of the other House were very much upset over the fact that a resolution which apparently bears upon the

security of our Republic was first advanced in the press rather than in the nature of a formal document presented to the Senate or to the House of Representatives.

Also, many Members of the Senate were disappointed by the lack of candor which was exhibited by some of the administration witnesses in the presentation of support for the resolution. The argument over economic aid is characteristic of what I have referred to.

The junior Senator from Minnesota has supported economic aid in every vote in the Senate. I have supported it at times to the disappointment of my friends and colleagues. I believe in an effective foreign economic policy. I am trying to help build one. But I say that the lack of documentation for foreign economic aid in the pending resolution as presented by the administration really jeopardizes constructive, effective foreign-aid programs and policies. It is to this subject that the Senator from Minnesota and other Senators have referred on other occasions.

I do not intend to vote to kill foreign aid, but I do not want the debate on this resolution to result in discrediting effective foreign aid. Therefore, I think it is pertinent, and very important, to note that the Senator from Texas, the majority leader, was able to have written into the resolution as reported by the committees an amendment reading as follows:

None of the additional authorization contained in this section shall be used until 15 days after the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and, when military assistance is involved, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been furnished a report showing the object of the proposed use, the country for the benefit of which such use is intended, and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, from which the funds are proposed to be derived:

The purpose of that amendment is to see to it that Members of Congress are at least informed as to the purposes for which that money would be expended; in other words, that money would not be expended for projects, programs, and uses, which would adversely reflect upon an economic assistance program.

I mention these facts, because the resolution as reported from the committee contains three basic amendments which I believe greatly improve the resolution.

The first amendment Mr. President, places the responsibility for the use of our Armed Forces on the President, as Commander in Chief under the Constitution. The amendment provides:

To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.

That is a fundamental amendment, and it complies with the traditions and precedents of our constitutional history.

The second amendment was offered by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD]. It provides that the \$200 million authorized shall no longer have placed on it the limitations imposed in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, and that that \$200 million is authorized to be used until the end of the fiscal year June 30, 1957. That is a far cry from what the administration presented.

The administration presented a resolution in which the authorization ran on ad infinitum, to the point of eternity. This is a direct limitation, and requires that Congress shall review the entire matter of economic assistance on a fiscal-year basis.

I point these matters out because, as the Senator from Oregon has indicated, there is doubt in my mind as to how one should vote on the resolution. However, I do not want my criticism of the economic assistance aspects of the resolution to be interpreted as my being opposed to a constructive economic policy. In fact, I cry out today for the administration to formulate and to present to us a foreign economic policy. It has none.

The administration has many ad hoc and part-time policies. It would be well for every Member of the Senate to read the Millikan-Rostow report from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on the subject of America's foreign economic policy. It contains some very important reading. Members of the Senate should determine once and for all what kind of foreign-aid program we should have. Instead of a policy based on 3 months, 6 months, or 2 months, or on any other hit-and-miss basis, it should be a policy designed to meet long-term objectives.

Ninety percent of all our foreign economic aid has been for military support. That is hardly an economic policy. That is a military policy.

The Senator from Oregon has been very generous in yielding time to me. I will conclude by saying that his reference to the United Nations is entirely appropriate. I know there are some people who are condemning what is going on in the United Nations today, and our activities in the United Nations, in order to discredit the United Nations. The Senator from Minnesota feels that if the administration will effectively utilize the facilities of the United Nations and give direction, leadership, and guidance, the United Nations will be able to be an effective instrument in certain areas.

The United Nations is only 11 years old. It is not fully developed. We ought not to ask, as the saying goes, a boy to do a man's job. The United Nations ought not to be given impossible problems to solve. It ought to be given problems that are possible of solutions. Therefore I am not going to join in the hue and cry of condemning the U. N. What should be done is to constructively criticize our failure to give leadership in the United Nations.

A classic example of that is to be found in the existing situation relating to the Israel-Egyptian situation, where we are constantly saying that we are going to wait and see what other people

do, and that we are going to wait and see what the African-Asian bloc does.

That is not leadership. That is even poor following.

As I have suggested before, we might at least consider what our friends to the north, in Canada, are doing. Canada has had the courage to stand up against Britain when the British went into Egypt. We might cooperate with a nation that has demonstrated sensitivity to the problems of the modern world. The Dominion of Canada has shown great courage. By working with the Dominion of Canada, at least on hemispheric policy, we might be able to contribute to leadership and direction.

However, I sense that when some people want to cover up for the failures or the errors of judgment or the inadequacies of our own foreign policy, they usually say that the United Nations is at fault.

Let the record be clear that no sanctions could be imposed on anyone in the United Nations if we did not want them imposed. That is the first point.

The second point is that there can be effective economic and political leadership in the United Nations if the United States will lead.

I hope that while Mr. Mollet, the French Prime Minister, is in the United States, we can reestablish the spirit of friendship and cooperation which has symbolized our foreign policy for many years.

I conclude by saying that I am delighted the Prime Minister of France is visiting our President and our country. I hope those meetings will produce again that great spirit of fraternity which has characterized the relationships between the United States and the Republic of France. France is a great country. It has a great people. It has great history. It is doing great things. French political leadership, despite all the criticism that has been leveled against it, has given the world the Coal and Steel Community, the proposals for the European Defense Community, and, more recently, the Common Trade Area Community. The French are struggling to strengthen the areas of freedom. I hope that we will be able to reestablish our friendly relationships with the French and the British, with mutual respect for our differences, but with a great faith in those things that unite us.

I again thank the Senator from Oregon for his fine statement and for his generosity in yielding to me.

Mr. NEUBERGER. I thank the Senator from Minnesota for his very effective response to my remarks.

I wish to say this to the Senator from Minnesota. I do not have his long experience in the Senate or the benefit of his very able service on the Committee on Foreign Relations. However, I believe he does share with me the knowledge of how difficult it is in the Senate, under present circumstances, to try to be a responsible member of the Democratic Party.

I remember that last year, when the Eisenhower administration was urging that Congress allow the administration to continue aid to the Tito government

in Yugoslavia, so far as my own State is concerned—and I can only speak for the State of Oregon—it was a highly unpopular proposal in Oregon.

The Republican floor leader in the Senate and, I believe, also the chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, joined in submitting an amendment on the floor to strike out aid to Tito in the bill which provided foreign aid for various countries throughout the world.

The Republicans had their cake and ate it, too. If I am not mistaken, we liberal Democrats, who have been at times berated all over the place for allegedly being leftists, had to stand on the floor of the Senate and save the Eisenhower administration's program with respect to assistance to Yugoslavia.

After the Congress adjourned I went home to my State. I spoke all over the State at various meetings, not only at nonpartisan meetings, but at other meetings, where I campaigned for the reelection—happily successfully—of my distinguished senior colleague in the Senate.

On many occasions people came up to me—almost always they were members of President Eisenhower's political party—and told me how disappointed they were that I had voted to continue aid to that blackguard and rascal, Tito. When I told them that this was the specific request made by the President and the Secretary of State, many of them refused to believe it. I asked friends of mine to check at county courthouses on the political affiliation of these people, because in my State people register to vote by political parties, and almost invariably all the people who were thus so critical of me were members of President Eisenhower's party. They refused to believe that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles would suggest so unpatriotic and un-American a policy as continuing aid to Tito. The only way I could convince these people that the "terrible" Democrats had voted for a policy favored by Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower was to send them copies of the letter from Mr. Dulles, in which he stated this policy was adopted with the full concurrence of the President. The administration has had its cake and has eaten it, too. The administration has looked to us on this side of the aisle to vote for their program, to save it from being wrecked by the Republican leaders, and then we get berated by Republicans when we go home.

I have been a Member of the Senate for only a very short time, but I remember that virtually the same thing happened with respect to reciprocal trade.

I think, on 5 or 6 rollcalls, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] and I voted with the administration for a 3-year extension of the reciprocal trade program. But when I went home I was criticized by Republicans because I allegedly voted to wreck the tuna-fish industry or the cherry industry. When I told them it was an administration program, they said, "Ike would not propose a program that you Democrats would vote for." They did not believe that the 3-year extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act or the allowance of aid to Tito are part of the Eisenhower pro-

gram, because they think that only Democrats would do anything like that, and that "old Ike" would not do such a thing.

We have been depended upon to defend the Republican foreign policy from attack by their own Republican leaders in the Senate, but when we go home, we get criticized by the Republicans in our own States.

Mr. President, I wish to add one thing which I think is quite significant.

Almost at the very time the President of the United States went on the air to appeal for United Nations action in the Middle East crisis—action which many of us hope will not come to pass in the terms which the President favors—almost at the very time the President did that, the Republican minority leader had made a major foreign-policy speech criticizing the very composition, the very organization, of the United Nations.

One of the things that amuses me is that some Republicans will quote with approval a criticism of the United Nations on the basis that, in the United Nations, there are certain countries which have a thousand times the population of other countries.

I do not know whether they realize it, but that could also be a criticism of the United States Senate, where certain States have 65 or 70 times the population of other States. But I think it highlights the whole Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere of this situation, that almost while the administration is offering all these platitudes about the United Nations, the administration's chief Senate spokesman is making a policy speech criticizing the entire fundamental basis of the structure of the United Nations.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. NEUBERGER. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I wish to revert to something said a moment ago about Democratic support meeting with criticism in the Senator's home State. As a matter of fact, did not the Senator also encounter the situation that during the campaign it was thrown up to him constantly that the Republicans gave the President better support for his foreign policy than did the Democrats, and that many times that argument would be made by the very leaders to whom the Senator has made reference?

Mr. NEUBERGER. Constantly. One other amusing thing happened in my State. There was a Republican Member of the House of Representatives who was extremely isolationist in his voting. He was an opponent of foreign aid. He was defeated in 1956 for reelection, but he has now been appointed to a foreign-aid position under this administration with reference to a program which he voted against steadily during his career.

Mr. SPARKMAN. There have been analogous situations both in connection with foreign aid and with other programs of the Federal Government. For instance, one of the criticisms which I think is a sound one is that in a great many of the agencies which have been set up as independent agencies for the purpose of regulating certain segments of our industry, persons have been appointed from the very ranks that were supposed to be regulated. As a matter

of fact, predominantly the employees have come from those ranks.

Mr. NEUBERGER. We often have to take political risks to support the administration's foreign policy. I am not objecting to that. If we run for this particular office we should expect to hazard political risks.

I asked the capable girl in my office who handles the mail to give me a statement concerning it, and she told me that my mail ran 5 to 1 against the administration's reciprocal trade program, for which I voted. I am speaking of my mail from the State of Oregon. I do not think I received one letter favoring aid to Tito. We are supposed to vote according to our conscience and our own best judgment, but it is at least interesting that we have to undergo political jeopardy for defending the administration's program.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I think we should give a great deal of consideration to foreign policy. I understand the Senator believes in resolving doubts in favor of the President on any foreign policy question, but at the same time having an obligation to criticize constructively such foreign policy as the President may promulgate. Is that correct?

Mr. NEUBERGER. Definitely. If it meant staying in the United States Senate for the rest of my natural life, I would never indulge in the type of criticism such as that which was leveled against President Truman by certain Republicans during the Korean war.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Does the distinguished Senator agree with me that under our form of government as it has developed through the years the President of the United States has not only the power but the responsibility to promulgate and to execute foreign policy?

Mr. NEUBERGER. Definitely. Most assuredly the Senator is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. If that be true, does it not follow logically that it is our duty to scrutinize carefully the portion of foreign policy in which we alone have a part in carrying into effect, such as confirming nominations, ratifying treaties, appropriation of funds, and all the things which are necessary to carry foreign policy into effect, and to engage in constructive criticism whenever we believe the proposals are justly subject to such criticism?

Mr. NEUBERGER. Of course, the distinguished Senator from Alabama is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I commend the Senator from Oregon for the very fine presentation he has made. I regret that I was not on the floor to hear all of it, but I have enjoyed greatly the part I have heard.

I particularly wish to commend the Senator from Oregon for the sterling defense he has made of the United Nations. I agree with the statement made by our friend, the distinguished Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], with reference to the United Nations.

It was my pleasure and privilege to have served as a delegate to the United Nations in 1950. I count it as a real distinction. I have been a strong believer in the United Nations, recognizing all the time its imperfections and its weak-

nesses, but believing that as we recognize its imperfections, our obligation becomes even greater to work harder to make the United Nations the kind of effective organization which we dream it may someday be.

Mr. NEUBERGER. I thank the Senator from Alabama for his defense of the United Nations, because the United Nations is the only international organization which exists in the entire world in which we can vote rather than plunge into dreadful atomic war.

If I may address a personal comment to the Senator from Alabama, Mrs. Neuberger and I have said many times, when we have watched Senator SPARKMAN in the Senate, that he has confirmed our belief we voted for the right candidate for Vice President of the United States in 1952.

I now yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. First, Mr. President, I should like to second the observation by the Senator from Oregon relating to the Senator from Alabama. Indeed, that was a vote for the right man and for the right cause.

Mr. NEUBERGER. Would that it had prevailed.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I may say, Mr. President, that these words of comfort are indeed welcome, even though they come—

Mr. HUMPHREY. Belatedly?

Mr. SPARKMAN. No; from a minority representation. However, let me say to both the distinguished Senators that I speak in truth and yet facetiously about the minority in which we found ourselves in 1952.

However, there is one thing with reference to that election of which I have always been proud. I have never, at any time, felt downhearted as a result of the outcome of that election. I felt proud of the fact that 27 million Americans voted their belief in the principles for which the Democratic Party stood.

While I am thinking of that, I may add that I was in Kansas City last night, and a newspaperman asked me this amazing question: "What about the Democratic Party? Do you think it will come back?"

I believe they were the words he used. I said "Before I answer that question, I should say that I do not accept the implication of your question. The Democratic Party has not been away. As a matter of fact, it seems to me you should be asking that question about the Republican Party, because in 1956 the Democrats among the American people expressed their confidence in the Democratic Party by electing a Democratic Senate, a Democratic House, and a majority of the governors. They elected also a Democratic majority in many of the State legislatures throughout the country. I am certain the same thing would be found to be true if you inquired about the election of officials to positions in county courthouses and to other political positions."

I said to him, "I say the Democratic Party won a tremendous victory in 1956. We made a clean sweep except for one man."

He then asked me, "Do you think that in 1960 you will get that office?"

I said, "Yes; I believe we will make a clean sweep in 1960."

Mr. NEUBERGER. The Democratic Party is the healthiest corpse anybody in this country ever saw.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I am certain the Senator wants the Record to be complete and accurate. Lest anyone misunderstand what the Senator from Oregon has said when he spoke of aid to Tito, the resolution or the proposal on which we voted in the Senate was not merely for aid to Tito, but it was a vote for confidence in the integrity and judgment of the President of the United States.

That resolution, if the Senator will recall, provided that we would give Marshal Tito aid, but that we were willing to vote that if the President determined it was in the vital interest of the United States and the national security of this country, he could, if in his judgment all those factors prevailed, extend aid to Tito. That is what we voted for.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And the President made a public pronouncement to that effect.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

The Senator from Oregon has commented about the rather isolationist former Representative from his State who has recently been given a choice administration job in the foreign aid field, although he voted against foreign aid.

I have almost come to the conclusion, I regretfully say, that the way for one to get a job in an agency which he has opposed is, first, to lose the election, and then to secure an appointment to the agency which he sought to kill before he lost the election.

I remember when Mr. Cole was appointed head of the housing administration. He had voted against public housing when he was a Member of Congress, but afterward he was put in charge of it. I said then that that was like putting a fox in charge of a chicken coop. I still think that that was perhaps the most accurate description I could give.

The Senator from Alabama knows that the present Director of the International Cooperation Administration—the ICA—Mr. Hollister, had a record of opposition to the ICA and the policies and programs under the jurisdiction of that agency.

It seems to me that this is a part of what must be called the schizophrenia of the Republican Party. Is it any wonder that the President wants to modernize his party? Is it any wonder that he is asking for some kind of rehabilitation of his party?

We witnessed that in the Senate today when one of our distinguished colleagues rose and said that Paul Hoffman was not the kind of Republican his party could use; that they would wash their hands of him.

Mr. President, if Mr. Hoffman is not wanted in the Republican Party—I have only one invitation; I can only speak for myself as a Democrat—I think he would be a wonderful addition to any organization, and we would be glad to welcome him into the Democratic Party, if he would join with us in our programs.

The other observation I wish to make is this: The Senator from Oregon has pointed out how difficult it is for Democratic Senators to maintain a sense of responsibility. I have said that we Democrats must never be irresponsible, but that we ought to be irrepressible. Let us not be irresponsible; let us be irrepressible in what we believe and in the advocacy of what we believe. It has been mighty difficult not to let our emotions get the best of us, particularly when in 1952 the leaders of the Republican Party, then campaigning, said they were going to unleash Chiang Kai-shek. Poor old Chiang. Not only is he still on a leash; he has a halter on him so firmly that he can hardly wiggle.

But we were going to unleash Chiang Kai-shek. But then he lost some islands in the north, and he has been tied closer to home than any young boy who has violated the household rules and has been sent behind the closet door.

Then Senators may recall that there was to be a liberation. That idea took hold among certain groups in this country. Our friends of Polish extraction and of Lithuanian extraction—great Americans—felt that somehow or other the Democratic policy was one of containment, not one of liberation.

The Republicans said, "We are going to liberate."

All at once someone decided he wanted to get liberated. What happened?

The Secretary of State said, "No; you are not supposed to get liberated the way you are trying to liberate yourselves. You are not supposed to fight for it or accept our help."

What I am trying to point out is that it is extremely difficult not to try to take advantage of what are such glaring weaknesses and conditions that they are obvious even to the blind. To exploit these issues for political purposes would in a sense do an injustice to sound, constructive, and creditable foreign policy. For instance, does the Senator from Oregon recall the emphasis on "agonizing reappraisal" and "new look"?

The plain truth is that I am afraid some of the propagandists in the Republican ranks decided that the way to get a foreign policy was to "jazz it up" public-relations-wise. The truth is that that kind of policy became foreign to our friends and foreign to our constituents, and no one could quite understand it. Much of our trouble can be attributed to that situation. At the proper time we shall discuss it in more detail.

I am sure the Senator from Oregon has asked us to discuss the pending joint resolution with conviction and with conscience, and that is the way the debate will be maintained.

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, I am glad the Senator from Minnesota places that interpretation upon my remarks, because it was my intent and purpose to encourage responsibility in foreign policy.

Before yielding the floor, I wish to say to the Senator from Minnesota that I am extremely pleased that earlier in the debate he spoke about the responsibility of our own Democratic leadership in the Senate. Both he and I realize that occasionally some of our liberal friends

have been critical of the Democratic majority leader of the Senate. I am relatively new to the Senate, as compared to the service here of the Senator from Minnesota. But I wish to say that I, for one, glory in the fact and rejoice in the fact that the Democratic Members of this body have so responsible a leader as the senior Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON]. There have been many occasions, as is evident to anyone who is familiar with American politics, when the Democratic leader could have used demagoguery or opportunism—if we wish to use those descriptive terms—to stand against such administration proposals as foreign aid, the continued program of giving a certain measure of assistance to Tito, the reciprocal trade program, and other features of the administration's foreign policy, many of which were inherited from previous administrations, and rightly so. I am very proud that the senior Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] has not used those political openings, but that, instead, he has placed what he considers to be the welfare of his country above certain ephemeral political opportunities for his party. I have felt great pride and faith in that fact. It seems to me that when we read the history of these times, we shall find that the occasions when statesmanship has been demonstrated in our country have been those when the welfare of our country has been placed ahead of temporary political advantage. Every one of us familiar with the state of public opinion in the Nation realizes that there is a great deal of political hay to be made out of blind, reckless denunciation of foreign aid or of certain international policies or of reciprocal-trade agreements, particularly in areas where certain industries or certain persons legitimately feel that their businesses or jobs may have been hurt by reciprocal trade.

I feel that the Democratic majority leader of the Senate has certainly demonstrated a high order of statesmanship when he has not taken narrow or partisan advantage of his political opportunities on occasions when he has felt the national welfare demanded that we support the administration, no matter how unpopular its policies might be. I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] about the characteristic statesmanship of our majority leader, the senior Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON], in those instances and circumstances.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield further to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPARKMAN in the chair). Does the Senator from Oregon yield to the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. NEUBERGER. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am very happy that the Senator from Oregon has made those comments. They bring to my mind the fact that a political party does not have to be unanimous in order to have unity. Certainly there is a great deal of difference between unanimity and unity, as we have stated many times on this floor. Unity leaves room for differences based on respect for the points of

view of others and their background and their outlook and their experience. Unanimity means enforced discipline which would leave no room for differences of opinion.

Let me say that I have not always voted as the majority leader has requested or as he himself has voted. But I believe it fair to say that we have had leadership which has been considerate and temperate and experienced, and at all times has put the welfare of the country above all else. The majority leader has an excellent record in the field of international relations, in particular. This has been to the benefit of the administration.

As the Senator from Oregon knows, our majority leader once said to us that he did not view the role of the opposition as one of simply opposing. Instead, he has used the role of the opposition as being that of opposing when we believe that the majority or the administration is wrong, and of supporting it when we believe it is right. That does not eliminate constructive debate—either on the pending joint resolution or any other subject.

In the case of the pending measure, there is considerable argument, because there are doubts and uncertainties about it. When the vote on the pending joint resolution is taken, we must vote either for it or against it; we cannot vote "maybe." I have often said to my constituents that when we come to decide about one of the primary issues, I often wish there were a column "down the middle." Often there is talk about going down the middle of the road; and such a course is supposed to be a safe one. However, when we vote on a bill or other measure, we must either vote for it or vote against it; we must either vote "yea" or "nay"; there is no "maybe" column, which might help one be popular with many persons.

The purpose of the debate is to give us an opportunity to express any doubts or misgivings we may have, as well as to give us an opportunity to express our convictions. Finally, when the debate has concluded, we resolve the issue by voting. That is what will happen in the case of the pending joint resolution.

That is what the majority leader stated in his opening remarks, after the joint resolution was called up. He proposed that there be thorough debate, that there be responsible debate. He urged that the debate not be limited, that there be no attempt to cut off any reasonable degree of participation in the debate or of examination of the details of the pending measure. But he pointed out that ultimately we must vote on the joint resolution. I believe that the people of the country should know that that is what we wish to do, and that there is a determination here not to stall, not to play politics with the joint resolution, but to examine it and evaluate it, and then decide about it, and to express our decision by means of our vote.

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Minnesota for his very cogent and effective remarks.

Mr. President, if no other Senator desires me to yield to him, I now relinquish the floor.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina obtained the floor.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield to me, to permit me to suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. I yield for that purpose.

Mr. LONG. Then, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Gore	Morton
Allott	Green	Mundt
Anderson	Hayden	Murray
Barrett	Hennings	Neely
Beall	Hickenlooper	Neuberger
Bennett	Hill	O'Mahoney
Bible	Holland	Pastore
Blakley	Hruska	Payne
Bricker	Humphrey	Potter
Bush	Ives	Purtell
Butler	Jackson	Revercomb
Byrd	Javits	Robertson
Capehart	Jenner	Russell
Carlson	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Carroll	Johnston, S. C.	Schoeppel
Case, N. J.	Kefauver	Scott
Case, S. Dak.	Kennedy	Smathers
Chavez	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Church	Knowland	Smith, N. J.
Clark	Kuchel	Sparkman
Cooper	Lausche	Stennis
Cotton	Long	Symington
Dirksen	Magnuson	Talmadge
Douglas	Malone	Thurmond
Dworshak	Mansfield	Thye
Eastland	Martin, Iowa	Watkins
Ellender	McCarthy	Wiley
Ervin	McClellan	Williams
Flanders	McNamara	Young
Frear	Monroney	
Goldwater	Morse	

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PAYNE in the chair). A quorum is present.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NEUBERGER in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, I believe that each Senator present knows that what I shall have to say here today is not said because I am a Democrat. What I shall say will be the same as what I said when the Democrats were in office. I take the same position in matters of this kind, whether it be under a Democratic or a Republican administration.

Mr. President, I am bitterly opposed to the so-called Eisenhower doctrine. I am opposed to it in its watered-down ver-

sion. It has not, in my judgment, been watered down enough. It should be watered down to the point that unless we are prepared to stop aggression everywhere, aggression by the large nations as well as by the small nations, we should not attempt to stop it anywhere. Unless all the nations, who are members of the United Nations, contribute their pro rata share of manpower and resources, then I contend we should refrain from carrying the sole responsibility. Though the United States is the leader of the free world, ours should not be the sole responsibility of policing the entire world. We simply do not possess sufficient manpower, nor do we possess the material resources to stop aggression everywhere.

We have stopped England and France. We have not stopped Israel. To adopt an inconsistent, immoral position of forcing our friends to stop aggression against their rights, and then of assuming the responsibility of preventing aggression ourselves, and on the other hand of winking at aggression by Russia against Hungary and other satellite countries and of preventing aggression by India or by China, is wrong. Our actions in this regard are neither justified nor are they moral.

Our foreign policy under the President is disastrous. It is fraught with danger to the lives of our American boys and with danger from the standpoint of the waste of our material resources. Our foreign policy under the President and Secretary Dulles is bankrupt in its principles and purposes.

Let me prove the charges.

The President proposes to do now, at a late date and under circumstances and grave handicaps—which, by the way, he himself has created—what the President prevented others from doing when quick and certain success would have attended our efforts.

The resolution which the President wishes us to pass proposes to do now just the opposite of what he earlier prevented others from doing with their own manpower and at their own expense. This happened when the Suez crisis first arose and was at its height.

The President said in substance last year when the crisis in the Middle East was at its peak that he "could not conceive of the use of military force as a good solution." At what point did he get this conception?

What he must have meant was that the use of military force by England, France, and Israel was not a good solution. But, in essence, he now says give me 200 million extra dollars and the right—in advance of a declaration of war by the Congress—to use American forces wherever I please. The President helped to create a vacuum in the Middle East by causing the forces of England, France, and Israel to withdraw from that area. The President's resolution would fill that vacuum with our own men and material strength. What other deduction can a fair and objective mind reach?

Mr. President, how long, oh, how long, will the American people permit themselves to be the stooges of the divergent forces which are at work today?

If it was wrong for England and France to prevent the confiscation or nationalization of the Suez Canal Co. with their own men and own resources, what right have we to subject our American boys and girls and our American resources to about the same purpose and in the same undertaking? The President wants Congress to give him a blank check and an absolute grant of power and, at the same time, subject the use and deployment of such power and money according to the mandates and edicts of the United Nations. Such action gives Russia a veto over what we may wish to do. The Congress must give up its veto power and hand it over to Russia in the Security Council.

The President wants us to bypass our constitutional requirements on the one hand, but, on the other hand, he wants us to subordinate our actions to the mandates of the United Nations. In what a predicament such a lack of regard for our constitutional form of government can involve us. Shall we again give in to Russia's veto on the pretense that we need to do so to halt Russian infiltration?

The Constitution of the United States is more sacred to me than the charter or a thousand charters of the United Nations. A charter which permits force against the weak and restrains force against the strong is not much of a charter to me. A rule which does not work both ways is a poor rule to me.

A few dates and a few events will prove the truth of the charges I make. Let us look at the facts. They are not in dispute. Let us look at the events as they have occurred. The timetable of them is clear. The recorded events are not now subject to argument. The obvious deductions from them may spell just as disastrous an adventure as we experienced in Korea.

Here is the recent history of world events in their date order. In late July—July 26, 1956—Nasser announced that he was nationalizing the Suez Canal Co. Nationalization without prompt, adequate, and just compensation is confiscation. Such has been our national policy from the beginning of our history as a Nation.

Who dares to deny this? Did the President complain that Egypt had broken her treaty obligations when Egypt nationalized this private corporation, the Suez Canal Co.? Did the President complain about Egypt's immoral act of violating her duty to mankind? Did the President address himself to the question of Egypt's compliance with international law? Not at all. His efforts were directed principally to restrain England and France from protecting the rights of their citizens and their Governments as the stockholders in the Suez Canal Co. He wishes to punish Israel now because she is unwilling to be strangled to death.

We should bear in mind also that when that event was taking place, there was a treaty in existence between Egypt and England under which England had the right to go in there to protect the Suez Canal.

High level diplomatic talks began on August 1, 1956. Mr. Murphy, Assistant

Secretary of State, was first dispatched to London. Then Mr. Dulles suddenly flew back from South America and migrated after him within a few days. Throughout the month of August 1956 we talked, and talked, and proposed further discussions. Other nations were called into conference. Not one word came from the White House in condemnation of the international banditry being practiced by Nasser on the stockholders of the Suez Canal Co.

The negotiations which started in August failed in September of 1956. Every proposal for a solution of the crisis created by Nasser's piracy failed.

Russia seized the turn of events in her favor. Through her western doors, she used her might to repress the uprisings in Budapest. Hungary became a bloody battleground for the further practice of Russian tyranny.

On October the 25th, a few days before the election, the President said it was not necessary to call a special meeting of the United Nations to consider the unrest in the Middle East or, for that matter, for any other action. The President satisfied himself and the situation by saying:

The United States deplores the intervention of the Soviet military forces.

The puppet government of Hungary has defied the United Nations. That government will not even let the Secretary General of the United Nations pay it a visit. The Secretary General cannot observe what is going on in Hungary much less stop it. The President has yet to denounce the international thievery of Nasser. But look. When Israel sent her forces into the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt and was within 20 miles of the Suez Canal, and England and France, on October 30, 1956, sent Egypt an ultimatum, the President dispatched to England and France a "vigorous and emphatic protest."

In desperation, on October 31, 1956, England and France started troop movements into Egypt.

The President then took to the airwaves and in a broadcast on October 31 finally declared:

We took our first measure in this action yesterday. We went to the United Nations with a request that the forces of Israel return to their own line and that hostilities in the area be brought to a close—there, with no veto operating, the opinion of the world can be brought to bear.

Why had not the President brought the opinion of the world to bear on Nasser in his confiscations in July? Why had not the President done more than "deplore" the Russian action in Hungary and in Russia's earlier depredations in the satellite countries? What about bringing world opinion to bear on Russia? What rule of law is there that is worth a continental that does not apply equally to the strong as it should to the weak?

I hold no brief for England. I hold no brief for France. I hold no brief for Israel. I owe my loyalty and my responsibility to the boys and girls of America, to their mothers and to their fathers. I owe an obligation to the economic welfare of all the people of the

United States. Why should we play a game of international chess with the blood of our boys and girls? Why should we waste our economic well-being and permit Russia to hold the check rein of a veto over our actions?

Mr. President, it never occurred to the President to protest Egypt's unlawful actions in her seizure of the canal company. Deploring Russia's use of force in Hungary is quite a different thing from wanting to use our boys and girls and our own money to do what we had theretofore prevented France, England, and Israel from doing on their own account. These dates and these events compound a situation that requires more explanation than we have yet been given. The Secretary of State is facile of speech, easy with the gift of explanation, but the reason for our doing what we are now asked to do is a poor excuse for having prevented our true and tried allies from assuming the job on their own responsibility.

Talk not to me about our actions conforming to the mandates of the United Nations. Our actions in Korea conformed to the mandates of the United Nations. By conforming we suffered in excess of 150,000 casualties. That is the kind of conformity that I, as one American, want no more of. How soon are we to forget that we furnished more than 90 percent of the manpower and more than 85 percent of the materials in that fiasco? In Korea, we lost the only war in history in which we were ever engaged. We lost it when we could have won it. We lost it under the charm and direction of the United Nations. We will lose another war, a more costly war, unless every member of the United Nations pays its proportionate share of the cost of every such police action, not only in manpower, but in material resources. Must we be the banker for the world both in manpower and material wealth?

Shall we continue to be the blood bank for the world?

I ask again, When will the American people awaken to the disaster that awaits us when we attempt to crush the weak and merely scold the wrongdoings of the strong? Such actions do not help the morals of the world one iota. They only further weaken and hurt us. Weaken, I mean, our own United States.

Moral leadership is fine. I admire moral leadership. I adore moral leadership. But I detest intellectual dishonesty. I detest immorality that permits the strong to run rampant in committing violations which result in the weak knuckling under to the forces of the strong. I say in substance with the leader of the Republican side in this Chamber, that such a course of conduct by us is immoral, unjustified, and unwarranted. I say in substance with the leader on our side of the aisle, that it is wrong to pressure only one side of a two-sided dispute. No amount of juggling of words, twisted phrases, doubletalk, schoolteacher approach, or radio adaptation of "Father knows best" from the President or his wandering boy, Secretary Dulles, can convince me that it is moral for Russia to crush Hungary, but that it is improper for England and

France to protect their property interests in the Suez Canal Co. This immorality of action is compounded a thousand times and made infinitely worse from every point of view I hold when it is proposed that we, in America, shall now do what we prevented others from doing on their own account and in their own interests.

In November we voted with Russia and Egypt for a cease-fire. We voted against England, France, and Israel.

In the early days of November, just before the election, the British and French invaded Egypt. The Russians had already sent their armored tanks into Hungary. At about the same time, Bulganin proposed that Russia and the United States intervene in Egypt to halt invasion there. A White House spokesman said:

Neither the Soviet nor any other military forces should now enter the Middle East except under a United Nations mandate.

Nothing was said then to the effect that the United States should use its own forces under a United Nations mandate to oppose Russian forces from infiltrating the Middle East. The threat then was greater than it is today. While the threat of the use of force in Egypt and Hungary was at its peak, the President flew, on November 10, to Gettysburg to tramp over his place and look after his livestock.

The oil shortage in Western Europe was being felt to the great detriment of all our allies in NATO. Rationing in Europe was being enforced. People were suffering from the slow-down in industry. Others were suffering from insufficient heating oil. The clarion call for the protection of law and order and the preservation of peace was sounded by the then Prime Minister of England. Here are Mr. Eden's words:

Surely it was never the intention that, if the United Nations could not act, its members should not be allowed to take action to protect the interests of peace itself—if we renounce the use of force when law cannot command order, then we are in fact undermining the rule of law. We are leaving the world open to the lawbreakers.

It was not until December 12 that the General Assembly condemned Russia's cruel actions in Hungary. All the while, the Secretary General of the United Nations was forbidden even to enter Hungary; much less did the use of force to repel force there receive any consideration. If it was wrong for England to invade Egypt to prevent the theft of her property, was it right for Russia to continue to steal the freedom of millions of suffering Hungarians?

Such a contradiction of positions is so immoral and so hopelessly insolvent as to bankrupt any national policy which pursues it.

On January 5, 1957, 2 days after the Congress was convened, on Saturday, if you please, before any of our committees had been organized, the stage was set for the great drama. The President came before us with all the trimmings, fanfare, and scenery of an announcement of world-shaking proportions. Someone around the President leaked the news to the press before he spoke to us. This

was to condition us as to what was coming: That communism was threatening to invade the Middle East; that the Reds were again on the march; that Syria was being weakened by Communist inroads. That the Middle East countries were being subverted; that infiltration was raging; that freedom again was being imperiled. All these things were a part of the buildup. The President politely reversed, on January 5, 1957, the position he took in the fall, during the crisis in the Middle East, for he then said:

The use of force is inconceivable.

On January 5, 1957, the President requested an extra \$200 million over and above the other hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars we have appropriated to prevent Russian aggression by infiltration. He asked us to waive our constitutional duty. He did not propose that England, France, and Israel return to Egypt, so as to help prevent the destruction of their national interests and their properties in those countries and in Egypt.

We have only one excuse to enter the Middle East with our own boys and girls and spend our own national wealth there. That excuse is wrapped up in the question: Is it in our own national interest to do so? If it is, then is it in our own national interest to prevent our allies from doing likewise or from helping us now?

Our entering now is inconsistent with our preventing the entrance of our traditional allies. This situation, however confused and confusing, cannot be dressed up in other terms, no matter what words are employed or how they may be distorted in their meaning. On what terms does the President now wish to have this extraordinary power? This is the most extraordinary situation I have ever known. He wants the Congress to abdicate its constitutional function to declare war, and yet to make that abdication subject to the changing, uncertain, unreliable, undependable, and vacillating moods, opinions, mandates, or edicts of the conglomeration of nations constituting the United Nations. Such a proposition to me is as preposterous as it is unwise. I shall have none of it. Not a bit of it is worth a single drop of blood of any humble American boy or girl who has been the pride and joy of a helpless American mother or a devoted American father. None of such blood in such a cause will stain my vote on the President's resolution. I am for America's interests first. I shall vote for American interests first. Shall we spend our money, squander our resources, and spill our blood, as the President on January 5, 1957, said: "Consonant with the actions and recommendations of the United Nations?"

Perish the thought. Perish the plan. Perish the resolution that will permit another American life to be lost under the wishy-washy, inconsistent policies of the phrasemakers who deceive, beguile, and mislead the American people.

This policy under the resolution relieves the President from "consulting" the Congress, but requires him to conform his actions "consonant" with the

"actions and recommendations" of the United Nations. Before any American boy is sent off to fight Communist aggression in the Middle East or elsewhere, I want the American Bill of Rights to go with him. I want him to have the opportunity to win his fight. I want him to come home after his victory. I do not want these rights to be subject to Russia's veto in the United Nations. Every excuse to sidestep the Constitution and the will of the Congress is the best reason I know why we as American representatives should withhold our consent. A blank check of money and authority is the demand of every one wishing dictatorial powers. Hitler got one. Tojo was clothed with that kind of authority. Mussolini possessed such advance power. I shall withhold my vote to entrust such power to any man.

We would be led to believe by many members of the press that this advance grant of power, this go-ahead signal of authority, is necessary to ward off the subtle growth of communistic subversion. This to me is so much tommyrot. The evidence before the Internal Security Subcommittee, of which I am a member, does not justify such a conclusion. The truth of the matter is, and I add to it Chairman WALTER's statement as further proof, that we have opened the very doors of our country to thousands of Communists by our do-good policy toward the Hungarians. Many Communists have recently entered our country as refugees. Let me ask the simple question, What would have happened to the United States in 1776 if the patriots of the American colonies had fled to Canada or Mexico? There would have been no America as we know it today. We do not overcome communism by running from it. Neither do the Hungarians. I grieve for suffering humanity wherever it suffers. I mourn the loss of freedom wherever it is being lost. But when we run from communism, we strengthen it. Yet when we stand by, persevere, fight, and suffer, we can overcome it.

The myth of the communistic infiltration in the Middle East as the reason for the President's resolution disappeared as a mist before the rising sun when King Saud in one of his latest press releases said he did not feel that the Middle East was in danger of subversion from communism. The Arab World looks to Mecca. Russia would not dare to break the ties of the Arabs or to prevent their facing Mecca. The leaders in other Arabian countries seconded the note of King Saud, namely, that the Arabian countries had no fear of the growth of communism among them. Thus, in one fell swoop, falls the scarecrow of communism. The window dressing afforded by this reason—growth of communism—has to be pulled aside. In my judgment—and there is much evidence before the Internal Security Subcommittee and much evidence before the House Un-American Activities Subcommittee to sustain this judgment—we have received, through the refugees admitted to this country from Hungary, more Communist agents than today are operating from Russia in all the Middle

Eastern countries. I fear that that is so. If the President must consult the United Nations before he acts in the Middle East, that is the best reason in the whole wide world why he should consult the Congress. Why is it that he can wait to consult the United Nations, but that he cannot wait until the Congress is consulted and until it acts? I should like to have someone answer that question. Do the Members of Congress not represent the American people? When, oh when, will America come first? Why should we neglect our own people? Why should we continue to look after, suffer, bleed, and die for others? All the while, we continue to neglect our own. When will our national leaders begin pulling for America first? When will we cease sending billions of dollars to other countries, when there is so much need for a few hundred thousand dollars here at home? Consider the present situation of the farmers of our country, some of whom are in dire need of a small loan, in order to make a crop this year. But it is said that America cannot afford to make such small loans—not gifts—to farmers in the United States.

We drive away and antagonize our friends with whom we were allied in two world conflicts. We pull them away when they are seeking to protect their national interests. I refer to England and France. We assert that the use of force is inconceivable. Before the echo of his words has died away, the President says on a Saturday, in true sportsmanship style, that it is necessary to clothe him in advance with power to use force whenever he feels it is necessary, wherever he feels it is necessary, and against whomever he feels it is necessary. Such a policy lacks responsibility. Such a policy lacks statesmanship. Such a policy is dangerous. The truth of the entire matter is that he wants to place the Congress "behind the eight ball."

Such policy, on the other hand, is the very essence of irresponsibility. Representative government is being destroyed, democracy is being destroyed, and freedom itself seeps down the drain, when we give any man, whoever he may be, the power of life or death over American lives and property, as is now proposed by President Eisenhower to be given—even to him.

When Congress yields its powers to the President, without limitation or restriction, what is left of the Constitution? When the Constitution is gone, what is left except the concentration of power in the President? As Woodrow Wilson once said "Such concentration precedes the death of human freedom."

The sun does not shine today on any man in America to whom such power should be given. The sun has never shone on any President of the United States to whom I would entrust any such power.

In connection with the pending joint resolution, there is more at stake in human freedom, in human liberty, and in free government everywhere than meets the ordinary eye. Bit by bit, our Constitution has been interpreted in such a way

that human freedom and the way of life in America, as we and our forebears have known it and loved it, are gradually being whittled away. Now the right of Congress under the Constitution to "declare war" is to be transferred to the President. The lights of the past, the wisdom of the years, the experience of our forebears, their sufferings and the sacrifices of our ancestors, must now be laid aside, forgotten, forsaken, and neglected. We shall rue the day when we grant such a power. Let us return now to responsible, representative democracy. Let us not abdicate our constitutional functions and pass even a watered-down version of the joint resolution demanded by the President. Watered-down poison is no less poisonous. Poison thus becomes slackened in its death-dealing effect, but gradually and in the end it is fatal—fatal, in this case, to the best form of government ever devised in all recorded history by the toil, sacrifice, and brain of man. I say the very foundation of free government can be destroyed unless we are willing now to return to our ancient moorings and our enduring landmarks.

The net effect of what the President said in his latest broadcast on the Middle Eastern situation is that the weak, God-fearing nations must suffer because they are vulnerable, while a strong, atheistic country, such as Russia, must be side-stepped because she is strong. What an even-handed way to administer justice. To me, that is a novel concept of morality and international justice. Can such a policy be reconciled with any law of God or man that gives hope of enduring the test of time? The President, by his latest announcement, shows that expediency, not justice, prompts his actions and motivates his joint resolution. My duty in the matter is clear. My purpose will not be diverted. I will not forsake justice. I will not pursue the easy path of expediency. I will vote my conviction that no more American blood shall be shed in a fruitless, purposeless enterprise. I will not vote to give up the constitutional right of the Congress, when necessary, to declare war.

APPOINTMENTS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LAUSCHE in the chair). The Chair has been requested by the Vice President to announce for him the following appointments:

The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR] to be a member of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, to fill the vacancy caused by the retirement from the Senate of the Honorable Walter F. George.

The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] to be a member of the District of Columbia Auditorium Commission, vice the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], resigned.

The Senator from Oregon [Mr. NEUBERGER] to be a member of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial Commission, to fill the vacancy caused by the retirement from the Senate of Hon. Herbert H. Lehman.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Gore	Morton
Allott	Green	Mundt
Anderson	Hayden	Murray
Barrett	Hennings	Neely
Beall	Hickenlooper	Neuberger
Bennett	Hill	O'Mahoney
Bible	Holland	Pastore
Blakley	Hruska	Payne
Bricker	Humphrey	Potter
Bush	Ives	Purtell
Butler	Jackson	Revercomb
Byrd	Javits	Robertson
Capehart	Jenner	Russell
Carlson	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Carroll	Johnston, S. C.	Schoeppel
Case, N. J.	Kefauver	Scott
Case, S. Dak.	Kennedy	Smathers
Chavez	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Church	Knowland	Smith, N. J.
Clark	Kuchel	Sparkman
Cooper	Lausche	Stennis
Cotton	Long	Symington
Dirksen	Magnuson	Talmadge
Douglas	Malone	Thurmond
Dworshak	Mansfield	Thye
Eastland	Martin, Iowa	Watkins
Ellender	McCarthy	Wiley
Ervin	McClellan	Williams
Flanders	McNamara	Young
Frear	Monroney	
Goldwater	Morse	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, what is the pending question before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment in the nature of a substitute, which is open to amendment.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and myself, I send forward an amendment to the committee's substitute which I ask to have stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the committee's amendment, it is proposed to insert the following:

That the United States regard as vital to the national interests and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use Armed Forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations.

Sec. 2. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably

assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.

Amend the title so as to read: "Joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East."

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I was not able to be on the floor earlier today, and I did not know whether the leadership had announced any definite time at which the Senate would adjourn this afternoon. I observe that it is now quarter to 6 o'clock. I intend to address myself to this amendment, which is in the nature of a substitute, not at any great length, but I should prefer not to do so this afternoon. I should prefer to proceed tomorrow after the conclusion of the morning business. If the leadership wishes to stay here longer this afternoon I have no alternative but to suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Georgia suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. RUSSELL. In the absence of any other procedure that might be taken at this time, Mr. President, I do suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Gore	Morton
Allott	Green	Mundt
Anderson	Hayden	Murray
Barrett	Hennings	Neely
Beall	Hickenlooper	Neuberger
Bennett	Hill	O'Mahoney
Bible	Holland	Pastore
Blakley	Hruska	Payne
Bricker	Humphrey	Potter
Bush	Ives	Purtell
Butler	Jackson	Revercomb
Byrd	Javits	Robertson
Capehart	Jenner	Russell
Carlson	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Carroll	Johnston, S. C.	Schoeppel
Case, N. J.	Kefauver	Scott
Case, S. Dak.	Kennedy	Smathers
Chavez	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Church	Knowland	Smith, N. J.
Clark	Kuchel	Sparkman
Cooper	Lausche	Stennis
Cotton	Long	Symington
Dirksen	Magnuson	Talmadge
Douglas	Malone	Thurmond
Dworshak	Mansfield	Thye
Eastland	Martin, Iowa	Watkins
Ellender	McCarthy	Wiley
Ervin	McClellan	Williams
Flanders	McNamara	Young
Frear	Monroney	
Goldwater	Morse	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, we are confronted with a very rare and unusual situation in the Senate: We have Senators who do not desire to speak and do not desire to vote. Most of the time there are plenty of Senators who wish to address the Senate.

We have had a quorum call in the hope that we could get Senators to come to the floor and express themselves on the pending joint resolution.

Mr. President, if no Senator cares to speak this evening, I am prepared to

move that, pursuant to the order previously entered, the Senate stand in adjournment until tomorrow.

Mr. President, I so move.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 6 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned, the adjournment being, under the order previously entered, until tomorrow, Wednesday, February 27, 1957, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATION

Executive nomination received by the Senate February 26, 1957:

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Olin Hatfield Chilson, of Colorado, to be Under Secretary of the Interior, vice Clarence A. Davis, resigned.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1957

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Eternal God, our Heavenly Father, we thank Thee for this new day. May we rejoice and be glad in it.

We gratefully acknowledge that always and everywhere Thou art ministering unto our many needs, sustaining and supporting us in our weakness and restraining and guiding us in our strength.

Hear us in our prayers of intercession for all who are the victims of difficult and tragic circumstances.

Help us to cultivate a nobler skill in the art of brotherly living, and may our minds and hearts sense the high value and eternal worth of all human souls.

Grant that we may hasten the coming of that glorious day of prediction when every need shall be supplied.

In Christ's name we bring our petition. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

BUILDING ON SAND

Mrs. GRANAHAH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mrs. GRANAHAH. Mr. Speaker, throughout the long period of negotiations, conferences, statements, speeches, announcements and proposed deals for achieving peace in the Middle East, many of us have been impressed by the hopelessness of building something durable on sand.

Much of our Government's approach and many of the proposals put forward by Secretary Dulles have apparently been based entirely on an assumption of good faith and an assumption of cooperation from Egypt's Nasser.

Isn't that attempting to build on sand? Hasn't the Egyptian dictator shown that any arrangement he enters into is only at best a temporary policy which he will repudiate at will?

As a very new Member of Congress, I certainly do not presume to tell the President how to run his job. I do not pretend to be a great expert in foreign policy. I am seeking to learn the duties of being a Member of Congress and I am trying hard to become familiar with the operation of our Government generally. I admit I have much to learn.

Nevertheless, I should think by now it would be obvious to anyone in our Government, and particularly anyone assigned to responsible duties in connection with foreign policy, that before attempting to settle this far-reaching crisis in the Middle East on the basis of what we hope Nasser might be willing to do, that we make sure we know his real intentions.

Much of the difficulty in getting Israel out of the areas the U. N. says Israel should evacuate is based on the plain fact that Nasser has agreed to and then repudiated a series of understandings which turned out to be insincere, or at least turned out to be misunderstandings. As long as we let policy be set that way, any peace will be built on Egyptian sand.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND EGYPT

Mr. LANE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mr. LANE. Mr. Speaker, the American conscience is uneasy, as it views our Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde foreign policy.

No word of criticism for Egypt which still stands in contempt of a U. N. resolution, but righteous indignation and threats of sanctions against Israel under similar circumstances.

How to reconcile these opposites?

It just cannot be done without treating both alike.

Is the leadership we contribute to the United Nations to be based on military assistance and economic aid, accompanied by secret diplomacy that is as variable as the wind?

This does not satisfy Americans.

Diplomats must never forget that the conduct of foreign policy cannot be alienated from public opinion here in the United States.

Our people are known for their sense of fair play.

They do not believe in the doctrine of expediency, whereby a small nation is pressed to the limit, while a larger nation, guilty of brutal aggression, goes unpunished.

The United Nations can never command the confidence and support of mankind, unless it establishes a consistent policy. And for that, in the present state of the world, it must depend upon just leadership on the part of the United States.

There must be no sanctions against Israel unless similar sanctions are invoked against Egypt, Communist Russia, and India.

Obviously all this cannot be done on the basis of votes and vetoes.

But there is another imperative at work, namely, justice.

What is the rule for them must be the rule for Israel, until such time as there is equal justice for all.

Therefore, Americans oppose sanctions against Israel.

We realize that Israel must withdraw from Egypt, but, in return, must have genuine guarantees that Egypt will not interfere with the passage of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and through the Gulf of Aqaba.

Whatever formula is negotiated to achieve these ends, as a preliminary to settlement of the tensions in this area, will be acceptable to the American people provided that no sanctions are brought to bear against Israel.

Otherwise, our Government will ignore the majority opinion of its own people, leading to a loss of confidence in its conduct of foreign policy.

There must be no sanctions against Israel.

MARY ANN BARTHOLOMAY—SHE COOKED THE BEST CHERRY PIE IN AMERICA

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased and honored to announce that America's best cherry pie baker is in Washington today. She is Mary Ann Bartholomay, of Henrietta, N. Y., a resident of my Congressional district.

After capturing State and regional awards, Mary Ann just the other day was chosen the winner of the National Cherry Pie Baking Contest in Chicago. She won out over representatives of every other State, Canada, Alaska, and Hawaii. It is a high honor, and from all reports, a well-deserved one.

Mary Ann is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Karl Bartholomay. She is 17 and a senior at Rush-Henrietta High School, where she is preparing to become a home economics major in college. Besides her cooking proclivities, she has been extremely active in 4-H work, with the Youth Fellowship and the junior board of the Henrietta Civic Center.

She is in Washington today, accompanied by Miss Jane L. Merry, 4-H Club agent for Monroe County, to present one of her famous pies to a representative of President Eisenhower. I am sure the President will be most appreciative of this tasty gift.

Mr. Speaker, Mary Ann Bartholomay proves a point I have long contended—that the best cooks in America come from the 38th Congressional District of New York. I am therefore not surprised that this award has come to a resident of that area, but I do want to extend my heartiest congratulations to this queen of cherry pies. I wish her many more years of happiness and success in cooking and in life.

I am also proud to announce that western New York's far-famed cherry indus-